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Chaptdr I 
INTRODUCTION 
The present study forms part of the work programme in the area 
of styles of development. In the course of work on a general 
simulation model designed to experiment with different possible 
development styles it became clear that employment is likely to remain 
one of the major problems facing the Latin American economy through 
the remainder of this century, if not longer. One of the major 
variables determining the magnitude of the employment problem is of 
course the size and distribution of the labour force and, behind this, 
of the population itself. Given the importance of this aspect it was 
judged advisable to develop a separate, although still quite simplified, 
population model so that different possible assumptions about population 
and labour force trends could be investigated and the results made 
available for use in the general model. 
It is these experiments with the population model which are 
reported on in the present document. In addition, a brief general 
discussion of the population situation in the region is provided to 
place the experiments in their proper perspective. In a future stage 
of the work programme the labour force estimates will be used to 
investigate the varying aspects of the problem of integrating all of 
those seeking work'into the higher productivity and higher income 
Sectors of-the economy.. 
As noted, the population experiments described _are quite simple 
in concept, do not pretend to carry the analytical. rigour required by 
professional demographers, and are,not aimed at this audience. 
Estimates of all variables were made on the basis of the best data
available at,the'time, but some of these, must be regarded as only 
very approximate. Still,. an effort has been made to deal with a 
number of the central determinants of population and the labour force, 
and although results can often net be specified with precision they 
/are likely 
are likely to be of some interest to economists and others concerned 
with the role of population and the labour force in the development 
process. 
FoUr contries were selected'for:the experiments with the aim 
of giving something of the range of variety throughout the region: 
Argentina, a highly urbanized country with a relatively low rate of 
population growth; Venezuela, a highly urbanized country with a high 
rate of population growth; Brazil, with an average degree of 
urbanization and a moderately high (and also average for the region) 
rate of population growth; and El Salvador, a country which remains 
mostly'rural and with a'high rate of population growth. 
A. General Population Trends and Structures  
Total population trends 
The simulation experiments reported on here are basically 
concerned with the 30 year period 1970-2000. This is already a 
period of such length that nearly all variables can change considerably, 
and for most purposes there is little Point in considering longer' 
intervals. Population trends however are perhaps the long-term 
variable per se. The Underlying parameters often change relatively—
slowly, and even when they do change can reqUire'a prolonged period: 
before working themselves out through the population structure. For 
this reason the aggregate population was projected first for a 
100 year period under each of two limiting hypotheses. This shows a 
limits within which population movements are likely to lie, and serves 
as a general framework within which to orient the analysis, which is 
thereafter restricted to the 1970-2000 period. 
The limiting hypotheses refer to age specific birth rates. At 
one extreme the projection shows what would occur if birth rates 
remained at about the 1970 levels. At the other extreme it is 
postulated that the age specific birth rates decline steadily and 
rapidly for 25 years, by which time'(1995) they reach a level which 
implies approximately zero population growth in a stable population, 
and then remain unchanged at that level. Both hypotheses are extreme. 
/There will 
There will almost certainly be future declines in birth rates, which 
are now often very high, in most countries; and it is most unlikely 
that within 25 years birth rates will decline to the level consistent 
with zero population growth. Nevertheless, this does set limits and 
these, particularly the lower limit, are of some importance, 
specifically when dealing with the probable size of the labour force 
during the coming decades. 
The results of these projections are presented in table 1, 
showing, for the limiting hypotheses, the rates of population increase 
and the absolute size of the population at intervals over the 100 year 
period. 
For practical purposes the information provided by the minimum 
projection is of greater interest. Although in this projection birth 
rates in all countries have already declined by the end of the century 
to a level consistent with zero growth in a stable population, the 
population is in fact still increasing at a rate of about 1.3 per cent 
per annum for the region as a whole, and at higher rates in some 
countries. Even in the year 2035, when birth rates have been at the 
zero growth level for fully 40 years, the population continues to 
increase at 0.5 per cent per annum. That is, even with this extreme 
minimum hypothesis well over half a century would pass before the 
rate of population increase declined to the present day Western 
European level. About 100 years would pass before the population 
become stable and growth actually stopped. 
During this period the size of the population would expand 
substantially. Even with the very rapid decline in birth rates assumed, 
the population of countries such as El Salvador or Venezuela doubles 
by the end of the century; the population of Brazil will exceed 
175 million at the end of the century, and that of the region as a 
whole will be well above 500 million. When stability is eventually 
reached a' small country such as El Salvador would have a population 
of well over 10 million, Venezuela over 35 million, similar to that 
of Argentina, Brazil about 265 million (similar to the 1970 population 
of the region as a whole), and the population of all of Latin America 
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/The practical 
The practical importance of this projection is that it shows 
quite clearly that the concept of Latin America as an under populated 
region, with abundant land and other resources in relation to its 
population, is only a transitory phenomenon. Even with an extreme 
hypothesis regarding the decline in birth rates the population of 
the region will continue to grow rapidly for a prolonged period, and 
when it stabilizes will be nearly triplet the 1970 population. The 
phenomenon of under population and relatively abundant resources will 
have passed in most countries in less than 50 years time. 
Long term planning in the region will have to be oriented more 
in this direction. Land and other resources will become increasingly 
scarce - a minimum of around 800 million people will have to be 
provided for - and increasing attention will have to be given to the 
husbanding of these resources. This is likely to have major 
implications for a wide range of problems: patterns of urbanization 
and land settlement, natural resource extraction rates and export 
policy, agricultural development programmes, etc. It should be 
emphasized that no programme of family planning, or autonomous change, 
can reasonably be expected to change this situation. The projection 
is a minimum one, assuming a sharp and rapid decline in birth rates, 
and the real question is likely to be how far above this minimum the 
actual trend will lie. 
The maximum projection is of interest less as a real possibility 
than as an illustration of the implausibility of things remaining as 
they are for a long period. If birth rates were to remain at their 
1970 level the population of the region would surpass 700 million at 
the end of the century. This is 35 per cent more than with the 
minimum hypothesis, but is still not an impossible difference, and 
again indicates the very long term and slowly ,  changing nature of 
population trends. Even with extreme hypotheses the results differ 
only moderately at first; it is only after several decades that the 
divergence begins to be striking and to finally reach enormous 
proportions. Should birth rates continue at the 1970 level for 
100 years (with death rates unchanging at the levels expected in the 
/year 2000) 
6 
year 2000) the population of a small country such as El Salvador 
would increase to over 150 million people, Brazil would'haVe a 
population of over 2 billion, and tlie region as a whole would have a 
population of over 6 billion'- half again as large as the present 
population of the entire world. Such magnitudes boggle the imagination. 
The question is not whether this will happen, but rather how and how 
soon changes will occur which will bring population growth of more 
manageable proportions. 
A4e structures at the national level  
To return to the minimum projection, it is of interest to note 
not only the changes in the totals, but also the shifts in the age 
structure which occur. As was noted above, the population continues 
to increase fairly rapidly:for some time after birth rates have 
declined to the zero growth level (in a stable population) and this-
is due to the age structure. The-age structure also has major 
implications for the size: and rate.ofgrowth of the labour force, the 
size of the_dependent population, educational requirements, etc. 
The youthful nature of the Latin American population has been 
widely commented on, but some of the implications are probably less.- 
generally known among non-specialistsl -particularly when these refer 
to-changes over time; and they are of-considerable importance. The 
major factor determining the age structure, as well as the-total rate 
of increase, is the birth rate; but death rates can also have an 
important influence and the impact of the two underlying vital rates 
tends to be of a similar sort.,  
Birth rates obviously determine the size of the infant population, 
and changes in birth rates affect the relative size of this group and 
hence the age structure... Less obviously, a large proportion of total 
deaths also occur amongthe very young. In the late 1960s 40 per cent 
or more of all deaths in the region probably occurred among those less 
/than 5 
than 5 years of agell/ and the percentage was probably even higher 
in earlier years. The bulk of these child deaths, in turn, occurs 
among infants of less than one year. This situation is a reflection 
both of the age structure of the population, and of the high child 
mortality rates which are often encounteredl .especially before death 
rates begin to fall substantially. 
So changes in mortality rates tend to, have a concentrated impact 
on the -Very young, and to affect the age structure in a way similar to 
the effect of changes in the birth rate. In either case it is first 
the size, and hence relative importance, of the youngest age group 
which is affected. With time this initial impact then works its way 
through the age structure in a wave like fashion. 
It is useful to illustrate the variations which these kinds of 
influences have already produced in the region, and the extremes 
possible with the limiting hypotheses of the projections. Table 2 
shows the age structures in the four countries dealt with in the 
projections. 
In Argentina both birth and death rates have for some time been 
lower than in most of the region and this has already resulted in a 
distinctly different age structure. Structures in the other countries 
shown, while varying somewhat, are more similar. The differences are 
concentrated at the two ends of the age structure. Children (those 
less than 15 years of age) are a markedly smaller proportion of the 
population in Argentina, 29.1 per cent of the total. At the other end 
of the range children account for 47.5 per cent of the population of 
El Salvador. Adolescents and young adults (the 15-39 age groups) 
account for surprisingly similar proportions of the population, and 
the compensating differences are concentrated in the older age groups. 
In Argentina 33.4 per cent of the population is 40 or more years of 
age while in El Salvador the corresponding figure is only 16.9 per cent. 
There is considerable variation among countries. In Uruguay and 
Argentina the figure was only about 15 per cent, while in a few 
countries it was over 50 per cent. There was some concentration 
around 45 per cent, however, and this included several of the 
most populous countries. For comparison it may be noted that 
the figure in Canada and the United States was approximately 














Argentina Brazil Venezuela El Salvador 
0- 4 10.0 16.3 17.3 18.5 7.1 
5-14 19.1 26.4 29.5 29.0 13.9 
15-19 9.0 10.8 10.8 10.3 6.8 
20-39 28.6 27.2 24.8 25.3 26.8 
40-65 26.2 16.3 14.7 13.8 30.0 
65 and 
over 7.2 3.0 2.9 3.1 15.4 
The figures show the percentage of the total population of the 
country included in each age group. 
The minimum projection eventually results in an approximately 
stable population in each country and the age distribution is 
essentially the same in each case. 
/The projections 
-9 
The projections using the maximum hypothesis (unchanging age 
specific birth rates) yield age structures in 2070 similar to those 
of 1970 in the respective countries, and are not reproduced in the 
table. The projections with the minimum hypothesis of eventual zero 
population growth result in a quite different age structure however 
- essentially the same for each country - and this is shown in the 
table. The differences are of the same sort which already occur 
between the different countries in 1970, but more marked. Children 
plus adolescents account for only about 28 per cent of the total in 
a stable population, young adults about 27 percent, and the older 
age groups -about 45 per cent. To take the most extreme comparison, 
in El Salvador children and adolescents would decline from 58 per 
cent of the population in 1970 to 28 per cent, while those 40 or 
more years of age would increase from 17 per cent to 45 per cent of,  
the population; the percentage of young adults would not change much. 
These different age structures have numerous important 
implications. The dependent population (those under 15 and over 65) 
represented only 36.3 per cent of the population in Argentina in 
1970 whereas the proportion ranged up to 50.6 per cent.in El Salvador. 
Even with similar productivity levels per member of the, working 
population this would mean that per capita incomes would be higher 
in Argentina. Also, the school age population is relatively much 
smaller in Argentina and so educational costs less demanding. In 
an eventually stable population the dependent population would be 
of the same relative importance as in Argentina in 1970, but the 
composition would be quite different: there would be relatively 
fewer children and more retired persons, with consequent social and 
economic implications. 
The most active working age population was approximately evenly 
split between the younger and older age groups in Argentina in 1970, 
whereas in El Salvador the younger group outnumbered the older 
nearly two to one. Thus in Argentina the proportion of experienced 
workers was much greater than in the other three countries, with 
/the various 
- 10- 
the various consequences which this might bring.'" Again the age 
structure in 'a stable population is in this respect more similar to 
the 1970 situation in Argentina - but with a significant further 
shift toward the 'older and more experienced part of the working age 
population: 
Reflection will bring to mind other implications of the 
differences in age structures shown, varying according to one's 
principal interests. 
The 1970 age structure shown in table 2 are already the result 
of changes over time in the different countries, and as these changes 
have important implications for parts of the following discussion 
they too need to be noted. The type and extent of change which has 
occurred in recent decades can be illustrated with the figures for 
Venezuela shown in table 3. 
As shown, the relative size of the child population has 
increased substantially in recent decades: from 41 per cent of the 
total in 1936 to 46.8 per cent in 1970, with most of the increase 
occurring in the single decade of the 1950s. This again illustrates 
how the initial impact of changes in the underlying vital statistics 
tends to be concentrated on the youngest age group. There was some 
increase in birth rates, probably the result of improved health 
conditions, but the decline in mortality rates seems to have been 
more important, and this too had its most concentrated effect on the 
very young. 
As is shown later in the more specific country analyses, the 
age structure of the labour force itself varies from the age 
structure of the population due to differing labour participation 
rates. The date therefore provide only an approximate idea of 
the labour force distribution. 
/Table 3 
Table 3 
VENEZUELA: AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION IN 
RECENT DECADES a/ 
Age group 1936 1941 1950 1960 1970 
0- 4 15.0 15.8 17.6 19.2 17.3 
5-14 26.0 2566 24.E 26.8 29.5 
15-19 10.4 10.4 9.9 9.1 10.8 
20-39 30.0 29.4 29.1 27.4 24.8 
40-65 15.4 15.3 15.2 14.8 14.7 
65 and over 3.2 3.4 3.4 2.6 2.9 
2./ 	The 1950 to 1970, ,figures are from CELADE. The 1936 and 1941 
figures are census figures approximately adjusted so'as 
be directly comparable to the CELADE figures.'- 
It is first the infant population (those less than 5 years .of 
age) which begins to increase in relative importance.- during the 
1940s and 1950s this group grew sharply in relative size. Then in 
the mid-1960s birth rates began to decline 'and so the relative 
importance of the infant population in 1970 fell from its earlier 
peak, and the surge of the 1940s and 1950s was beginning to work 
its way through the age structure. During the 1950s and 19606 the 
5-14 year group increased sharply 4n relative importance, and in 
the 1960s the adolescent population was similarly affected. But 
the surge has only begun to.enter the adult population and so these 
groups have continued to decline in relative importance. 
Again there are numerous implications which follow from these 
changes.. In the 1950s and 1960s the rapidly rising elementary 
school population can be expected_tc'have exerted increasing pressure 
onthe educational system. In the 1960s this pressure will have 
spread to the secondary and university level. 
/Of the 
- 12 - 
Of the impacts only just beginning one is of particular 
importance from the present point of view. The surge is only 
beginning to enter the age groups which make up the labour force. 
In the,1960s the number of new entrants to the labour force can be 
expected to have increased sharply, with'consequent pressures for 
additional employment, and this pressure can beexpected to continue 
for some years to come. 
A second consequence which can be noted is that the surge is 
also just beginning to enter the child bearing age groups, and this 
will have an important impact on total births in coming years, quite 
apart from the trend in age specific birth rates. 
This sequence shown for Venezuela can be regarded as fairly 
normal, although the changes are sharper than those which have 
occurred in some countries. First an improvement in health conditions 
leads to a sharp increase in the size of the infant population, 
largely as a result of the fall in infant mortality rates but also 
to some extent through a possible rise in birth rates. This surge 
will then begin to work its way through the age structure.' Finally, 
at some point birth rates may decline and counteract this tendency 
toward increase. 
In most of Latin America the substantial decline in death 
rates appears to have begun in the 1940s, while trends in birth rates 
have been more varied. Of the countries considered here, birth rates 
in Argentina seem always to have been lower than in most countries, 
and have been declining gradually for some time. In Brazil birth 
rates have also been somewhat lower than in a number of countries 
- although well above the Argentina level - and there was a slight 
decline during the 1950s and 1960s. In Venezuela birth rates have 
been at a high level and began to decline significantly only in the 
mid-1960s. In El Salvador they have also been high and through 
1970 had not shown a marked tendency to decline. 
The tendency for a substantial decline in mortality rates to 
occur well ahead of any compensating change in fertility rates also 
results in a speeding up of the rate of population growth, a fact 
/that has 
- 13 - 
ihat'hasbeen more widely commented on. But it is worth repeating 
the l'igures for the region as a whole to emphasize the magnitude of 
the change. In recent decades, the average annual rates of 
population growth in Latin America were as follows: 
1920-1930 	1.9 per cent 
1930.4940 1.9 per cent 
1940-1950 	2.4 per cent 
1950-1960 2.8 per cent 
1960-1970 	2.8 per cent 
As observed above it is in the 1940s that falling mortality rates 
introduced a sharp change, and this continued apace through the 
1950s. In those two decades the annual rate of population increase 
rose by nearly half. The 1960s was a period of transition: the rate 
of increase was stabilized at a high level - a result of offsetting 
trends in different countries. The current expectation is for a 
decline, due to falling birth rates; but it is not expected that, 
for the region as a whole, the rates of population growth of the 
1920s and 1930s will again prevail in this century. 
Labour force trends  
It is very important to keep in mind that due to the changes 
which brought it about this speeding up of,the rate of population 
increase has been accompanied by a shift in the age structure of 
the population. To date this has meant primarily an increase in the 
number of children and adolescents, but in coming years this surge 
will work its way through the rest of the age structure. There is 
one aspect of this which is of special interest here and needs to be 
made explicit: the implications for the labour force and so for 
employment prospects. 
/Table 4 
' Table 4 shows, for each of the four.countriesconsidered, how 
fast a hypothetical labour force has grown since 1950, and how fast 
it might increase in the future. The labour force is hypothetical 
as it assumes there is no change in labour participation rates. The 
figures thus illustrate how population growth and changes in the age 
structure alone affect the labour force.2j To 1970 the population 
figures are those of CELADE. From 1970 on they are the figures which 
result from the minimum projection, which assumes that birth rates 
decline to the eventual zero growth level in 1995. This minimum 
projection is of greater interest as it shows the lowest rate of 
increase in the labour force which must be anticipated - and as can 
be seen even this rate will remain high for some time. 
The figures in table 4 give, again, a rather different picture 
for Argentina than for the other countries considered. At the 
beginning of the period shown the labour force was already growing 
less rapidly in: Argentina than elsewhere, and this divergence became 
steadily greater through the 1950s and the 1960s. Whereas in 
Argentina the rate of increase decline& from the level of the early 
1950s, in the other countries it increased substantially. 
The problem of employment has not been of the same serious 
nature in Argentina as in some countries of the region - despite the 
fact that the rate of economic growth during the 1950s and 1960s was 
relatively low, and that the population was very largely urban so 
that employment'problems tend to be more conspicuous. A major 
element keeping the employment problem under reasonable control in 
these circumstances was undoubtedly this tendency for the labour 
force to increase at a more moderate rate. If the trend in Argentina 
had been similar to that of the other countries shown the situation 
would have been much more serious. 
1/ Possible effects of changes in labour participation rates are 
considered in the simulation experiments discussed later; but 
it is first useful to emphasize the tendency of basic 
underlying population changes. 
/Table If 
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Table 4 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: HYPOTHETICAL ANNUAL RATES OF 
INCREASE IN THE LABOUR FORCE a/ 
Argentina Brazil Venezuela El Salvador 
1950-1955 1.7 2.7 2.5 2.2 
1955-1960 1.5 2.7 2.8 2.4 
1960-1965 1.4 2.9 3.2 2.8 
1965-1970 1.4 3.1 3.5 3.1 
1970-1975 1.4 3.1 3.8 3.6 
1975-1980 1.2 3.0 3.7 3.6 
1980-1985 1.1 2.9 3.4 3.4 
1985-1990 1.0 2.7 3.1 3.1 
1990-1995 1.0 2.5 2.9 2.9 
1995-2000 0.9 2.2 2.7 2.6 
2010-2015 0.4 1.1 1.3 1.2 
2030-2035 0.1,  0.5 0.6 0.6 
2065-2070 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
The rates of increase shown are those_which would result if 
no changes in labour participation rates occurred. A fixed 
set of labour participation rates by age group - the ILO 
estimates for 1960 for each country - are applied to the 
population figures for each year. Through 1970 the population 
figures are the'CELADE estimates. After 1970 they are the 
figures which result from the minimum hypothesis projections:. 
In both cases they exclude international migration. 
/But Argentina 
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But Argentina is an exception, and the other countries are 
more typical of what has occurred in the region as a whole. There 
are two aspects of the labour force trends in these countries which 
are of particular interest here. First, there has been a steady 
rise in the rate of increase in the labour force over the past two 
decades. The rise was sharper in Venezuela and El Salvador than in 
Brazil, but it was substantial in each country. Further, the rates 
of increase in the early 1950s were no doubt already well above those 
of earlier decades. This speeding up of the growth of the labour 
force reflects, with some lag, changes in population growth rates. 
As discussed earlier, the substantial decline in death rates, with 
its impact on population growth, generally began around 1940, and 
can be expected to have begun to be more fully reflected in labour 
force changes toward the end of the 1940s. During the decades of 
the 1920s and 1930s this hypothetical labour force was probably 
increasing at only slightly over 2 per cent per annum in Brazil and 
Venezuela and at less than 2 per cent per annum in El Salvador. 
This substantial speeding up in the growth of the labour 
force in recent decades - from around 2 per cent to 3 per cent or 
more per annum in most countries - has undoubtedly been a major 
factor behind the increasing awareness of the lack of adequate 
employment opportunities. This factor alone could often create 
difficulties: an economic structure capable of absorbing an annual 
2 per cent increase in the labour force could become increasingly 
inadequate in this respect as the annual increments rose to half 
again that level. There are of course other important factors: 
increasing urbanization, so that employment problems become more 
visible; changes in the industrial structure toward more capital 
intensive and labour saving techniques; etc. But it is important 
to keep in mind that the basic underlying population variables have 
changed in such a way as to themselves make the employment problem 
substantially more difficult to deal with in recent years. 
/The second 
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The second aspect of these labour force trends which is 
important here is that this pressure can be expected to continue 
for some time, and even on occasion to increase further - during the 
1970s and 1980s. As shown in table 4, with the assumptions used 
the rate of increase in the labour force reaches a peak in Brazil 
in the last half of the 1960s and the.first half.of the 1970s; while 
in Venezuela and. El .Salvador the peak - in each case considerably 
higher than in Brazil - is reached only,during the decade of the 
1970s. 
From_the 1980s,on the rates of increase gradually decline, but 
it will be recalled that this is on the basis of ,a projection which 
assumes a rapid fall in birthrates - to an eventually zero growth 
level in 1995. Even with : this extreme hypothesis the labour force 
will continue to grow rapidly through the 1970s and 1980s; and at 
the end of the century the rate of increase is still 2.8 per cent 
and 2.6 per cent per,  annum in Venezuela and El Salvador respectively, 
and only in Brazil hap fallen back to..2.2 per cent. In absolute 
terms the numbers continue to rise well after the rate of increase 
has begun to decline. In Venezuela the absolute increase in the 
labour force toward the end of the century would be about double 
the yearly increase registered in the late 1960s; and even in 
Brazil the number to be absorbed each year would be nearly two-thirds 
larger. It is only well into the next century that the groWth of 
the labour force (as here defined) begins to slow to the levels 
which now commonly prevail in the advanced industrial countries, 
and that the absolute numbers to be absorbed begin to decline. 
Even with extreme hypotheses then the underlying population 
characteristics rensure that the labour force will continue to grow 
rapidly in most of the region through the rest of this century. In , 
many countries this growth will actually speed up in the years 
immediately ahead. Employment policies must therefore be framed 
to deal with employment pressures about as great as those which 
have been experienced in recent years, and with the expectation that 
the situation in the 1970s and early 1980s is likely to be especially 
/serious in 
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serious in this respect. To the extent that birth rates decline 
less rapidly than in this extreme hypothesis the period of maximum 
pressure will extend further into the future. 
There is one qualification to this picture which needs to be 
mentioned here, even though it can only be adequately treated later 
with the aid of the simulation experiments. It is the urban 
employment situation which is usually of greatest concern to policy 
makers, and rural-urban migration can cause the rate of increase in 
the urban labour force to vary greatly, independently of the trend 
forthe labour force as a whole. 
Table 5 shows rates of growth of the urban population in recent 
decades, from which it can be presumed that the urban labour force 
in each of these countries has increased much faster than the figures 
shown in table 4. In Venezuela and Brazil in particular the urban 
labour force has grown very rapidly during the post-World War II 
period. 
Both recent and future trends depend heavily on how far 
urbanization has gone and how fast it is progressing. In a country 
such as Venezuela, where urbanization has been rapid and has gone 
relatively far (only about one-fifth of the population is still 
rural), this has meant both a period of extremely rapid growth in 
the urban labour force and the probability that future increases 
will be more moderate; already in the 1960s the rate of increase in 
the urban population, although still nearly 5 per cent per annum, 
was well below that of the preceding two decades. In . a country such 
as El Salvador, by contrast, the bulk of the population is still 
rural, and the possibility of a speeding up of migration and a 
consequent much faster growth of the urban labour force remains in 
the future. 
As noted this aspect is discussed more fully in the context of 
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Table 5 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: INTERCENSAL RATES 























0 • 0 
1936-1941 2.7 1.2 5.3 3.8 6.5 
1941-195o 3.o (-) 	o.i. 67 7.4 7.8 
1950-1961 4.0 0.5 6.3 6.3 6.6 
1961-1971 , 3.4 (-) 	0.5 4.9 ... 
Brazil 
1940-1950 2.3 1.6 3.9 4.8 4.6 
1950-1960 3.0 1.3 5.5 6.2 4.3 












1961-1971 3.5 3.3 • 3.8 • • • • •• 
Urban population as defined in census data._ This includes smaller 
cities not shown in either of the following two columns. 
The rates of growth in these columns refer to a fixed list of cities, 
with the composition of the list determined by the population in 
1960. The rates of growth are therefore not effected by cities 
shifting from one category to another as the population increases. 
The data are from CELADE, lioletIn Demo rfificol Ano IV, NQ 9. 
/Urban7Rural- 
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Urban-rural and regional differences  
The discussion up to this point has concentrated on population 
characteristics at the national level, with some•reTerences to trends 
in Latin America as a whole. There are often, however, important 
differences within individual countries, and these are not only of 
interest in themselves, but are also important factors in determining 
trends at the national level. One of the important reasons for 
undertaking the simulation experiments discussed later was precisely 
to try to take into account these differences and to appraise their 
impact on the national aggregates. These urban-rural, and on 
occasion regional, differences are therefore discussed in more 
detail later; but it is useful here to point out several of the main 
features. 
First, there is the widely noted fact that the urban population 
is generally increasing much faster than the rural population. 
Trends in the countries being considered are shown in table 5. In 
both Argentina and Venezuela migration to the cities has for some 
time more than offset the natural increase in the rural population: 
in Argentina the absolute size of the rural population has declined 
substantially since the mid-1940s and in Venezuela there has been a 
small net decline since 1941. In Brazil the rural population has 
continued to increase, at least through 1970, but the rate of 
increase since 1940 has been falling steadily and is ever further 
below the national average. Only in El Salvador is the situation 
somewhat different. In that country the rural population has grown 
faster in recent decades, in line with the rising rate of total 
population increase, and even grew somewhat faster than the urban 
population until around 1950. 
With this single exception the urban population in each country, 
and in all recent intercensal periods, increased at a faster rate 
than the rural population. In El Salvador the difference is modest, 
but in the other three countries it is striking. At the extreme, in 
Venezuela the urban population increased throughout the 1940s and 
1950s at an average rate of about 6 1/2 per cent per annum. 
/Table 5 
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Table 5 also shows the rates of population increase in the 
larger cities in the different countries, an aspect which has also 
received considerable attention. As can be seen, the expansion of 
these larger cities is often, but not always, even faster than that 
of the urban. population,as a whole. 
As was discussed earlier, at the national level there is 
substantial variation in the age structures of the different 
cbuntriest'and within a particular country somewhat similar variations 
can be observed between the urban and rural populations and on 
occasion on'a regional basis. Table 6 shows the urban and rural age 
structures in each of the four countries. Table 7 shows the same, 
data in a somewhat different form: how each age group is divided 
between the urban and rural areas. 
The differences in age structure are quite consistent, and 
often substantial. The percentage of children (up to 15 years of 
age):is in. each., 	a much larger proportion of the rural than 
of the urban population, the difference:ranging from 11 percentage 
points in Argentina down to 5 in Venezuela. This gap may well 
widen for some time in some countries, primarily because the 
decline in birth rates, and the consequent reduction in the relative 
importance of the youngest age groups, tends to occur first in the 
urban areas. 
The 15-19 age group is where the transition occurs. In 
Argentina this group, like children, is a smaller proportion of the 
urban than of the rural population; in the other countries it is 





SELECTED COUNTRIES: PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION, BY AGE 




Argentina Brazil Venezuela.  El Salvador 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban RUral • Urban Rural 
o- 4 ) 13.1 17.1 17.3 19.9 15.6 18.1 
5-14 ) 27.8 38.8 25.6 29.2 26.2 29.6 25.7 28.8 
15-19 8.o 9.6 11.1 10.9 9.3 8.5 10.0 9.4 
20-39 31.5 27.3 29.1 25.4 29.6' 23.9 28.1 26.2 
4o-64 26.3 19.8 17.5 14.6 14.9 15.3 16.6 14.7 
65 and over 6.4 4.5 3.5 2.7 2.5 2.7 4.o 2.8 
The calculations are based on the latest available census data. This 






SELECTED COUNTRIES: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF EACH 
AGE GROUP 2/ BETWEEN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS 
Age 
group 
Argentina Brazil Venezuela El Salvador 
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urbah' Rural  Urban Rural 
0- 4 	) 66.8 33.2 49.4 50.6 59.1 40.9 35.0 65.0 
5-14 52.7 47.3 59.6 40.4 35.9 64.1 
15-19 70.2 29.8 56.3 43.7 64.4 35.6 39.9 60.1 
20-39 76.4 23.6 59.3 40.7 67.6 32.4 40.2 59.8 
40-64 78.9 21.1 60.3 39.7. 61.9 38.1 41.4 58.6 
65 + 79.8 20.2 62.2 37.8 61.2 38.8 46.6 53.4 
Tot. pop. 73.8 26.2 55.9 44.1 62.5 37.5 38.5 61.5 
Calculations are based on the same4ata used for table 6. 
/The adult 
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The adult population as a whole - those 20 or more years of 
age - is the counterpart of the child population and is a more 
important part of the urban population in each country, although 
there is a good deal of variation within this total. In Argentina it 
is the older half of the adult population which is of strikingly 
greater relative importance in the cities; in Brazil and El Salvador 
all of the adult population is uniformally, if more modesty, of 
greater relative importance in the cities; and in Venezuela the 
young adults are of much greater relative importance while the 
older half of the adult population is actually a slightly smaller 
proportion of the total in the urban areas. These variations reflect 
the shifting importance of the two principal factors underlying these 
differences in age structure: birth rates and the importance of 
migration. In Venezuela, for example, migration was very substantial 
during the 1940s and 1950s, and since it is primarily the young who 
migrate this resulted in an unusually large concentration of young 
adults in the urban areas. 
There are also important differences from one country to another. 
Although there are consistent differences between the rural and urban 
age structures within each country, not all urban (or rural) age 
structures are alike; in particular, the rural age structure in 
Argentina is more similar to the urban than to the rural structures 
in the other countries. Further, when seen in this cross classified 
way the range is very great. The relative importance of children, 
for example, varies from less than 28 per cent of the urban 
population in Argentina to nearly half the rural population in 
Venezuela. Other differences can be seen by examining the data 
shown in table 6. 
Table 7 shows the same data organized somewhat differently: the 
percentage of each age group which lives in the urban and rural areas 
of the country. The youngest age group is always of greatest relative 
importance in the rural areas (and least important in the cities). 
In Venezuela the rural percentage falls steadily through the young 
/adult group 
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adult group and then rises again for the older adult population. 
In the other three countries the rural percentage continues-to fall 
steadily throughout the age structure. 
These different age structures tend to aggravate one of the 
_major economic problems in .the region, the much-lowerproductivity 
and income levels in the rural areas. Since the dependent population 
is everywhere a substantially higher proportion of the total in the 
rural areas this pulls per -capita incomes even further below urban 
levels than would anyway occur because of the lower productivity per 
worker. In addition, children comprise the great bulk of this 
dependent population and this aggravates the educational problem. 
Children, relative to the rest of the population, are concentrated 
in the rural areas, where adequate educational facilities are in any 
case more difficult to provide and where low incomes limit the local 
.contribution.. 
This population structure is likely to be an important aspect 
of the difficulties of the rural areas: except for Argentina, only 
about half of the rural poiulation is in the active age groups, even 
if these are stretched to include all those from 15 to 65 years of 
age. 
It is also worth noting that women appear to migrate to the 
cities in significantly greater numbers than men, perhaps reflecting 
the type of employment most easily found in the urban areas - domestic 
and other low income service positions commonly filled by women are 
probably more readily available. For the different countries 
table 8 shows the proportion of women and of men, in each age group, 
which live in the urban areas. The proportions are essentially the 
same for the 0-4 age group, reflecting birth patterns, but thereafter 
a consistently higher proportion of the female population is found 
in the cities. 
/Table 8 
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Table 8 
SELECTED COUNTRIES: PROPORTIONS LIVING IN URBAN AREAS, 
BY SEX AND AGE GROUP 1 
Age 
group 
Argentina Brazil Venezuela El Salvador 
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females 
0- If 49.3 49.3 59.o 59.o 34.9 35.1 
5-14 66.2 67.3 52.1 53.3 58.4 60.7 35.3 36.6 
15-19 67.4 72.9 53.9 58.4 62.1 67.o 37.5 42.2 
2o-39 74.6 78.3 57.5 61.o 67.6 67.5 37.8 42.6 
4o-64 76.4 81.5 57.7 62.9 59.5 64.4 37.4 45.3 
65 + 76.4 82.9 57.7 65.9 53.4 66.4 39.0 51.3 
A/ For each country the figures show the percentage of the male (or 
female) population of any given age group which lives in the urban 
areas. 	For example, in Argentina 66.2 per cent of all males in the 
0-14 age groups live in the cities; the remaining 33.8 per cent (a 
figure not shown in the table) live in the rural areas. 
/Similar differences 
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Similar differences in the age structure may also occur between 
different regions within a country; a situation which can be 
illustrated with data from Brazil. Table 9 shows the age structure 
in the state of Sao Paulo, a high income area, and in the Northeast 
region, a low income area; in both areas urban and rural age 
structures are shown separately so that the urban-rural and regional 
influences are not mixed. Table 10 again shows the same information 
in different form: for each age group the proportion of the nationwide 
total living in the different zones. 
The figures in table 9 show the now familiar and consistent 
sort of variation. At one extreme is the age structure in the urban 
areas of Sao Paulo, with a relatively small proportion of children 
and with a large proportion of the population in the active age 
groups - and comparison with the figures in table 6 shows that this 
is a shift of that sort also by comparison with the- figures for the 
urban areas of Brazil as a whole. The rural areas of Sao Paulo have 
an age structure very similar to that of the cities of the Northeast, 
an intermediate situation. And at the other extreme is the age 
structure of the rural Northeast, with a large dependent population 
and a much smaller proportion in the active age groups. 
Table 10 shows the cities of Sao Paulo to have only 12 per cent 
of the infant population of the country to care for (those less than 
5 years of age), but close to 18 per cent of the most active age 
groups (those 20-64) to provide income. The rural areas of the 
Northeast have 21 per cent of the infant population but only 16 per 
cent of the major income earning groups. 
The consequences of such differences are similar to those which 




BRAZIL: AGE COMPOSITION OF THE URBAN AND RURAL 
POPULATIONS IN SAO PAULO AND IN 
THE NORTHEAST, 1970 2/ 
Age group 
State of Sao Paulo Northeast Region 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
07  4 11.6 15.1 15.6 17.7 
5-14 23.6 28.2 27.5 29.1 
15-19. 10.4 11.0 11.4 10.7 
20-39 31.4 26.9 26.5 24.6 
4P-64 19.3 16.1 15.7 14.8 
65 and over 3.8 2.7 3.3 3.1 




BRAZIL: PERCENTAGE OF NATIONAL POPULATION IN SELECTED 
AREAS, BY AGE GROUP 62/ 
ANNIMINNY.,11■11100•••.•••=i 
Age group 
State of Sao Paulo Northeast Region 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
0- 4 11.9 3.8 13.2 20.9 
5-14 13.3 3.9 12.7 18.8 
15-19 14.5 3.7 13.0 17.0 
20-39 17.5 3.7 12.2 15.7 
40-64 18.2 3.7 12.2 16.0 
65 and over 18.5 3.2 13.3 17.2 
a/ 	The figures show the percentage of the population of any age 
group living in the designated area. For example, 11.9 per 
cent of those less than5 years of age in Brazil live in the 
cities in the state of Sao Paulo. The percentages across do 
not sum to 100 as major areas of Brazil are not included in 
the table. Calculations are from the data of table 9.. 
/B. The 
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B. The Simulation Experiments 
The simulation experiments are designed to provide detailed 
projections, to the year 2000, of population and labour force trends 
in the selected countries. They are of course not predictions, but 
rather calculations of what will occur given specified assumptions 
about the variables which determine the model. The principal 
variables involved are birth and death rates to calculate population 
trends, and then labour force participation rates to derive the labour 
force. Each of these variables is specified by sex and by 5 year age 
groups. In addition, one of the central aims of the simulation 
experiments is to calculate the effect of urban-rural and regional 
differences, so each of these variables is given a set of values for 
each of the regions considered, and within each region for the urban 
and the rural areas. This makes necessary the consideration of 
internal migration, and so migration rates are another central 
variable; again these are specified by sex and by 5 year age group. 
For Venezuela and El Salvador the experiments distinguish only the 
urban and the rural areas, but for Argentina and Brazil regional 
divisions are also taken into account. 
The first step was to estimate all of these values for the base 
year, 1970.1/ The CELADE estimates of population, by 5 year age 
groups, and of age specific birth and death rates, provided figures 
at the national level for each country. Then, with the use of census 
data, estimates were made of urban-rural and, where used, regional 
differences for each of the variables in the model. Values, by sex 
and 5 year age group, were calculated for each region and/or the 
urban and rural areas so that they were consistent with the CELADE 
aggregate estimates for the country. Labour force participation 
rates and the age structure of internal migration were estimated on 
the basis of census data alone. 
1/ For Venezuela and El Salvador detailed data from the 1970 censuses 
were not yet available so estimates were originally made for 
1960 and then calculations were made to reproduce the 1970 
situation insofar as this was known. 
/Starting with 
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Starting with these base year estimates, the simulation 
experiments calculate trends to the year 2000 with a given set of 
assumptions as to how the values of the underlying variables will 
change during that period. Five different simulation experiments 
were run for each country. Some of the more specific assumptions 
made for the individual countries are discussed later, but the 
experiments were designed to have a common pattern for each country, 
and their general nature can be given here 
The first experiment assumes relatively little change from the 
1970 situation. Fertility rates decline only moderately, there is 
relatively little internal migration, and labour force participation 
rates remain nearly unchanged. Changes are generally of similar 
magnitude in different areas of the country; that is, there are no 
important relative shifts between different regions and/or the 
urban-rural areas. 
The seCond'experiment postulates very:rgreat changes, within a 
context of economic and social change which is largely concentrated 
on the more modern areas. In this context the variables are changed 
mostly in the'more advanced regions.and/or.in the urban areas. 
Substantial internal migration is postulated, toward the more 
developed regions and/or toward the cities; urban fertility rates. 
decline sharply - at least in the more developed:regions to around 
the zero growth rate in a stable population; urban labour force 
participation rates shift to about'the present European values 
(the 1968 French rates). The changes in the less developed regions 
and/or the rural areas are not as sharp, but are still more 
subStantial than those postulated in the first.experiment. 
- The third experiment again assumes.thatchanges are concentrated 
on the more modern areas, but the changesin these areas, while 
still substantial, are not as great as in the second experiment. 
The changes in the less developed regions and/or the rural areas 
are similar to those: postulated in the second experiment. 
The fourth experiment assumes a different type of economic and 
social change: one concentrated largely on the less modern areas. 
/There is 
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There is less migration here than in any of the other experiments, 
and a larger proportion of the population remains in the less 
developed regions and/or the rural areas. And it is primarily the 
variables in these areas which are changed: fertility rates dedline 
substantially, and move nuchcloser to those in the more developed 
regions. and/or the urban areas; labour force participation rates 
shift approximately to the present structure in the more developed 
regions and/or the cities. In the context of this experiment, more 
moderate changes are projected for the more developed regions and/or 
the urban areas. 
Finally, the fifth experiment assumes a more balanced change, 
spread through the more modern and the less modern areas. The 
population structure toward the, end of the century, as between the 
different regions and the urban-rural areas, is intermediate between 
those projected in the third and in the fourth experiments; and 
the values assigned to the different coefficients are also intermediate 
between those used in these two experiments. 
The values assigned to mortality rates have not been mentioned 
in this description of the simulation experiments. This simplified 
the discussion, and was done because mortality rates have less 
differential impact in the calculations than the other variables. 
In the CELADE population projections four alternative, possibilities 
are normally presented. Each of the four postulates a different 
rate of decline in birth rates, but as there is less uncertainty 
about mortality trends the same mortality rates are used in each 
of the four projections. A similar procedure has been followed in 
the simulation experiments. Mortality rates are often different 
in different areas of the country, and these differences have been 
estimated for the base year, 1970. The CELADE projections to the 
end of the century are then used as the guideline. In the first 
three simulation experiments it is assumed that mortality rates in 
the different areas all decline in line with the CELADE projecticins; 
that is, the structure of relative mortality rates in different areas 
does not 
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does not change. In the fourth experiment it is assumed that, as 
part of the concentration on the less modern areas, mortality rates 
in these areas are gradually reduced to the level of those 
prevailing in the cities; by the end of the century mortality rates 
are uniform throughout the country. The fifth experiment here too 
represents an intermediate position between the fourth experiment 
and the others. 
The results of these simulation experiments can best be analyzed 
by first examining separately, and in some detail, the set of results 
for each country. Later an attempt is made to draw more general 
conclusions by comparing the different country projections. It is 
simplest to begin with Venezuela and El Salvador, where only an 
urban-rural division is used, and then take up Argentina, where 
two regions are distinguished as well as the urban-rural breakdown, 
and finally Brazil, where three regions are used in the model. 
/Chapter II 
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Chapter II 
'VENEZUELA' 
The Situation in 1970 and the Main Variables of  
q1111-EahOJIL25221112ELE 
Venezuela is a high income country in which modern type 
activities account for a relatively large proportion of total 
production and employMent. One central aspect of this is a largely 
urban oriented economy, and this is reflected in the population 
structure: in 1970 three-quarters of the population lived in cities 
with 2,500 or more inhabitants. 
This level of urbanization is the result of very substantial 
migration from the rural areas during the past several decades. 
As late as 1940 over 60 per cent of the total population was rural, 
but since that date there has been no increase even in the absolute 
size of the rural population and its relative importance has fallen 
steadily and sharply, to only about 22 per cent of the total in 
1970.1/ This has been a period of very rapid population growth in 
Venezuela, and with the natural increase going entirely to the cities, 
the urban population in 1970 was 5 1/2 times what it had been 
thirty years earlier. 
One important implication of this situation is that the 
massive internal migration of recent years cannot continue much 
longer, for the urbanization process is already quite far advanced. 
1/ 	Rural here is according to the census definition: those 
living in communities of less than 1,000 persons. Until 
1961 this was the basic census division. Beginning with the 
1961 census there are three major groups: rural (less than 
1,000), intermediate (1,000 to 2,500), and urban (more than 
2,500). The intermediate area accounted for only 3 per cent 
of the population in 1970, and as the underlying population 
variables were very similar to those in the rural areas 
these two are joined and considered "rural" in the simulation 
experiments. The absolute size of the intermediate population 
declined from 1961 to 1971, indicating that internal migration 
was entirely toward the larger urban communities. 
/Migration flows 
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Migration flows will increasingly have less impact on the structure 
of the urban population, but more on the rural population from 
which it is drawn. Up to the early 1960s migration appears to 
have accounted for perhaps half of the total increase in the urban 
population, but this proportion has already begun to fall, and is 
unlikely to be more than one-fifth by 1980. Migration on that 
scale in 1980, however, would involve a substantial decline in the 
absolute size of the rural population. Migration will therefore 
almost certainly be a steadily less important factor in the cities; 
but if it continues on a substantial scale will have an increasingly 
profound impact on the rural economy. 
Another central variable which needs to be mentioned here is 
the birth rate. Fertility rates in Venezuela are still high, and 
have only begun to decline significantly in very recent years (since 
1965 according to the CELADE estimates). The rate of population 
growth as a consequence is of course also high. There is an 
important difference in fertility rates in the urban and in the 
rural areas - the base year estimates of fertility rates in the 
countryside are nearly 40 per cent higher than those for the cities -
but they are still high in both areas. 
In the years immediately preceding 1970 we have estimated that 
the total fertility rate 1/ in the cities was about 5.4, while in 
the rural areas it was 7.5. Although it would vary somewhat with 
the level of death rates, a total fertility rate of around 2.2 would 
eventually result in zero population growth (after the prolonged 
period required to reach a stable age structure). Even in the cities 
1/ 	The total fertility rate is the number of children the 
average woman would have if age specific birth rates 
throughout her fertile life remained constant at the values 
estimated in a particular year. That is, it is the sum of 
the age specific birth rates for women aged 15 to 49, 
inclusive. It can be roughly thought of as the size of the 
average family which would result with any given level of 
fertility. This is a more precise measure of fertiity trends 
than a measure such as the gross birth rate (which is affected 
by the age structure of the population) and will be generally 
used throughout the analysis. 
/birth rates 
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birth rates are far above this level and the rate of natural -increase 
is therSlorS still high. But birth rates are well below those in 
the rural areas, and so migration to the cities can have an important 
impact on the average rate at the national level - assuming, as the 
Moder does, that migrants tend to adopt fairly rapidly the 
practices of the city, and that the urban values can therefore 
be applied to recent migrants. 
The importaUCe of this aspect is,  increased by the fact that 
migration tends to be heaviest among teenagers and young adults, 
and thus there is a disproportionate shift to the cities of the age 
groups where birth rates are high. That it is primarily the young 
who migrate is a fact which has been widely commented on, but it is 
rather surprising just how young many migrants in Venezuela appear 
to have been, and the structure of the migration is worth noting. 
- 	, 
The estimates refer to the 1950s, when as already noted migration 
to the cities was very large.1/ 
The first noteworthy feature is that considerably more women 
than men migrated to the cities. Although in 1950 there were 
significantly more males than females still living in the rural 
areas, during the 1950s there were actually about 10 per cent more 
female than male migrants. About 32 per cent of the 1950 rural 
female population was living in the cities 10 years later; the 
corresponding figure for males was only 27 per cent. 
The estimates were made by comparing data from the 1951 and the 
1961 censuses. Essentially, the rural population of"a given 
age group in 1951 was projected to 1961 by'applying the 
estimated death rates for the 10 year period. This calculated 
population was then compared to the 1961 census. figure and . 
the difference was taken as an estimate of migration. The 
actual calculations were somewhat more complicated as the 
adjusted CELADE estimates were used as the basis for the 
calculations rather than the uncorrected census figures. As 
a check, similar calculations were made for the urban area 
to estimate the inflow for each age group. The two sets of 
calculations gave nearly identical results and so the 
estimates can be considered a reasonably accurate description 
of what actually occurred. 
/The very 
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The very young accounted for the bulk of this large migration: 
about two-thirds of those who migrated were less than 25 years of 
age. This percentage is similar for both males and females, but 
the structure is somewhat different: females seem to have begun to 
move to the cities in, large numbers before the.age of 15, while 
the surge in male migration began only when they were about 5 years 
older. Also, while male, migration virtually ceased after the age 
of 35, significant female migration continued into old age. An 
approximate and complete stup.ture by 5 year age groups, consistent,  
with the data for the 1950s, is as follows: 
PERCENTAGE OF ,THE RURAL POPULATION WHICH MIGRATES 
IN A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD 2./ 
ALLEFEM percentage which mi rates 
Females 	 Males 
0-4 	to 	5-79 to lo 
579 to 10714 22 ,13. 
10-14 to 15-19 26 24 
15-19 to 20-24 20 25 
20,-24 to' 25-29-  16 19 
25-29 to 3o-34 15 14 
30-34 to 35-39 15 11 
35-39 to 4o-44 14 10 
4o-44 to 45-49 14 9 
45-49 to 50-54 14 8 
:50-54 to 55-59 13 8 
55-59 to 6o-64 12 8 
6o-64 to 65-69 12 8 
65-69 to 70-74 12 8 
About 15 per cent of the entire rural population would 
migrate during a five-year period with these figures. 
The age group column shows the age at the beginning and 
at the end of the five-year period; that is, the first row 
shows migration by those who were in the 0-4 age group at 
the beginning, and therefore in the 5-9 age group at the 
end of the five-year period. 
/It is 
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It is worth,noting that because of the nature of the census 
data estimates of this sort overstate the amount of migration where 
this is taken to mean physical movement from one locality to 
another. If a community grows in size so that, whereas it was 
classified as rural in the preceding census, it is now classified 
as urban, the entire populace will be included in our estimates of 
"migration". For some purposes it is important to try to eliminate 
this aspect, and a very approximate calculation can be made on4he 
basis of the above figures. It. can be assumed that migration of 
males above 50 is zero, and that the figure which is shown (8, per 
cent) is therefore a rough estimate of the percentage of each age 
group which is included in the migration figure because the 
community in which they lived became reclassified as urban. If this 
8 per cent is substracted from each age group the percentages of 
those who actually moved to an urban community would be about as 
follows: 
Age group Perq±n121.22j2191PlaiSlliMarates _ 
Females Males 
0-4 	to 	5-9 2 2 
5-9 to 10-14 14 5 
10-14 to 15-19 18 16 
15-19 to 20-24 la 17 
20-24 to 25-29 8 11 
25-29 to 30-34 7 6 
30-34 to 35-39 7 3 
35-39 to 40-44 6 2 
4o-44 to 45-49 6 1 
45-49 to 50-54 6 0 
50-54 to 55-59 5 0 
55-59 to 6o-64 4 0 
60-64 to 65-69 4 0 
65-69 to 7o-74 4 0 
This more clearly shows the aspects already mentioned. Female 
migration is markedly larger than male migration at very early ages. 
/And although 
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And although there is a definite concentration of migration among 
young women, it continues to be significant throughout all age 
groups. ,Male migration on the other hand begins somewhat later, 
and is almost entirely compressed into a 25 year age span. Looked 
at in this way, more than three-quarters of all migrants were less 
than 25 years old (more than 80 per cent of all males, but rather 
less than threequarters of.the female6). 
It ,has seemed advisable to discuss the structure of migration 
in some detail as this can be an important aspect of population trends 
in countries where substantial migration is occurring. On a simple 
urban-rural basis estimates of- this sort.are accurate enough to be 
very useful. For Venezuela calculations were made for both the 
rural (outmigration)-and the urban area (inmigration) as a check, 
and there was very close correspondence between the two sets of 
figures. Similar calculations were made for the '.other countries 
and, with some variation from. one country to another the results 
support those obtained for VenezUela.. Some of the special features 
are noted.in the discussion of the other countries.. 
Finally, for most age groups :death rates in Venezuela are 
substantially higher in the rural areas than in the cities. up to 
the age of 35 we have estimated that death rates average around 
60 per cent higher in the rural than in the urban areas; the 
differential then declines rapidly, and above the age of 50 we have 
assumed that death rates are the same in both areas. 
These death rate differentials must be regarded as only very 
approximate estimates. Data is available by state, but not on an 
urban-rural basis, so the basis for the estimates was the comparison 
of figures, for, tates which were more heavily rural with those which 
were largely urban. This was an element in the estimate of fertility 
levels as well, but here further .data were available (figures for 
the number of children less than one year of age'in the urban and in 
the rural areas can be obtained from the census, and adjusted tor 
infant mortality these can be used as an estimate of births during 
the year) so the estimates are somewhat more precise. But direct data 
/on age 
-4o- 
on age specific birth as well as death rates by rural and urban 
area are lacking in Venezuelc so the estimates used should be 
regarded with caution. Nevertheless, they do give an order of 
magnitude to the different conditions which prevail in the rural 
and in the urban areas. This is a factor of considerable 
importance, and the estimates are regarded as sufficiently good 
to be quite useful for purposes of the present analysis. 
B. Results of the Simulation Experiments 
Having described the general setting from, which the simulation 
experiments begin in Venezuela, the significance of some of the 
assumptions of these experiments can be more readily appreciated. 
Since migration has been very large in recent years, all of the 
experiments assume some slowing down of this process; its 
continuation on the same scale could rapidly depopulate the 
countryside. The second experiment (great change from the 1970 
situation) is closest to the recent past in this respect: in this 
experiment the rural population remains approximately constant, 
and in relative terms declines to less than half its 1970 size by 
the end of •the century. The other experiments assume varying 
increases in the absolute size of the rural population although, 
except for the fourth ,experiment (concentration on a rural type 
development), they all result in .a more or less, substantial further 
declines in the proportion of the population which lives outside 
the cities. A development of the sort depicted in the fourth 
experiment would of course imply a very sharp departure from past 
experience in Venezuela, and must be regarded as unlikely. 
With respect to birth rates on the other hand, it is the 
second experiment which postulates the sharpest departure from past 
trends. This experiment assumes that fertility rates in the cities 
fall rapidly until, in 1995, they reach a level consistent with 
zero population growth; and even in the rural areas age specific 
birth rates decline. 40 per cent, although they remain well above 
the zero growth level (the total fertility rate declines to about 
/4.56 in 
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4.56 in 1995). It is the first experiment (little change from the 
1970 situation) which is most similar to the recent past in this 
respect, it being assumed here that birth rates fall about one-
quarter during the 30 year period. The other experiments involve 
varying intermediate assumptions. 
The principal results of the experiments are shown in table 11. 
For each experiment only the results at the end of the 30 year 
period - that is, those for the year 2000 - are shown; the 1970 
situation is also shown for comparison./ 
Population trends  
The total population will more than double by the end of the 
century even in the second experiment, with its extreme assumptions 
regarding the decline in urban birth rates and the shift in 
population to the cities, where birth rates are much lower. The 
population increase is much greater in the first experiment 
(relatively little change from the 1970 situation). In the last 
three experiments the increases are intermediate and, in view of the 
different sets of assumptions involved, remarkably similar: in each 
the population expands about 2.3 times, from 10.6 million in 1970 
to 24.4 million at the end of the century. 
1/ 	A sixth simulation experiMent was run for Venezuela to 
deterMine the results if migration to the cities should 
continue at the rapid rate of recent years, while relatively 
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Table 11 
VENEZUELk: RESULTS OF THE SIMULaTION EXPEAINENTS I/ 
1970 











Population (millions) 10.6 26.4 21.6 24.4 24.4 24.4 
Rural 2.7 4.7 2.7 3.6 6.o 4.9 
Urban 7,9 21.7 18.9 20.8 18.4 19.5 
Population (1970 = 100) 100 243 204 229 229 230 
Rural 100 175 100 132 223 153 
Urban 100 273 238 261 231 246 
Rate of increase (% p/a) 12/ 3.1 2,8 1.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Rural -0.8 1.7 -o.4 0.7 2.2 1.7 
Urban 4.7 3.0 1.9 2.6 2.3 2.5 
Population distribution OD 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Rural 25.3 17.9 12.4 14.6 24.6 20.2 
Urban 74.7 82.1 87.6 85.4 75.4 29.8 
Population age structure (90 100 100 100 100 .100 100 
o - 	4 16.9 14.8 9.7 12.8 12.7 12.8 
5 - 14 29.4 25.5 21.5 24.0 24.1 24.1 
15 - 19 10,7 10,7 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.7 
20 - 39 25.1 28.9 33.5 30.7 30.7 30.6 
4o - 64 15.0 16.o 19.6 17.4 17.4 17.3 
65 and over 2.9 4.1 5.0 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Rural age structure (%,) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
o - 	4 18.4 16.3 14.1 15.3 14.1 14.9 
5 - 14 32,2 27.6 26.7 27.5 26.9 27.4 
15 - 19 9.2 10.1 10,0 10.1 11.2 10.9 
20 - 39 21.6 26.1 27.4 26.8 29.4 27.5 
4o - 64 15.1 15.2 16.7 15.6 14.4 14.9 
65 and over 3.5 4.6 5.1 4.7 4.o 4.5 
Urban age structure CO 100 100 100 100 100 100 
o - 	4 16.4 14.4 9.1 12.4 12.2 12.3 
5 - 14 28.4 25.o 20.8 23.4 23.2 23.3 
15 - 19 11.3 10.8 10,7 10.8 10.6 10.7 
20 -.39 26.3 29.5 34.4 31.3 31.1 31.4 
4o - 64 15.o 16.2 20.0 17.7 18.4 18.0 
65 and over 2.7 4.0 5.o 4.4 4.5 4.4 
Labour foroe (millions) 3.26 8.93 9.06 9.18 8.69 8.93 
Rural .80 1.58 1.01 1.24 2.01 1.61 
Urban 2.46 7.35 8.05 7.94 6.68 7.32 
Labour force (1970 = 100) 100 274 278 282 267 274 
Rural 100 198 126 155 251 201 
Urban 100 299 328 323 272 298 
Rate of inorease (%;p/a) 1 3.4 3.3 3.o 3.3 3.1 3.2 
Rural -0.4 2.2 0.6 1.3 3.1 2.3 
Urban 4.9 3.6 3.3 3.6 3.1 3.4 
Mlle labour force (1970 = 100) 100 265 233 245 252 249 
Rural 100 193 120 151 210 184 
Urban 100 293 276 280 268 274 
Female labour force (1970 = 100) 100 311 466 434 328 378 
Rural 100 252 189 190 678 388 
Urban 100 319 500 464 284 377 
Labour participation rates (%) 
Total 30.6 33.9 41.9 37.6 35.7 36.5 
Rural 29.7 33.6 37.4 34.8 33.5 32.7 
Urban 30.9 33.9 42.5 38.1 36.4 37.5 
W61. 	.....ral 1 	n q4_n An q qii 4 Rn_n c"4-q 
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Table 11 (cone.) 
The year 2000 
1970 Experi- Experi- Expert- Expert- Experi- 
ment I 	ment II ment III ment IV ment V 
Rural labour foroe age structure (70) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
10 - 19 22.9 20.6 18.8 20.0 17.9 
20 - 39 41.3 45.9 45.4 45.9 55.8 49.8 
4o - 64 30.1 27.o 28.8 27.5 26.o 27.o 
65 and over 5.7 6.5 7.0 6.6 3.7 5.3 
Urban labour force age structure (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
10 - 19 
20 - 39 
40 - 64 
65 and over 




























521 ° 10 - 19 14.5 12.8 8.9 10.3 11.7 0.9  
20 - 39 52.9 54.5 57.6 56.9 53.8  55.7 
4o - 64 29.8 28.8 32.o 30.7 30.2 30.4 
65 and over 2.9 4.0 1.5 2.1 4.3 3.0 
Female urban labour force age structure (%) 100 100 100 No 100 100 
10 - 19 20.1 16.6 11.6 13.2,  15.2 13.7 
20 - 39 55.3 57.5 58.2 58.1 56.9 57.8 
4o - 64 22.7 24.o 29.o 27.4 25.8 27.0 
65 and over 1.8 2.0 1.2 1.3 2.1 1.5 
Note: The 1970 CELADE estimates of population, by sex and 5 year age group, provided the basis for the 1970 
estimates shown. Rural/Urban differences were estimated with the use of a feW aggregate figuret which 
were available from the 1971 census plus .the: detailed data from the 1961 census. The CELADE estimates 
of age specific birth rates and death rates were used as the starting point in all of the experiments 
again with rural/urban breakdowns estimated from census data. Labourioartioipation rates, by sex 
and 5 year age group, were estimated directly from the census, data. The principal assumptions which 
determine the results of the experiments relate to migration rates, fertility rates, and labour 
participation rates. The different migratiOn rates assumed can be roughly fudged from the table on 
the basis of the population shift from the rural to. the urban area in the different experiments. 
The assumptions about fertility rates were as follows. In the 1965-1970 period the total fertility 
rate was estimated to be 7.5 in the rural and 5.4 in the urban area. These figures were assumed to 
decline lineally until in the last period of the sxperimente (1995-2000) they were as follows:, 
experiment I, 5.6 and 4.0 respeotively; experiment II, 4.6 and 2.2; experiment III, 5.1 and 3.3; 
experiment IV, 4.0 and 3.3; experiment V, 4.6 and 3.3. Changes in labour participation rates to the 
end of the century were: experiment I, little ohange;,experiment II, urban rates to the Western 
European level and some shift in rural rates; experiment III, urban rates about two-thirds of the way 
to the Western European level and some shift in rural rates; experiment IV, little change in urban 
rates and rural rates to the urban level; experiment V, midway between experiments III and IV. There 
were also assumptions about differential trends in mortality rates, but these have much less impact 
On the results than assumptions about theother variables. The trendinstotal mortality rates is that 
used in the CELADE projections. 
s/ Only the results at the end, of the experiments - that is the year 2000 - are shown as this is the single 
figure of most interest; the 1970 figures are shown for comparison. The trend is not necessarily smooth 
throughout the 30 year period however, and this is often of considerable importance. Several instances 
of this sort are noted in the analysis. 
12/ The rates of increase shown are the annual rates of increase during the 5 year period up to the date shown. 
That is, in the first column they are the annual rates during the period 1965-1970; in the other columns 
during the period 1995-2000. 
/This implies 
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Mae iMgiae-that:tharate of, population growth will remain 
10.4:11_,Even_intho..E.iPPPTIclexperiment the rate of population increase 
is still'1.6 percent-per annum at the end of the century - despite 
,the fact that the total fertility rate in the cities has fallen to 
the zero-growth rateAin a stable population), and that only one 
, ,eighth. of the population still lives outside the cities by that 
time. an the other experiments the rate of population growth remains 
.a good deal higher (2.8 per cent at the end of the century in the 
first axperiment and .2.3 per cent in the others), although in all 
cases it has declined significantly from the rate of 3.1 per cent 
Which prevailed around 1970. As noted in more detail later, a 
major factor in this continuing high rate of population growth is 
the age structure of the population,,_the number of births 
remaining high for this reason even.when substantial declines in 
age specific birth rates are postulated. 
In Venezuela then the population is likely to continue to 
increase rapidly at least to.the end of this,century. Following 
,upon the very rapid growth of recent decades,' this will mean a 
lundamental change in this:basic aspect of social and economic 
organization. In 1950 the popUlation was only a little more than 
5- million; during the second half of this century it can,be expected 
to have increased nearly •iVe-fold. At mid-century the country was 
sparcely populated, with a very generous resource base but with a 
limited internal market. By the end of the century this situation 
will have been reversed to an important extent. The domestic market 
will be very much larger, and should be able to support a reasonably 
diversified range of economic activities - the population will be 
similar to that of Argentina in the mid-1970s and the income level 
will probably be high. But the resource basa•will be a good deal 
less generous relative to the- population it will then have to support. 
Although Venezuela will continue to be among the countries with 
relatively low population density, this will have increased to 
around 27 inhabitants per km2; for comparison, this is about-triple 
the present figure for Argentina, and somewhat more than the. 1970 
density in Mexico. And mhereas in 1950 the country possessed 
enormous per capita petroleum resources, by the end of the century 
the more economically favourablereserves may well have been 
largely depleted. 
In every simulation experiment thegreat bulk of this 
population increase is accounted for by.the growth of the cities. 
To a large extent this follows simply_from the fact that three-
quarters of the population was already urban in 1970, but an 
additional factor is the continuing migration from the rural to 
the urban areas. Migration is least .important in the fourth 
experiment (strongly rural oriented development), but even there 
the rate of population increase-is slightly higher in the 'cities, 
and these account for over,three-quarters of the total increase in 
population over the 30 year period. In the other experimente the 
growth of the cities represents Oven larger, proportions of the 
total increase - lip to 100 per cent:in the second_ experiment, where 
there is no increase in the absolute size of the rural population. 
The rate of populatimvgrowth in the rural areas in Venezuela 
will altoet certainly be relatively modest in coming years. Even 
in the first experiment, which assumes only a slow decline in birth 
rates in the rural areas and onIy. modest migration (sharply less 
than in the recent past),-.the rural'population increases at an 
average rate of slightly less than.2 per cent per annum, In the 
second experiment with a greater decline in birth rates and with 
migration continuing to be substantial (but even here a bit slower 
than in the 19606), there is no growth at all in the rural 
population. 
This set of circumstances will make it.much easier to improve 
conditions in the rural areas in Venezuela. First, the proportion 
of the total popillation-which is rural was already relatively loW 
in 1970, and'can be expected to decline further in 'coming_years., 
The problem is therefore of lesser relative Magnitude than in 
most countries of the region. Second, the rate of increase in that 
population can be expected to be relatively moderate. Thus most of 
/the resources 
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the resources available can be devoted to improving conditions; 
less will be required simply' to expand facilities for an increasing 
population. Rural conditions have already improved substantially 
in Venezuela in recent years, and an important factor in this 
improvement 'has no doubt been the fact that the size of the rural 
population has remained approximately constant for a,considerable 
period, so that improvements were entirely reflected in increases 
in the level of per capita welfare.' 
Despite this relatively slow growth of the rural population, 
due in large part to migration to the 'cities,' the rate of population 
increase in the cities themselves can also be expected to be 
substantially less rapid than in the immediate past. This 
apparent paradox is a reflection of the fact noted earlier: the 
transition from a rural to an urban society has already largely 
been completed in Venezuela so that migration, even though it 
continues, is of declining importance in determining the rate of 
increase of the urban population. The importance of this aspect is 
readily seen from the rates of increase in the urban population. 
The urban population increases - most in the first experiment 
(relatively little change from the 1970 situation), even though 
relatively little migration is assumed. In the second experiment 
by contrast; although migration is much heavier the urban population 
increases much lebs. This clearly shows that urban birth rates, 
rather than internal migration, have now become the primary 
determinant of the rate of increase of the urban population. 
For the 30 year period as a whole, the average rate of increase 
in the urban population in the different experiments ranges froth just 
under 3 per cent to 3.4 per cent per annum. This is substantially more 
than the rate of increase which will occur in the rural population, but 
substantially less than the rate of increase in the urban popUlation 
itself in earlier years (Well over 6 per cent per annum in the 1940s and 
1950s, and slightly more than 5 per cent per annum during the 19,60s. The 
rate of increase in the urban population has already begun to slow 
/notably - since 
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notably - since around 1960 - and the. deceleration will continue in the 
years ahead. The rate of increase declines more or less steadily 
from 1970 to the end of the century in all the experiments, 
finally reaching the rates shown in table 11.1/ 
In a sense then it may paradoxically be easier to -improver- 
both urban and• rural conditions in Venezuela in coming years. The 
mass migration which‘ctahVerted the 'population from being mostly 
rural to largely urban has already taken place. As a result, a 
substantial decline in the rate of population increase in the cities 
has already occurred,' end' he decline will continue. This will mean 
that the pressure for new facilities simply to accommodate the 
increase in populatiOn will' be less, and more of what is available 
can go to improving conditions. in per capita terms. This moderating 
of the pressure to deal with the very rapid expansion of the urban 
population will also make it easier to divert funds to improving 
conditions' in the rural areas; and as noted the slow or even zero 
growth of the rural'poPulace will mean that this will largely, or 
entirely, contribute to improved per capita welfare in the countryside. 
It does need-to be noted however that the slower growth of 
the urban population is true only in relative terms. Due mostly to 
the prevailing high birth rates, even in the cities,' the absolute 
increase in the urban population is likely to be steadily largely 
for some time to come. Even in the second experiment, for example, 
the urban population, after increasing about 3.2 million during 
the decade of the 1960s, -increases 3.5 million during the 1970s and 
4.0 million during the 1980s. But despite these rising absolute 
amounts, the rate of increase falls substantially over those years: 
from an average of 5 per cent per annum during the 1960s to 3.7 per 
cent during the' 19706 and to 3 per cent during the 1980s. Fore some 
1/ 	Even if rapid migration to the cities should continue and 
there should be only a moderate decline in birth rates, as 
in the sixth experiment (not shown, see footnote page '+1) the 
growth of the cities would'not be a great deal faster. The 
average rate of increase for the 30 year period would be 
3.6 per cent per annum (compared to 3.4 per cent in experiment 
I), and at the end of the century would be 3.1 per cent (3.0 per 
cent in experiment I). 
/purposes it 
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purposes it is the absolute increase which is of primary importance, 
and this will be steadily larger; but for many purposes it is the 
relative increase which matters, and the rate of growth of the 
urban population can be expected to decline substantially. 
The age structure  
In addition to the ,:overall increase, there are more or less 
significant changes in the age.structure of the population, in alL 
of the simulation experimehts. The smallest change occurs in the 
first experiment,-which assumes the least decline in birthrates, 
but even here it is significant: children (those less than 15 years 
of age) decline from 46.3 per cent of the population in 1970 to 
40.3 per cent at the end of the century, with offsetting increases 
in the age groups over 20. The greatest changes occur in the 
second experiment, which assumes the greatest decline in birth 
rates.. In this experiment the proportion of children drops much 
more sharply from the same 46.3 per cent in 1970 to only 31.2 per 
cent at the end of the century - and again offsetting increases 
occur in the over 20 age groups. 
Even if birth rates should decline sharply and so•produce a 
relatively large shift in the age structure, as in the second 
experiment, the Venezuelan population will remain a relatively young 
one at the end of the century. Although the proportion of children 
would decline substantially, it would remain somewhat higher than 
the figure for Argentina in 1970'(29.1 per cent), 'add oonsiderably 
higher than the proportion which would preVail in an eventually 
stable population (21 per cent).1/ 'Further, it 'would be primarily 
the young adult population'which would increase' in relative importance. 
The 20-39 age group would increase from 25.1 per cent of the total 
in 1970 to 33.5 per cent at the end of the century, well above the' 
proportion in Argentina in 1970 and still further above the 
proportiOn in a stable population. The over 40 age group would 
1/ 	See again table 2, p. 8, Chapter I. 
/increase less, 
increase less, and would remain much less important than in a stable 
population, or even than in Argentina in 1970 (24.6'per cent as 
against 45-;4 per cent and 33.4 per cent respectively). In sum, 
more than three-quarters of the population would still* be less than 
40 years of age, whereas in Argentina in 1970 the proportion had 
already declined to two-thirds, and in an eventual stable population 
would fall to less than 55 per cent. In all of the other simulations 
the population of course remains even more youthfull than in the 
second experiment. 
There are significant differences in the shift in the age 
structure in the urban and in the rural areas. In general the rural 
population remains younger than the urban; in particular, in the 
rural area the proportion of children remains more than 40 per cent 
at the end of the century in all of the experiments, whereas in the 
cities it drope to siightly"beloW 30 percent in the second experiment.  
The high proportion of children in the rural area is partly dim to 
the continuing"higher birth rates, but also in'part to migratiou, 
which drains off larger number of adolescents and young adults. 
Too much significance cannot be given to the different trends in 
age structure however due to the way migration is handled- in the 
model. Migration is assumed to be a percentage of the age group 
concerned, and this is estimated on the basis of the structure of 
migration in the recent past. However, when the rural population 
declines to the relatie size projected in most of these simulation 
experiments the age structure of migration, and consequently the age 
structure of the remaining rural population, may well assume quite 
distinctive forms. This has been the case in some of the high 
income industrial countries where the rural pOpUlation has declined 
to a small proportion of the total (a disproportionate percentage of 
the rural population may be older adults) and, with variations for 
such factors as probably substantially higher rural fertility rates, 
may well occur in countries like Venezuela. A more detailed study 
would be necessary to illuminate this aspect and so the simulation 
experiments may not be a very accurate guide here. 
/Returning to 
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Returning to the nationwide figures, it is worth noting some 
of the implications of thie ehiftin the age structure. First, 
the relative importance of the dependent population (those less 
than 15 and those over 65) declines in all of the simulations; 
from 49.2 per cent of the total in 1970 it falls to figures ranging 
from 36.2 per cent in the second experiment to 44.4 per cent in 
the first experiment. The lower figure of the second experiment 
is approximately the same as.the percentage in Argentina in .1970, 
and also that eventually reached in a stable population. The 
composition of the dependent population will still be quite different 
in Venezuela however - there will be relatively more children and 
fewer of the over 65 group. 
Although the importance of children in the dependent population 
will.remain relatively large, the shift is beginning -(the proportion 
of children declines and of those over 65 rises. in all of the 
simulations), and this means different.rates of growth for 
different segments ofthe dependent populations; and this can have 
important consequences. 
For the younger.age groups perhaps the principal aspect is 
the rate. at which the, educational. system.will need to be expanded 
to accomodate those of school age. For this purpose, the 5-14- age 
group can be:taken ap_an - approximate_.measure of the pressure for 
primary school facilities. As noted, the relative size of this. 
group declines in..all.of the experiments, so that to the end of 
the century the rate.-of increase will be less than:for the population 
as a whole. It. nevertheless may remain fairly high, and may 
fluctuate sharply,. 
The rate of increase of this segment of the population has 
already- been slowing for over a decade: from a peak level of 
5.7 per cent per annum during the second half of the 1950s, it 
declined to 4.7jper cent per annum during the 1960-1965 period, and 
further to 3.7 per cent per annum in the 1965-1970 period. This 
rapid slowing in the rate of increase will.continue for a time as 
/the initial 
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the initial population bulge passes out of this group;l/ in all of 
the simulation experiments the population in the 5-14 age group 
increases at a rate of less than 2,per cent per annum: during the 
1970s as a whole. 
The trend thereafter depends heavily on the assumptions made 
about fertility rates. In the. first experiment, where birth rates 
are assumed to decline only.moderately, therate of increase in the 
primary school age group again rises to 3.4 per cent per annum during 
the 1980s, and declines only moderately_, to;  2.6 per cent during the 
last decade of the century. In the second experiment, where by 
contrast fertility-rates are assumed tct decline sharply, the rate of 
increase remains at,slightly less. than 2 per cent during the 1980s, 
and falls further to less than 1 per cent. per annum during the 1990s. 
The other three experiments show rates intermediate between those in 
the first and second experiments. 
Even the absolute sizeof the increase in the population of 
primary school age is apt to fluctuate substantially in Venezuela 
for a time. After an increase of, well over one million during the 
decade of the 1960s,.the increase will be sharply less in:thf 1970s; 
the range is from 550,000 in the second experiment to 660,000 in the 
illiww..■•••••••• =•■••••••• - 
1/ 	The intermediate term interactions between different age groups 
of the population are at times rather complicated, and of some 
interest.' Easentially, the initial speeding up'of the rate of 
population increase which began-in the 1940s, and affected 
mostly the infant population at the outset, has by now passed 
beyond 'the groups here considered. In addition, the decline 
in fertility rates which began in the mid-1960s is beginning 
to have-its effect. The initial bulge is only beginning to 
affect substantially the size of the young adult population, 
but_as:tnis effect grows more important with time the number 
of births, will,again rise (quite apart from fertility rates) 
and will soon cause a secondary wave effect in the child 
population. The net effect is that after the first sharp rise 
in. the size of the child population there is a .temporary lull, 
when the rate of increase and even the absolute size of the 
increase drops substantially, until the second, induced, bulge 
hits this age group. 
/first experiment. 
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first experiment. The r increase will then again be larger in the 
1980s, the possibilities,varyingwidely from 780,000 in the second 
experiment up to nearly 1.5 million in,the first. And, finally, 
during the last decade of the century the increase is again smaller, 
only modestly in the first experiment, but down to 200,000 in the 
second. 
. At least until into the last decade of this century then the 
primary school population will continue to expand fairly rapidly, 
and if there is not much further decline in fertility rates the 
pace of expansion, after a respite during the 1970s, will again be 
sharply higher in the 1980s. Whatever the trend in fertility ratesi  
the expansion will,not be a smooth one, but will rather occur with 
sharp fluctuations and, if,dislocations are to be avoided, will 
require corresponding adjustments either in the rate of expansion 
of the primary school system itself or the way in which students are 
absorbed into the system. 
It is worth noting that the expansion will occur primarily in 
the urban area. During the 1960s there was only a very small, 
increase. in the population aged 5-14 in the rural area, and this 
will continue to be the case in the 1970s.1/ After 1980 the rural, 
population of primary school age may decline or may expand more 
rapidly, depending upon the extent of migration.2/ As it seems likely 
The rural population aged 5-14 increased less than 5 per cent 
during the 1960s, and all of this increase was in the first 
half of the decade. During the .1970s there will be a decline 
with the assumptions of the second and third experiments, and 
a small increase in the other 'experiments; even in the fourth 
experiment, where very little migration is assumed, the increase 
is only about 1 per cent per.annum. 
In the second experiment, which assumes that the flow to the 
cities continues at nearly the'1960-1970 level, the size of this 
age group continues to fall in the rural area. In the third 
experiment, with slower but still substantial migration, the 
rural population of primary school age begins to increase again 
after 1980, "but the rate of increase to- the end of the century 
is still less than 1 per cent per annum. In the other experiments, 
where migration is assumed to be much less important, the rate 




that an important prOportion of the rural population will continue 
to migrate to the cities in Venezuela, it is therefore also likely 
that there will be little or perhaps no increase in the primary 
school age group in the Tural'area. This will make educational 
planning easier, and nearly all expenditures will go to increasing 
the enrollment rate and improving the quality of schooling 
available; very little will be required to maintain conditions in 
the face of'rising - numbers to'be educated. 
Trend6 in'the cities are of course quite different, resembling 
those for the country as a whole but in a Somewhat exaggerated form. 
' The expariSiOn of the urban population of primary school age has been 
very rapid in the recent past. During the first half of the 1960s 
the increase was at the rate of 7.4 percent per annum, declining 
dUring the second half of the detade to 5.3 per cent per annum. 
This sharp slOwing will continue through the 1970s; the average 
rate for the decade will'be about 2.5 per Cent per annum.1/ The 
trend after 1980 varies greatly depending on the assumptions made. 
In the first experiment the urban' population of primary school age 
increases at the'faster rate of 3.7 per cent per annum during the 
1980s, and declines again to 2.7per cent during the last decade of 
the century. In the second experiment the expansion during the 
1980s is at about the same tate'as durifig the 1970s, before dropping 
to 0.7 per'cent per annum in the 1990s. The other experiments as 
Usual yield intermediate rates.`  
The'cOmMent6 made about the primary school age group at the 
national level apply here even more strongly. But although the 
rate of increase in the urban poPulation of primary school age will 
continue fairly high for some time at least, and may even rise again 
for a time, the very high rates of increase experienced in the 
1960s will not again occur. This is one of the important respects 
in which, the mass migration to the cities having passed its peak, 
pressureaOn'the urban area will ease in the years to come. -  
1/ 	This is the rate in all of the simulation experiments except 
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Although not part of the dependent population here being 
considered, it is useful to note in passing the trend of the 15-19 
year age group, as it Can'be taken as inaicative of the demand for 
secondary school education. This age gioUp has been growing.at an 
increasingly rapid rate in recent years. From 2.4 per cent per 
annum during the first half of the 1950s, the rate of increase rose 
rapidly to a peak .of 5.5 per cent per annum during the 1965-1970 'period. 
An even more rapid decline from that peak has now begun, 
and will continue until. 1985; during the 1980-1985 period the increase 
will be at the rate of only 1 per cent per annum. This decline 
will of course occur independently of any assumptions made about birth 
rates. After 1985 assumptions about birth rates have an influence, 
but the rate of increase is again higher in all of the simulation' 
experiments. In the second experiment it rises to 1.9 per cent'per 
annum and remains at approximately that level to the end of the 
century.. At the other extreme, in the first experiment it rises—
sharply to 3 percent per annum during the second half of the 1980s, 
and further to 3-.5 per cent during the last decade of the century. 
Here again can be seen the substantial fluctuations in the rate of 
increase in the potential school population, with the implications 
this will have for the educational system. 
Returning to the dependent population, the other segment of 
that population is made up of those over 65 years of age, and this 
group continues to increase rapidly, at a rate of 4 per cent per annum 
or better throughout the 30 year period; as a result its relative 
importance rises fairly steadily to the end of the Century in all 
of the simulation experiments.1/ Nevertheless, the over 65 group 
will not become of major importance during the period here considere 
The absolute size of the over 65 group is not affected 
significantly by the assumptions made (even at the end of the 
century all of this group will have been born before 1935) and 
is the same in all of the experiments. The differences in 
relative importance which occur are due exclusively to differences 
in rates of growth of the younger age groups and hence of the 
total population. 
See pages 9-13, Chapter I for a general discussion. 
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At the end of the century it will still account for 5 per cent or less 
of the population, compared with over 7 per cent in Argentina in 
1970 and over 15 per cent in an eventual stable zero growth population. 
Although the rate of increase in the older population has already 
speeded up (due to lower death rates through all age groups and 
hence larger, numbers surviving into old age), the bulge that began 
with the infant population, around 1940 will not reach the over 65group 
until after the turn of the century. Only then will this 
older age group begin to, experience the even higher rates of increase 
which have already passed through the child population, and the 
elderly population begin to be a much more important segment of the 
population. 
The great bulk of the dependent population will thus continue 
to be children in Venezuela at least through the end of this • 	. 
century. And as the child population can be expected to decline 
substantially in relative importance, a decline can also be expected 
for the dependent population as a whole. This will mean that per 
capita incomes will, rise over and above any increase which may occur 
in productivity levels per member of the labour force. Each member 
of the labour force will, in effect, have a declining number of 
dependents to be supported from ,what he produces. This may well be 
an important factor in producing rising levels of per capita income 
in Venezuela_during the next ,several decades. 
Turning away from the dependent population, the offsetting 
increase in the relative importance of young adults (those 20-39 years 
of age) in all of the projections also has major implications. As 
has already been noted at several points, the more rapid rate,of 
population growth, which began in Venezuela around 1940, had its . 
first impact on the size of,the infant population,, and this, bulge 
then began to work its way gradually through the age structure.1/ 
The impact on the young adult age group only began to be fully felt 
/around 1970, 
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around 1970, and it is during the period covered by the simulation 
experiments that this impact is at its peak. It ia this which 
accounts for, much of the rise in relative importance of this group 
in all of; the experiments. 
In absolute terms, the increase is very rapid and, since 
projected declines in birth rates require 20 .years before they 
begin to affect this. 	the rate is the same until 1990 in all 
of the experiments; only after that date is there some divergence. 
As noted„the:bulge in population growth only recently.began to 
reach this age group and.during the 1965-1970 period the population 
aged 20-39 increased at.the rate of 2.8 per cent per annum 
,(already however well above the rate of increase in earlier years). 
During the 1970s the rate of increase will jump sharply to 4.2 per 
cent per annum, and then decline somewhat to 3.8 per,cent per annum 
during the 1980s. During the last decade of the century the 
increase is considerably less rapid as the decline in birth rates 
which began in the latter 1960s begins to affect this group, and the 
bulge begins to move on to the older adult population. In the 
different experiments the rate of increase in the 1990s ranges from 
2.3 ,per cent to 2.8,per cent per annum, varying with assumptions 
about birth rates. 
This very rapid increase in the size of the young adult group 
means, first, that the number of births continues to rise 
substantially, even in the,face of declining age specific birth 
rates.1/ The effect can be illustrated by the second experiment, 
where fertility rates fall most sharply. During the 5 year period 
1965-1970 the total number' of births in Venezuela was 'approximately 
2.0 million. In the second simulation the number then rises steadily 
(although at a declining rate after 1980) to approximately 2.5 million 
in the 1985-1990 period - despite the fact that the total fertility 




rate is assumed to decline from 6.06 in 1965-1970 to 3.59 in the 
1985-1990. period. In all of the other experiments the number of 
births rises more rapidly, and continues to rise to the end of the 
century.1/ 
This aspect of the age structure - the increasing relative 
importance of the young adult group - thus ensures a relatively 
rapid rate of population growth to the end of the century even if 
there is a rapid decline in ,fertility rates. As has already been 
noted, the population continues to expand at the rate of 1.6 per cent 
per annum at the end of the, century even in the second experiment, 
where birth rates, are assumed to have-fallen to the zero growth 
rate in the urban, area; and the rate of increase remains substantially 
higher in the other.experiments. 
The second major implication of the growing importance of the 
young adult group relates to the labour force: the rapid increase 
in this age group more or less assures a rapid increase in the 
labour force to the end of the century regardless of possible 
declines in birth rates and in the rate of growth of the population 
as a whole. Labour force trends, including this aspect, are 
discussed in detail below. 
Labour force trendS'and structures  
The labour force in Venezuela will increase rapidly at least 
to the end of the century. From the point of view of the present 
study, this is perhaps the most important single conclusion to be 
drawn from the simulation experiments., Further, there is little or 
no uncertainty about this conclusion as, despite the quite different 
underlying assumptions, the different experiments yield surprisingly 
similar results. With 1970 = 100, the projected size of the labour , - 
force at the end of the century varies only from 267 (in the fourth 
- 	• •%-•  
1/ 	In the second experiment, with the continuing fall in 
fertility rates, the number of births declines to about 
2.2' million during the last 5'yea-i4s of 'thecenturi. In 
the other experiments the number of births during that 
5 year period ranges from 3.2 to 4.0 million. 
/experiment) to 
1/ 	See table 4, p. 15, Chapter I, and the•discussion preceding 
and following that page. 
/which will 
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experiment)to 282,-,(1m.theTthird experiment);for the period as a 
whole thewfigurep correspond:toaverage ratesof increase varying 
only from3.3 per cent per annum to 3,5 per cent per annum. 
It was already pointed out in Chapter I of this study that 
the labour force in Venezuela has been expanding with increasing 
rapidity in recent years: from 2.5 per cent per annum in the early 
1950s the rate of increase had:risen to about 3,5 per cent per annum 
in the latter 1960s.1/ The rate of increase will, rise further to 
around 3.8 per cent per:annum during the, 1970s (the range in the , 
different experiments is from 3.7 percent to 4.0, percent per annum) 
before falling back to about 3.4 per cent per annum during the first 
half of the 1980s and to 3.2 per cent in the second half of that 
decade. The last decade of the century shows no further decline in 
any of the experiments: except the second, with its assumption of 
rapidly-declining fertility rates from 1970 onward, and even in that 
experiment the deceleration is modest. 
For the country as a whole therefore it can be expected that 
the rate of expansion of the labour force will be at its peak 
during the 1970s. During the 1980s there will be a significant 
deceleration but the rate will remain high - at about the same 
average rate as during the 1960s, and much higher than in the years 
before 1960. And unless fertility rates have already fallen 
substantially during the-1970s, there will be no further slowing 
of the rate of growth of the labour force until after the turn of 
the century. At the national-leVel then the pressure for additional 
employment opportunities is likely to remain strong at least until 
into the next century. 
This pretsure will'very largely be felt in the urban areas, 
not Only because' the- more open uneMployment of the cities creates 
greater pressures tha&the more disguised unemployment in the rural 
area, but also because, in Venezuela, it is the urban labour force 
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which will increase most rapidly and account for the great bulk of 
the total increase. Even in.th.e fourth experiment (development 
concentrated on the rural areas and very little migration) the 
rural labour force accounts .for only a little over 22 per cent of 
the total ,increase to the end of the century, and in the other 
experiments the proportion is only from 3 to 15 per cent. In the 
fourth experiment the rural labour force expands at an average 
rate of 3.1 per cent per annum to the end of the century, but in 
the other experiments the rate ranges from 0.8 to. 2.4 per cent. 
As a consequence the rural labour, force is likely to decline 
substantially in relative importance: from nearly one quarter of 
the total in 1970 the proportion drops to about half that figure 
if migration continuep_to be fairly substantial, and even in the 
first and fifth experimental where migration is assumed to be much 
slower, the proportion, declines to about 18 per cent. These figures, 
in conjunction with the fact that available agricultural resources 
in Venezuela are still relatively abundant, indicate that employment 
pressures in. the rural area are not likely to be a major problem. 
On the contrary, it.is easier, to envision a situation where.labour 
shortages, in the. rural area could.. become evident by the end of the 
century. 
- The situation in the urban area is very different. It is in 
the cities that the great bulk of the increase in the labour force 
will occur. Even inthe.fourth experiment (rural oriented growth) 
the urban labour force is 24 times-the 1970 figure at the end of 
the century. In all of the other experiments the urban labour 
force triples or more in size, implying average rates of increase 
of 3.7 to 4.0, per cent per annum to the end of the century. 
By contrast with the situation at the national level, however, 
this increase, while very rapid, will not involve rising pressures 
for employmentin the cities. During the 1960s the urban labOur 
force increased at the rate of 4.8 per cent per annum, and in all 
of the experiments the rate of increase then declines steadily to 
the end of the century. In the second and third experiments, with 
/migration continuing 
6o 
migration continuing to be fairly rapid, the rate of increase falls 
only slightly during the 1970s, and does not drop below 4 per cent- 
per annum until the second half of the 1980s; in the other experiments, 
with less migration, the rate of increase is already down to around 
4 per cent per annum in the 1970s, and declines further in the 
early 1980s. 
Thus, although the urban labour force will continue to expand 
at a• rapid'rete at least to' the end of the century, and this is 
likely to mean continuing pressure for employment opportunities, 
, 
the pressure Can be expected to ease somewhat from that experienced 
during the 1950s and 1960b.' This is a further aspect of the mass, 
migration to the cities which has already been stressed at several 
points. During'the 1950s 'and 1960s a major part of the increase 
in the- urban labour force was accounted for by the inflow from the 
.,rural areas. As'the transition from a rural to a basically urban 
population Structure has now already occurred, this inflow is a 
steadily smaller Proportion'of the urban labour force. Therefore, 
even though the labour force from within the urban population itself 
is increasing' at a faster rate (the population bulge is entering 
the young adult age group), the total increase is at the same time 
at a slower rate.1/ 
1/ 	Here too it needs to be noted that this slowing is true only 
of the rate of'increase. The increase in the absolute size 
of the urban labour force is steadily larger in all of the 
experiments. During the five-year period 1965-1970 the urban 
labourforce expanded by slightly more than one half million. 
(This was itself a sharply higher figure than the increase 
during the preceding five-year period.) The absolute'size of 
the increase then rises until, during the 1995-2000 period,  
it is well over 900,000 even in the fourth experiment, and 
in the other experiments averages around 1.2 million. The 
number of new urban jobs required will therefore continue to 
rise at least to the-end of the century. But this rising 
absolute number will be a steadily declining percentage of 
the total urban labour force. 
/An, interesting 
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An interesting feature of this change is that the source of 
the increase in the urban-labour force will be quite different in 
the years ahead. During the 1950s, and to a lesser extent during.. 
the 1960s, a major part of the expansion in the urban labour force 
has been due to the arrival of migrants from the rural areas. 
During the 1970s and after, on the: other hand, recent migrants 
will be relatively less important; the still rapid increase will 
increasingly be dominated by new entrants who have grown up in the 
urban areas. The expectations and responses of this group are 
likely to be different from those of new arrivals, and for this 
reason the pressures for adequate employment opportunities may 
take different forms in the years ahead. 
One aspect to emphasize about the overall increase in the 
labour force is that, in every experiment, this increase is 
substantially greater than the increase in the population itself. 
At the extreme, ia the second experiment, while the population 
slightly more than doubles by the end of the century the labour, 
force expands 2 5/4 times. Further, the expansion of the labour 
force is quite similar in the different experiments, while the 
increase in the population as a whole varies much more with the 
assumptions made about trends in fertility rates. This points up, 
the important fact that the population trend alone is not 
necessarily a good indicator of how the size of the labour force 
is changing. During periods of demographic transition, such as 
that being experienced in Venezuela, the two trends may well diverge 
markedly. 
As a consequence of the more rapid growth of the labour force, 
the total activity rate in Venezuela can be expected to rise 
substantially. Whereas only 30.6 per cent of the population was 
a part ofthe active labour force in 1970, this percentage will 
rise steadily to the end of the century: to at least 33.9 per cent 
(in the first experiment) and perhaps much higher (to 41.9 per cent 
in the second'experiment). Among other things, this will mean, that 
per capita incomes will rise quite apart from any rise achieved 
/in productivity 
in productivity levels, for the inactive population to be maintained 
will be relatiVely smaller, If the average productivity per member 
of the labour force should remain constant, for example, there would 
still be an increase in per capita incomes at the end of the 
century: ranging fromnearly 11 per cent in the first experiment 
up to 37 per cent in the second eXperiment. This is a major, and 
fairly immediate, etonomic'benefit to be derived from a slowing of 
the rate Of foopuiation groWth. 
Significant changee will also occur in the structure of the 
labour force in coining years. As already noted, there will be a 
, 	. 
continuation of'the relative shift from the rural- to the urban area. 
In addition, women will prObably make- up arising proportion of the 
total; and, finally, the importance- of adolescents is likely to 
decline, offset by 'a rise in the proportion of adults, particularly 
the young adult group. To Make clear the meaning of these shifts, 
it is useful to discuss briefly the activity Coefficients in 
VenezUela, and the assumptions made in the experiments about how 
these Coefficients may'change. 
The initial labour iparticipatiOn'rates in Venezuela show the 
sort of structure common (in broad oUtline if not in detail) to 
many countries in theregion.1/ First, Women forma relatively small 
proportion of the labour'force. In the rural areas well under 10 per 
cent of the labour forte-is recorded as female, but too much meaning 
cannot be attached to'this figure as it probably reflects in part rural 
conventions about who is considered to be an "active" member of the 
labour force.2/ Even in the urban areas however only 23 per cent of 
• 
1/ 	The initial coeffiCiente Were estimated on the basie of the 1961 
census date, the, latest available at the time. the estimates were 
made. It was then assumed that the age specific participation 
rates for each area remained unchanged until 1970'. 
2/ 	The rural labour forte participation'rates for women are nearly 
constant around the low level of 10 per cent throughout the 15-60 
year age range. By contrast nearly all men from the ages of 20 
through 70 are recorded as members of the laboUr force; and three-
quarters of those over 70 and of those in the 15-19 year age group 
are recorded as active. This contrast almost certainly has a good 
deal to do with definitions'and conventional"ways of responding to 
the census, so the figures for the rural labour force must be 
used only, with considerable reservation. 
/the labour 
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the labour force is female and the great majority of urban women 
remain inactive; even in the 20-24 year age group (where the highest 
coefficient is registered) less than one-third are members of the 
labour force. The bulk of the women who work are young - women 
between the ages of 15 and 29 account for over half the total in 
the urban area - but this is due to the age structure of the 
population as well as to the higher participation rates among younger 
women. 
Among males participation rates are in general rather high. 
This is particularly true in the rural area where, as noted, it is 
probably due in part to conventions of classification. In the urban 
area male participation rates for the 25-55 year age groups are 
closely similar to those in Western Europe, for example; but 
participation rates are notably higher for those under 25 and for 
those over 55. These higher rates probably reflect somewhat lower 
school attendance for adolescents and very young adults, and less 
general social security benefits which keep more of the older 
population in the labour force. 
It is clear from the above what kinds of changes might occur 
in the labour participation rates. For males, participation rates 
for the young and for the older population may decline; and it is 
difficult to envision circumstances which might lead to significant • 
increases for any age group. Labour participation rates for the 
male population as a whole are therefore likely to decline, although 
probably only moderately. Female participation rates, by contrast, 
are much more likely to rise, and the potential increase could be 
large.1/ On both scores - falling male participation rates and 
rising female participation rates - the relative importance of women 
in the labour force can be expected to increase. 
By comparison with Western Europe, for expample, the female 
participation rates in Venezuela are low for the,: entire 15-69 
year age range. They are somewhat higher for the 10-14 and over 
70 age groups, but the coefficients are in any case very low for 
these groups and they are not a significant factor in the total. 
For much of the age range the participation rates in Western 
Europe are about double those in Venezuela. 
/These were 
These were the directions of change postulated in the simulation 
experiments. As a possible "target" toward which participation 
rates might move, the rates which prevailed in France in 1968 were 
used.1/ In the second experiment (urban oriented development with 
great change in the population parameters) it is assumed that the 
urban participation rates reach the 1968 French level by the end of 
the century. In the third experiment they move most of the way to 
that level, and in the other experiments in the same direction but 
by lesser amounts. With respect to rural, participation rates, the 
greatest change is in the fourth experipent (rural oriented development) 
where it. is assumed that by the end of the century they become the 
same as the rates which prevail in the cities; that is, this type of 
development would tend to eliminate differences between the rural 
and urban areas. In the other experiments smaller changes are 
assumed. But again the rural labour force figures must be used with 
caution because of the partially arbitrary nature of the initial 
labour force coefficients. 
These assumptions about labour force coefficients are one of 
the factors causing the structure (and also the size) of the labour 
force to change, and it is of some interest to determine the relative 
importance of this factor. Before going on to the consideration of 
changes in the structure of the labour force, the significance of 
changing coefficients in the growth of the labour force can be 
briefly mentioned. 
At first glance it would seem that this could be of major 
importance because higher participation rates for women might lead 
The reasoning was that this was a reasonably diversified, 
industrialized urban economy, with a social structure perhaps 
closer to that of Latin America than some of the other 
industrialized economies of Western Europe. As such it might 
provide an indication of the direction in which labour 
participation, rates could be expected to move. It must be 
admitted however that there is a considerable element of guesswork 
in the selection-of the labour participation rates which are 
projected to prevail at the .end of the century. This is 
particularly true of the female participation rates, where the 
range of variation from one country to another, even within Latin 
America, is very. substantial.„ 
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to a major expansion of the total labour force. In the specific 
circumstances likely, to prevail in Venezuela however, changes in 
participation rates are in fact of only secondary importance. This 
can be clearly seen from the results of the second. experiment, where 
the greatest changes are assumed (participation rates move to 
Western European levels). If, instead of the figures shown in 
table 11, the labour force in the year 2000 is calculated on the 
assumption that all labour force participation rates remain unchanged 
at the 1970 levels, the difference is not great. The size of the 
labour force would be 2.6 times what it was in 1970, instead of the 
2.3 tires shown in the table. Even-in the second experiment then 
only 12 per cent of the increase in the labour force results from the 
postulated changes in participation rates, and in the other experiments 
this percentage is considerably smaller. 
The major reason for this modest impact is simply that, in 
Venezuela, the population of working age will increase very rapidly 
during the coming decades, and this insures a rapid increase in the 
labour force quite apart from the assumptions made about. participation 
rates. 
A secondary reason is that as participation rates change, they 
do not uniformly increase. As was noted above, male participation 
rates are relatively high for the very young and for the elderly, 
and a shift toward Weptern European levels means a decline in these 
rates and hence a slower groleth of the male labour force. It is 
only the female participation rates which rise,,but this rise can be 
substantial and the impact on the female labour .force alone much 
greater. In the second-experiment, for expample,. half the increase 
in the female labour force.-is due to the rise in participation rates. 
But about 40 per cent of the increase due to rising female 
participation rates is offset by the decline in male participation 
rates. Women still account for less than one-third of the labour 
force at the end of the century even in the second experiment, and 
so the impact of such changes onethe total labour force is limited. 
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There will also be significant changes in the structure of the 
labour force in the years ahead, and the trend of labour participation 
rates is likely to be of more importance in some of these changes. 
Apart from the continuing shift toward an urban labour force, the 
principal change is likely to be an increase in the relative 
importance of women. To a limited extent the migration to the cities 
alone brings about a change of this sort, for women are a considerably 
larger proportion of the labour force in the urban area. But the 
changes which may occur in participation rates can be much more 
importa]t here. In the third experiment, for example, where urban 
participation rates move about two-thirds of the way to the Western 
European level, the proportion of women in the labour force rises 
from less than 20 per cent in 1970 to 30 per cent at the end of the 
century; and in the second experiment the rise is of course even 
Ereat7c. It is the change in participation rates which causes the 
great bulk of the increase in relative - importance in - these experiments. 
The importance of women in the labour force can - therefore be 
expected to increase, and - if urban participation rates move closer to 
the levels which currently prevail in Western Europe the change will 
be quite substantial. 
There will also be significant changes in the age structure of 
the labour force, due both to changes in the age structure of the 
population itself and to probable changes in labour participation 
rates. Much the most important factor here is the changing age 
structure of the population, and this has been discussed in some 
detail above and need not be repeated here. In brief, there is a 
decline in the relative importance of teenagers (those 10-19 years 
of age) and an increase in the relative importance of all other groups, 
especially of young adults (those 20-39 yearS of age). 
Probable changes in labour participation rates reinforce the 
decline in relative imnortance of teenagers, as male participation 
rates for this group can be expected to fall. Participation rates of 
those over 65 are also likely to fall however and this, by contrast, 
/goes against 
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goes against the population trend; the net result may be a decline 
or a small increase in the relative importance of this group in the 
labour force, depending on the assumptions (see table 11)0 
The importance of the two factors can be illustrated with 
the results of the second experiment, which assumes the greatest 
changes. If there were no chance in labour participation rates in 
that e=eriment the importance of adolescents in the labour force 
would decline from 17.5 per cent of the total in 1970 to 1206 per 
cent at the end of the century; all other groups would increase in 
relative importance, especially young adults. With the changes in 
Participation rates which nave in fact been assumed,-the relative 
impontance of adolescents declines fruther to 1008 per cent at the 
end of the century, and there are further moderate increases in the 
relative importance of both the young and older adult groups. But 
there• is a reversal in the case of thoSe over 65. If there were no 
change in participation rates in the second experiment the relative 
importance of this group would rise from 3.4 per cent in 1970 to 
404 per cent at the end of the century; but with the decline in 
participation rates assumed in the experiment the percentage actually 
falls to 2.0 per cent at the end of the •century. 
The age structure of the female labour force is affected most 
by probable changes in participation rates. In 1970 - teenagers and 
young adults were a considerably larger proportion of the female 
labour force, and changing participation rates tend to shift the 
structure closer to that which characterizes the male labour force. 
But as already noted, the changing-age structure of the -
population itself is likely to be of substantially greater importance 
in determining the age structure of the labour force. Changing labour 
participation rates are likely to be the primary factor only in 






A. The Situation in 1970 and the Main Variables of  
the Simition Experimezil;s 
The demographic situation in El Salvador is quite different 
from that in Venezuela described above. There has not been the same 
e:;:tensive development of modern type activities concentrated in the 
urban areas; more traditional type, particularly rural, activities 
have continued to occupy a Major proportion of the population. This 
is ralected in the fact that in 1970 somewhat more than 60. per cent 
of the population continued to live in the rural area. Further, •there 
has been very little change in this respect in recent years. In 1930 
abe t the same porportion of the population was rural; after actually 
rising somewhat to 1950 the proportion then declined slowly during the 
1950s and 1960s. El Salvador is the only one of the four countries 
considered in this study where rural-urban migration during the past 
several decades has not lead to a substantial decline in the relative 
• 	, 
importance of the rural population. Viewed from the urban side, tills 
means that the rate of growth Of the urban population in recent years 
reflects primarily the natural increase in the urban population; 
migration has contributed relatively little to the increase. While 
the urban population has been increasing somewhat faster than the 
rural population since 1950, the difference is modest; in the other 
countries considered the contrast between rural and urban rates of 
growth is much sharper. 
A major implication of •  this situation is that a mass migration 
to the cities:  such as has already cocurred or is currently talzing 
place in many countries of the region, remains only a possibility for 
the future in El Salvador. The impact such a mass migration can have 
on the population structure has already been stressed in the analysis 
/of Venezuela 
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of Venezuela - viewed there as a movement which has already taken 
place. One of the most important aspects of the simulation 
e:..:periments for Ll Salvador will be to clarify the shifts which would 
occur in this country should such a migration occur during the 
relaining years of the century. 
fertility rates are high, and have not yet shown any substantial 
tendency to decline. '.he CELA,D'estimates•show ani_ncrease from the 
early 1950s to the early 1350s; and cal hough there was then a mild 
decline to the late lfl.S0s this only meant a return to the fertility 
level which• prevailed in the early 1950s.It is probable that 
fertility rates are Significantly higher in the•rural than in the 
urban areas, although on]y limited data are available here. Birth 
registration data (on a departmental rather than strictly rural-urban 
basis) do not indicate any consistent difference, but this can be 
eplaned by assuming under-registration in the rural area. The 
census data show that the ratio of infants (these less than.  One year 
of ate) to warren of child-bearing age is significantly higher in the 
rural than in the urban area, and it is on the basis. of this data 
that the differential has been calcula tee— For the years immediately 
preceeding 1970 the total fertility rate was estimated at about. 5.5 • 
in the urban and 7.3 in the rural area. The situation here is similar• 
to that in Venezuela: the rates are still high in both areas So that 
the natural population growth is rapid, but there is an important 
difference so that rural-urban miration can have a significant impact 
on the rate of total population increase. 
As already noted, rural-urban migration has not been very large 
in recent. years; certainly much less important than in many countries • • 
of the region. The structure of that migration however has been 
quite similar to that in Venezuela, already described in some detail. 
First, more women than men. migrate. The 1961 .census shows that 
40 per cent of all women but only D6 1/2 per cent of the men lived in 
the cities; and the contrast is even greater if children are' eliminated 
and the comParison is limited to groups where migration has had• more 
/Of an 
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of an impact. Less than 38 per cent of young male adults (those 
20-59 years of age) lived in the cities while 43 1/2 per cent of the 
females did; and while the percentage remained at about 38 per cent 
for males, for females it continued to rise with age, reaching 50 per 
cent for those 65 and over. 
In terms of age structure it is again primarily the very young 
who migrate: nearly three-quarters of those who moved to the cities 
appear to have been less than 25 years of age. It should be noted 
however that during the period for which the structure of migration 
was estimated there was a Significant movement of people out of the 
country, and this complicates the calculations.. 1/ The estimates for 
El Salvador therefore cannot be used with the same degree of confidence 
as those for Venezuela; but, especially as the two sets of estimates 
are similar in broad outline, they are quite adequate for present 
purbo5.e:,. 
Finally, it has been assumed that death rates are the same in 
the urban and in the rural areas. This may well be an incorrect 
assumption, but appeared to be the best hypothesis. to adopt given the 
nature of the available data. There are no figures 	woulj support 
the expected result - higher death rates in the rural areas - and the 
possibility that the reverse is true cannot be excluded.2/ It does not 
The movement of people from the rural area can be 	as 
already described for Venezuela. however, one does not know in 
what proportions those who left the rural area moved to the 
cities, or left the country.- For the same reason the net increase 
by age group in the cities cannot be used as a check against the 
calculations of ,rural migration. 
There are no strictly urban-rural figures. Death rates, by age 
group, can be calculated for each "departamento". If the most 
heavily urban and the most heavily rural "departamentos" are 
compared the results actually indicate substantially higher death 
rates in the urban areas. Registered infant mortality rates 
(those less than five years of age) are almost twice as high in 
the predominantly urban departamentos. Death rates are then 
about the same in the two groups for those 5 to 40 years of age, 
but for those above 1+0 the rates are again substantially higher 
in the urban departamentos. These unexpected results can be 
elLplained away by assuming under-registration of deaths in the 
rural areas. It seems unlikely however that in reality (concl.) 
/seem likely 
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seem likely that the differential is very great in El Salvador however, 
and, taking into account the lesser impact of death rates on the 
simulation calculations, the assumption of no_difference. is adequate 
for present purposes. 
B. :2esults of the Simulation Experiments 
Seen in the context of this demographic situation, the 
assumptions o: the simulation experiments acquire more specific meaning. 
In El Salvador it is the first experiment which, in all aspects, most 
closely resembles the experience of the recent past: relatively little 
C hance in the underlying demographic variables and only a modest amount 
of ru.7.7al-urban migration. 
The second experiment, by contrast, implies a sharp departure 
from past trends. There is very substantial migration to the cities; 
birth rates decline substantially,. especially in the urban area; and 
lab,Jur loarticpation rates in the cities move to the Testern European 
levels. The same departure from past trends is implied in the third 
experiment, although to a lesser extent. 
The fourth experiment (concentration on the rural area and 
substantial change in the.rural parameters) is in a sense. a more 
realistic alternative in El Salvador. The rural economy is a more 
important part of the total :nail in many countries, and there has not 
been the same domination of modern type urban oriented activities. 
The bulk of the population is still rural and. so it is easier to 
envision a policy orientation of this sort. 
As the extent of rural-urban migration is likely to be a 
crucial feature in El Salvador, a sixth simulation experiment was run 
to consider this aspect in another context. .The. second and third 
G/ (cone).) death rates are much higher in the rural areas in 
El Salvador. The death rates calculated for the urban 
departamentos are ruite high, by comparison with the national 
estimates of CELADE, so it seems unlikely that rural death 
rates could be much above those levels. The assumption used 
in the experiments is that death rates were the same in the 
two areas in 1970; but it is quite possible that they may 
actually be somewhat higher, at least for certain ace groups, 
in either the rural or the urban area. 
/experiments assume 
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expeperiments assume substantial migration, in the context of 
substantial, urban oriented, change. Jut there is also the 
possibility of substantial migration occurring while the underlying 
population parameters show relatively little change; this, for 
example, was the pattern followed in the mass shifts to the cities 
in Venezuela over the past several decades. The results of such a 
trend are examined in the sixth experiment, which assumes heavy 
migration but otherwise the assumptions of relatively little change 
of the first experiment. 
The results of the usual five experiments, plus this sixth 
experiment in the case of El Salvador, are shown in table 12. 
Pc-uaAation trends 
It appears likely that the population at the end of the century 
will be about 2 1/2 times as large as it was in 1970. The increase 
will be somewhat less if birth rates decline sharply; but even in the 
second experiment - with mass migration to the cities and the 
assumption that urban birth rates fall to the zero growth level (in 
a stable population) by 1935 - the population substantially more than 
doubles. In the first experiment, which assumes little change from 
the 1970 situation; the population at the end of the century is 
2.0 times what it was in 1970. From 3 1/2 million in 1970, the 
population will increase to more than 7 1/2 million even if there is 
a sharp fall in birth rates; to around 8 3/4 million with assumption 
of more moderate but still fairly substantial change (the third, 
fourth and fifth experiments); and to 9 3/4 million if there is 
relatively little change from the 1970 situation. 
/Table 12 
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Table 12 
SET,ULATIOIT EXIfiliENTS.S/ 131, SALVADOR: ar't,SULTS 07 T} 
Population-(thousands) 	3 400 	9-744 - 
Rural 	 2,111 5,.491 
1970 Em peri- 
Ment 	I 
Urban - 1 36'9 	4.253 
Population (1970 = 100) 	 100 200 
Rural 	 . . '100 	-260 
Urban 100 311 
Rate of increase (;;,', p/a)12./ 	3.2 	- 	3.6 
Rural 	' 3.04 3.4 
Urban 3.5 	3.9 
7Lpulat:2.on distribution (;) 
Rural 	 60.6 	56.4 
Urban 39.4 . 43.6 
Topul:Ltion age structure (3)  
0 - 	4, , 10.4 	. 	18.1 
5 - 14 23.6 27.9 
15 - 19 	 10.2 	10.6 
20 „-9.2 25.6 , . 	26.9 
4o - 34 	 14.0 	- 13.4 
65 aid ever 	 2.2 - 3.2 
Rural age structure (9) 	• 
0 - 	4 19.2 	19.5 
5 - 14' 29.7 29.4 
15 - 19 	 . 	10.2 	. 	10.4 
20 - ;9 24.7 . 25.3 
42 - 64 	 13.3 	. 	12.4 
6!; 	021"A. nVEY.' 	 -24i) ' .20 
(%) 
c - 	4 
Urban ego stl-ut•t;'.re 
17.0 	.16.3 
5 - 14 26.9 25.9 
5 - 19 	 10.3 	10.7 
20 - 39 27.1 28.9 
40 - 64 	 15.1 	14.7 
65 and over 	 3.6 3.5 
Labour force (thousands) 	1 100.6 	3 200.3 
Rural 	 648.5 1 729.3 
Urban 452.1 	1 	170.5 







































































































































































The year 2000 
F.::per•- 	i3Xperi- 	Experi- 
ment II ment III ment IV 
7 566 • 	- 8 874 	8.670 
2,033 2.940 4 953 
5 537 	5,934 	3 725 
•217 • 	255 249 
• 96 	139 	235 
404 433. 272 
2nperi- 	'2:Teri- 
	




5 028 	g3 
253 263 
179 	, 100 
'367 514 
Rate of increase (5!, p/a)2.)/ 	3.2 	3.3 	3.1 	3.5 	3.5 	3.5 	3.5 
Rural 	 3.1 0.2 1.4 3.3 2.3 043 
Urban 3.4 	14.1 4,0 	4.5 3.6 4.3 4.6 
Nale labour force (1970 = 100) 
Rural 
Urban 
Female labour force (1970 = 100) 
Rural 
Urban 






























































































































100 291 277 286 281 203 ' 286 
100 267 108 151 269 197 109 
100 325 520 479 293 4o6 539 
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Table 12 (concluded) 
- 	• 	1970' 
. 
' 
Labour force age structure V) 
10 - 19 	. 23.1 
20 - 39 47.3 
40 - 64 24.9 
65 and over 	 4.3 
Rural labour force age structure (6) 
10 - 19 	 ..r.2 
20 - 39 41,7 
40 - 64 	 2;3..g 
65 and over 
Urban labour force age structure (();) 
xperi- 


















The year 2000 
 L 
	
Expert- 	Experi- 	Experi- Experi- 
meat III meat IV meat V 	ment VI 
17.5 	16.1 	17.3 	18.7 
53'2 54.1 53.6 24.8 25.8 25.9 25.7 
:24:.5; 
2.8 	3.9 	3.4 




25.6 24.9 	25.6 
' 5.3 	4.0 	4.6 5.9 
- 	10 - 19 
20 - 39. 
4o - 64 
65 and over 
;ale uaban labour force age 
structure (d) 
10 - 19 
20 - 39 
40 - 64. " 
- 	65 and over 
i'omele ur .can labour forge age 
Structure n. 
10 . 	12 
20 - 39 .. 	. 
40 - 64 







































• 13.8 	15.7 	14.5 	16.7 
- 56.2 54.2 56.8 55.3 
26.4 	26.3 	26.3 	24.6 
1.6 3.9 2.5 3.4 
13.2 	 13.6 	15.3 
57.7 ''/-3. 56.2 54.6 
.27.3 27.8 	27.4 26.2 
1.3 	4.4 2.8 	3.9 
14.8 13.7 	 20.0 




1.3 2.7 	1.8 2.3 
The 197J aztkic estimates of population, by sex and 5 year age group, provided the basis for the 1970 esti- -- 
mates sh,)wn. rural/urban differences were estimated with the use of a few aggregate figures which were 
available from the 1971 census plus the detailed data from the 1961 census. The CUD2 estimates of age 
spec*fic h_ di rates and dr at., rates were used as the starting point in all of the experiments - again with 
rural,/a ).reakdoITLs estimated from census data, Labour participation rates, by sex and 5 year age group, 
were esated dirletly from the. census data. The principal assumptions which determine the results of the 
experiments rclate to mizration rates, fertility races, and labour .participation rates. The different 
migration rates asSued can be roughly juded from thetable on the. basis of the populatin'shift from the 
rural to the urban area in the . different eXperiments. The assumptions about fertility rates'were as 
follows... In the 1965-170 period the total fertility rate was estimated to be about 7.3 in the rural and 
5.5 in the urban area. these figures vera-assumed to decline lineally. until in the last period of the 
ri expements ,(1995-2000) they were as follows: experiment I, r6.7 aW d 4.7 respectively; experiment II, 6.2 
and 2.2; ex?riment III, 6.2 crid 3.3; experiment IV, 4.8 and 4.1; experiment V, 5.5 and 4,1; experiment VI, 
6.7 and 4.7. Changes in labour partici•ation rates to the end of the century were: experiment I, little 
change; experiment II, urbal- rates to the Uesterx European level and some shift in rural rates; e:;peri-
ment III, urban rates about three-quarters of the way to the Western European level and some shift in rural 
rates; experi.celt r?, little cane in urban rates -rd rural • rates to the urban level; experLient V, midway 
between experiments III and IV; experiment VI, little change. There were also assumptions about differential 
trends in mortality rates, but these have much less impact on the results than assumptions about the other 
variables. Me trend in total mortality r:Aes is that used in the ELAD2 projections. 
a/ On1:- the results at the and of the exlyariments -that is the year 2000- are shown as this is the single figure 
of most interest; the 1970 figures are shown fo2 comparison. The trend is not necessarily smooth throughout 
the 30 year period however, and this can be of considerable importance. Some instances of this sort are noted 
in the analysis. 
The rates of increase shown are the annual rates of increase during the 5 year period up to the date shown. 
That is, in the first column they are the annual rates during the period 1965-1970; in the other columns during 
the period 1995-2000. These final rates are of course not necessarily the same as the average rate during the 




This means that rates of population growth will remain high. 
Even in the second experiment the rate of increase falls only from 
3.2 per cent per annum in 1970 to 2. per cent at the end of the 
century. In the experiments with intermediate assumptions the rate 
remains approximately constant to,1990 - despite important declines 
in birth rates - and then declines only slowly during the last decade 
of the century (to•around 3 per cent per annum). In the first 
experiment, with little decline in birth rates, the rate of population 
increase actually rises, to 3.6 per cent per annum at the-end of the 
century. That the rate of population increase does not fall in line 
with the decline in birth rates assumed is. in part due to the 
continuing decline in death rates; but the more important factor is 
the rapid increase in the number of women of child bearing age. 
Especially in the second simulation experiment, this age group is of 
rising relative importance, and this partially offsets the impact of 
falling age specific birth rates. This aspect is discussed in more 
detail below in the section dealing with changes in the age. structure 
of the population. 
In El Salvador then, a continuing rapid increase in population 
to the end of the century is to be expected, and the population will 
become very large indeed relative to the geographic size of the 
country. In 1950 the population was about 1.9 million; during the 
second half of this century it-is likely to rise to well over 
4 1/2 times that figure. This is similar- to the change to be 
expected in Venezuela, and again will mean great changes in economic. 
and social organization. nut whereas in Venezuela this sharp increase 
began when the country was sparcely populated and with a very generous 
resource endowment, in El Salvador the situation is quite different. 
The country has long been one of the most densely populated in the 
region; in 1950 there was already some population pressure and 
migration out of the country has at times been important. A very 
/approximate aPpreciation 
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approximate appreciation can be conveyed simply by noting the number of 
people per square kilometre of territory: 90 in 1950, 164 in 1970, and 
more thah 400 a likely figure for the end of the century.1/ 
It is by'no means impossible to achieve rapid growth and high 
income levels in a country with high population density; several of 
the high income industrial countries of Western Europe, for example, 
currently have densities of around 300 people per squarejalometre. 
Nevertheless, such high densities in a country which is still mostly 
rural and where income levels are relatively low - coupled., importantly, 
with the continuing high rates of increase which are to be expected -
are likely to considerably complicate the problems of economic and 
social development. The figures cited are very high by comparison with 
other less developed countries. The density in El Salvador was about 
the same as that in India in 1970, for example, and the population is 
growing faster 	21 Salvador; the density in China is less than half 
that in El Salvador. It seems likely that difficulties arising from 
population pressures will be among the more serious ones faced in the 
coming decades. Some of these difficulties, but only insofar as they 
relate to rates of growth rather than the density itself, are noted 
below. 
The way in which population trends evolve in the urban and in 
the rural areas will be of major importance in determining the course 
of economic and social development in El Salvador during. the coming 
decades. In Venezuela the mass migration to the cities has already 
occurred, and so the great bulk of the future population increase can 
with considerable confidence be expected to occur in the urban area; 
and this has a number of important consequences which were noted in 
the analysis of the Venezuelan data (see pp. 44-48). In El Salvador 
the situation is very different: the population is still mostly rural, 
1/ 	The intermediate assumptions of experiments 3, 4 and 5 result in 
densities of 405-,415 at the end of the century. Only the minimum 
projection of the second experiment results in a lower density 
(354) and the first experiment results in a density of over 
450 at, the end of the century. 
/so that 
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so that mass migration to the cities remains a possibility for the 
future, Differing assumptions about migration rates and about birth 
rates in the rural and urban areas therefore produce widely varying 
results in this. respect. The different simulation experiments provide 
very different scenarios of population trends in the two areas in 
coming decades, and which of these scenarios is :in fact 'most closely 
followed must'be a basic factor in the formulation of economic and 
social policy. 
The great possible range - of variation can be readily seen by the 
final population distribution in'the different experiments. In the 
second and sixth experiments around three-quarters of the population 





the end of the century; in•the third experiment about 
in the fifth some 57 per cent; and in the first and fourth 
43 per cent. The differences reflect primarily different 
about migration rates, but also about birth rates in the 
The impact of these different assumptions. can be seen 
more clearly through an analysis of rates of population growth, and as 
it is the population growth - in the cities and in the rural areas which 
is the more important policy variable, this will be discussed in more 
detail. 
The impact of a possible mass migration can be seen, in 
isolation, by comparing the first and the sixth experiments. The 
first experiment assumes very little:migration (similar to the. recent 
past), while the sixth assumes a mass movement to the cities; all 
other assumptions are the same in the two experiments. In the first 
experiment there is a steady rise in the rate of growth of the rural 
population (from 3.0 per cent per annum in 1970 to 3i per cent at 
the end of the century), while in the sixth experiment the absolute 
size of the-rural population remains constant, migration to the cities 
completely offsetting the natural increase. As a consequence the 
entire population increase in the:sixth experiment is concentrated in 
the urban area, and over the 30year period as a whole the urban 
population increases at an average rate of 5.6 per cent per annum. 
/At the 
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At the beginning of the mass migration the rate of urban population 
increase is 7.5 per cent per annum, declining to 4.4 per cent at the 
end of the century.1./ The differing rates reflect the very:large 
impact that mass migration has in its early stages, but -which is a 
steadily declining proportion of the urban popUlatiOdi as the population 
shift.to the cities progresses. 
Comparison of the first and sixth experiments also-shows clearly 
the potential impact of the different fertility rates in the urban and   
rural areas. Age specific fertility rates in each area are identical 
in the two experiments, but significantly lower in the cities than in 
the rural areas. In the first experiment the rate of total population 
increase gradually rises, to 3.6 per cent per annum at the- end of the 
century. In the sixth experiment however the continuing shift to the 
cities (and assuming the migrant's fairly rapidly adopt urban patterns) 
stabilizes the rate of increase at 3.3 per cent per annum. At the 
end of the century the total population is more than 6' per cent larger 
in the first experiment than in the siXth.' This isithe extent to 
which the often expressed conviction that urbanization is a major 
1/ 	This is with the assumption that - the rural population remains 
steadily constant at the 1970 level. The natural increase is 
offset by migration and the number of these migrants also 
therefore remains approximately the same As the urban 
population is steadily rising migrants. thus represent a declining 
proportion of the total urban population and this,is the major 
reason'for the steady fall in the rate of increase of the urban 
population. The assumption of a constant rural population is a 
reasonable one for purposes of analysing the impact of amass 
migration (this was approximatelywhat occurred in Venezuela 
over a 30 year periodi for example), but other assumptions could 
of course be made. It would be reasonable, for example, to 
assume a gradual rise in the rate of migration, particularly as 
there has been relatively little movement to the cities in 
El Salvador. in the recent past so that the assumption of a 
constant rural population implies a sharp jump in migration 
rates. 'The effect of,a gradual rise in the migration rate would 
mean: a less rapid rate of increase in the urban populace at the 
beginning of the period and amore rapid increaae,later. This 
would in practice bea: question of considerable importance and 
would have to be investigated in more detail for policy purposes. 
/factor in 
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factor in lowering fertility rates$ and hence the rate of population 
increase, might be realized in the conditions prevailing in 
El Salvador. The impact is important, but is limited by the fact that 
fertility rates in the cities themselves remain high. 
The second.simulation assumes the same mass migration to the 
cities as the sixth, but also a rather larger decline in rural 
fertility rates, and a sharp drop in urban fertility rates, to the 
zero growth level at the end of the century. The total increase in 
population is therefore a good deal less in the second experiment 
- for the 30 year period as a whole the average rate of increase is 
2.6 per cent per annum compared to 3.3 per cent in the sixth 
experiment - and this is almost entirely the result of a smaller 
increase in the urban population. But the increase in the urban 
populationt  while much smaller than in the sixth experiment, is still 
very substantial: the urban population at the end of the century is 
four times its 1970 size. The second and sixth experiments in effect 
set the limits to the growth of the cities in 'the event a mass 
migration of the sort postulated should occur. At a minimum the urban 
population would increase four—fold, and the increase could be held to 
this size only if a steady and very large decline in urban fertility 
rates accompanied the shift. If there were no substantial fall in 
fertility rates the city population would multiply more than five-fold. 
For the 30.year period as a whole the average rate of growth of the 
urban population would range from 4.3 to 5.6 per cent per annum, with 
higher_rates in the early years and lower ones later on. 
Such a mass population shift in El Salvador in the 30 years 
following 1970 would approximately parallel the shift which occurred 
in Venezuela in the 30 years leading up to 1970. Around 1940 the 
Venezuela population was similar in size to that of El Salvador in 
1970, with the same percentage split between the urban and rural areas. 
The rural population then remained constant because of very heavy 
migration to the cities, and the urban population increased at very 
high, but declining, rates; there was no decline in fertility rates 
/until toward 
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until toward the end of the period. Such a-sequence is one poStible 
scenario for El Salvador in the years to come, and much could no dbubt 
be learned of the major problets posed by such a mass shift 'through 
a study of the Venezuelan experience. There will be many differences 
of course. A central one is that Venezuela was sparcely populated at 
the time and El Salvador is not; and revenues were also more adequate 
in Venezuela than they seem likely -to be in El Salvador. On both 
scores the process is likely to be more difficult to manageA.n the  
latter country. 
Another possible scenario, at the opposite extreme, would 
envision relatively little migration, with the bulk of the population 
remaining in the rural areas. Two versions of this are presented: 
the first simulation experiment - relatively little change from the 
1970 situations one aspect of which is little migration - and the 
,fourth experiment, where there is greater change but where development 
is concentrated on the rural areas and there is little moVement-to 
the cities for this reason. Insofar as population trends are concerned 
the major difference between the two is'the creator decline in birth 
rates assumed in the fourth experiment, particUlarly in-the rural 
area, and hence.the less rapid population increase. 
In each experiment there is only a stall decline (around 
4 percentage points) in the proportion of the poPulationaiiiing in 
the rural area. These experiments thuS establish limits to the rate 
of increase in the rural population in the event that there shOuld be 
no important migration to the cities in the decades ahead. - At a 
minimum, and assuming a substantial decline in rural fertility rates, 
the rural population would increase at an average rate of 2.9 per 
. 	„ 
cent per annum over the period as a whole, and although this rate 
would be declining, it would still be at 26 per cent per annum at 
the end of the century; the rural population would-multiply 
2 1/3 times during the 30 years. At e maximum, with only a small 
decline in fertility rates, the rural population would increase at an 
average rate of 3.2 per cent per annum; at the end of the century 
it would be 2.6 times the 1970 size and would be increasing at a rate 
of 3.4 per cent per annum. 
/These potential 
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These potential increases in the rural population are much 
smaller than those which would occur in the cities in the event of 
a mass population shift. But they are still very large, especially 
when considered in the context of the high population density, and 
hence limited availability of agricultural land, which already 
prevails in El Salvador. 
Finally, there are the simulation experiments which represent 
intermediate outcomes between the extremes of massive movement to 
the cities or almost no migration at all: the third and fifth 
experiments.. The third experiment is similar to the second in 
concept (development concentrated on the urban area), but with less 
extreme assumptions. The rural population continues to increase at 
a steady rate of 1.1 per cent per annum, increasing nearly 40 per 
cent to the end of the century and still accounting for about one-
third of the population at that time. The urban population, although 
it receives less migration from the rural area and is a -smaller 
proportion of the total at the end of the century, actually increases 
at a faster rate.than in the second experiment due to the less 
drastic drop in birth rates assumed. Although the total urban 
fertility rate does decline by more than one-quarter during the 
period, the rate of population increase in the cities averages 5 per 
cent per annum for the period as a whole, and is still at the high 
level of .4.1 per cent per annum at the end of the century. 
The fifth experiment is closer to the rural oriented development 
scenario. There is less migration than in the third experiment and 
the rural population increases fairly steadily at about 2 per cent 
per annum. The urban increase is correspondingly smaller, and about 
43 per cent of the population is still rural at the end of the 
century. 
There is thus a very wide range of possibilities in this aspect 
of future population trends. There is little doubt that the total 
population will increase at a rapid rate to the end of the century, 
but there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how the increase might 
/be split 
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be split as between :theurban,.and rural areas. Average rates of 
increase for the 30 year period as a whole in the,. rural area range 
from.zero to 3.2 per cent per annum in the different experiments, with 
the rural popu;ption, varying from 23 to 57 per cent of the total at 
the end of the century. The average rate of increase in the cities 
ranges from 3.4 to 5.6 per cent per annum, with the urban population 
at the end of the century from 2.7 to over 5times its 1970 size. 
Which of these wide range of possibilities actually materializes 
will be a basic factor in the economic and social development of the 
country, and migration trends will have to be closely, watched for 
policy purposes.. To the extent possible prediction of future trends, 
will have to be madet as planning for the infrastructure and social 
services required to accomodate such shifts usually has to begin some 
years before the services actually become available. 
Whichever form the evolution takes is likely to involve major 
challenges. If there is only a slow (or..no) increase in the rural 
population, pressure on the land will not increase, and resources 
assigned to the rural area can be used largely (or entirely) for 
improving per capita conditions. But if this is the case it will 
mean that the cities are expanding at an explosive rate and there is 
likely to be considerable pressure to concentrate resources on dealing 
with the urban problems. And even in this case of mass migration the 
rural population will be 40 per, cent or more of the total for at least 
10 to 15 years and so cannot be.regarded as a minor part of the 
population and so relatively easy to provide for. If there is little 
(or no) migration then the expansion of the cities will be less rapid 
and so easier to deal with. But this will mean that the rural 
population will continue to increase rapidly, and will remain the bulk 
of the total, with consequent rising pressures on the available land, 
There will.be difficulties either way - or with any combination 
of urban and rural expansion - but the problems that will arise and 
will have to be handled will be very different ones depending on which 
path is followed.- As_noted, urban-rural population trends will be a 
basic:factor in the country's development and will have to be 
closely watched. 
• /The Ade 
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The age structure  
In 1970 El Salvador had the youngest age structure of the 
four countries considered in this study, and this structure will 
probably not change markedly by the end of the Century. In 1970 
children (those less than 15 years of age) accounted for fully 
47 per cent of the entire population, while the older segment of the 
adult population (those 40 and over) accounted for only 17.2 per cent 
of the total. By way of comparison, these proportions would be very 
nearly reversed in an eventually stable population which was no longer 
increasing; but very little of such a shift is likely to occur in the 
next several decades in El Salvador. 
The only marked change occurs in the'second experiment, where 
both amass migration to the cities and a sharp and sustained fall in 
urban birth rates are assumed. If that should occur the proportion 
of children would decline to just over 35 per cent of the total at 
the end of the century, but even then those 40 and over would increase 
only to 21.3 per cent. It is primarily the young adult group which 
rises in relative importance in the second experiment so that the 
population remains a predominantly young one. The shift that occurs 
is that whereas in 1970 children heavily outnumbered adolescents and 
young adults, this relative dominance is gradually reversed. But even 
with the rather extreme assumptions of the second experiment the more 
mature adult group and older persons will' remain a minor segment of 
the population until well into the next century. 
In the other experiments the changes are a good deal less 
substantial. In the first experiment (little change 
situation) the age structure changes hardly at all. 
experiments (with intermecliate assumptions) there is 
in the proportion of children - to from 41. 5 to 43.3 
total at the end of the century - and a Mild increase 
importance of the other groups. 
from the 1970 
In the other 
a mild decline 
per cent of the 
in the relative 
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There are important differences in the age structure of the 
rural as compared to the urban area: essentially the rural population 
is somewhat younger, and less change occurs to the end of the century. 
Even in the fourth experiment (rural-oriented development with 
substantial change in the rural parameters) children still account for 
43 per cent of the rural population at the end of- the century. By 
contrast, in the second experiment, with:great urban change, the 
proportion of children in the cities.falls,to 31.2 per cent. 
The probably only moderate shift in the age structure reflects 
both the fact that birth rates have only recently begun a rather slow 
decline, and that the bulk of the population is still rural, where 
birth rates are at particularly high levels. There are a number of 
implications which are worth noting. 
First, the relative importance of the dependent population 
(those less than 15'and over 65) is likely to remain high. In 1970 
slightly over'half of the entire population fell in these dependent 
age.groups, a perdentage which would fall quite substantially 
(to 39.3 Per cent) at the end of the century with the assumptions of 
the second experiment, but which-would remain at very high levels 
(ranging from 45 to 49 per cent) with the more moderate assumptions 
of the other experiments. Nearly all of this dependent population 
will continue to be children through the .end of the century; the over 
65 ace group will probably still be significantly less than 4 per cent 
of the population. 
Apart from the general economic implications of having such a 
large dependent population to be cared for, the highproportion of 
children can be expected to exert continuing pressure on educational 
facilities. The more rapid population growth only began in the 1940s 
in El Salvador, but the school age population has been increasing at 
a rapidly rising rate since that date and, from the point of view of 
the country as a whole, the period of peak pressure has already passed. 
During the first half of the 1950s the rate of expansion of the 
primary school group (those 5 to 14 years of age) had already risen 
/to 2.8 
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to 2.3 per cent per annum. The rate of increase then rose sharply 
to 3.7 per cent per annum during the second: half of that detade, and 
remained at the very high level of approximately 4 Per cent per annum 
throughout 	1960s.  
During the' 1970a the rate of increase will be substantially less, 
falling to 3'per•cent per annum it the firSt half of the decade and 
to a somewhat lower figure in the 1975-1930 period (rates range from 
2.4 to'2.9 per cent'in the different- experimentS). :from 1930 on 
there is greater divergence, depending on assumptions about birth 
 
rates: in the second experiment,  with rapidly declining birth rates, 
the rate of increase in the primary school age group falls steadily, 
averaging around 2 per - tent- per•annum during the 1930s and falling 
below 1 per cent' per annum toward' the end -of - the'eentury; in the 
intermediate type experiments the rate of increase rises to around 
3 per cent per annum during the 1930s before again declining (rates 
range from 2.2 to 2.7 i.per tent per annum at the end of the century); 
and in the first- experiment, with only a slow detline in birth rates, 
the'rate of increase is again sharply higher during the 1930s 
(about 3.7 per cent per - annum) and declines only slightly from that 
level (to 3.6 per cent) at the end of the century. The fluctuating 
rates of increase in all•of the simulation experimehts•extept the 
second is a reflection of the changing. age structure as•the'initial 
higher rate of population increase works its way through the: age -• 
structure, setting in motion wave like changes. This aspect has been 
discussed in some detail in the analysis of the Venezuelan data and 
need not be repeated here. 
in summary, from the national point. of vieW the period of most 
rapid increase in the 7rimary school population was experienced in 
the 1960s; intermediate assuM7otions about birth rates indidate that, 
with some fluctuation, 'the mates of increase will continue at around 
3 per cent per annum until toward the end of the century.--IBut here 
again a major consideration must be'how•that - increase is divided,as 
between the urban and rural areas, and viewed in this way the period 
of greatest pressure may well still lie ahead. 
/Of greatest 
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Of greatest interest in this respect is the urban area, as 
pressure-for schooling facilities as well as for other amenities is 
usually expeCtod- to be stronger there. During the 1960s the urban 
primary school age population increased at an average rate of 4.2 per 
cent per annum, Slightly higher than the figure for the country as a 
whole. iiever;:heless, there is a good chance that this rapid rate of 
increase WilL-continte on. the average-to the end of the century, and 
there may well be•Shorter periods when the increase is a good deal 
faster. 
The average:rate of increase; for the 30 year period as a whole 
ranges from 3.1 per cent per annum in the fourth experiment 
(development centred on the rural area with very little migration. to 
the cities) to the: extremely high figure of 5.5 per cent per annum in 
the sixth experim•ht (mass movement to the cities and only a slow 
decline in birth rates); it is k.3 and 4.2 per cent per annum. 
respectively in the intermediate type third and fifth experiments. 
With the initiation of large scale migration there may well be a 
decade or so when the urban population of primary school age increases 
at rates of 6-7 per cent per annum. In the urban area alone there are 
likely to be fluctuations in the rate of increase considerably larger 
than those relating to the entire population, and these can be of 
substantial importance and will have to be carefully watched. Again 
this is an aspect which was discussed in the Venezuelan analysis and 
need not be repeated here. 
In sum, the urban primary school age. population will continue 
to increase rapidly until at least the end of the century, possibly 
at an average rate even higher than that of the recent .past, and there 
may well be shorter periods of extremely rapid expansion. To give an 
idea of the change in rnangnitude such rates of increase imply, some of 
the figures from the intermediate type third simulation can be .cited. 
The urban population of primary school age in 1970 was just under 
37(5 thousand. In the third simulation the figure rises to 
730 thousand in 19 ::, and to approximately 1.5 million at the end of 
/the century. 
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the century. ghat is, facilities•existing in 1970 will have to be 
multiplied four-fold over the 30 year period to provide places for 
the same proportion of the urban primary school age group as was in. 
attendance in that year. if the proportion attending primary...school_ 
in the cities is to be raised, or if the facilities per student. are 
to be improved, an even greater expansion will 'fie. required. 
mut although the relative importance of the dependent population 
is 	to remain 	the group which will increase most rapidly 
during the remainder of this century is the . young aThlt age group 
(those 20-39 years of age). -With 1970 =100,- the size of the group 
at the end of the century rises from 278 to 29" in the different 
simulations, iMplying average rates of increase for the 30 year period 
as a whple from 3.5. pe-r. cent to 3.7 per cent per annum,,- significantly 
above the 	rate of increase for the copulation as a whole. It 
is important to note that despite the widely varying.. assumptions in 
the different experimentsi there'is little variation in the expansion 
of this age group, a- reflection of the fact 'that there is a 20 year 
lag before changes in birth rates begin to affect the size of the 
group and so the different assumptions have no impact until toward 
the end of the century. 
The rapid rate of increase in this age group is a. rather sharp 
break with the experience of the recent past and will have a number 
of major consequences. As noted, the sharp rise in the rate of 
population growth only began in '22,1 Salvador in the 1940s. -.A4 the 
increase was at first concentrated to a major extent in the infant 
population, and then began to work its way through the •age structure, 
it was only in the 1950s that the impact began to be fully felt in 
the young adult group. During the 1950s and early 1960s the number 
of young adults inCreased at the moderately high rate of 2.4 per cent 
per annum (already a good deal faster than in earlier years due to 
the decline in'death rates,. At that point the earlier sharp increase 
in the infant population began to enter this age group and the rate of 
increase began to move to a sharplyhisher level: during the second 
half of the 1960s it was 3.1 per cent per annum, and from 1970 there 
/will follow 
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will follow a twenty year period when the increase averages the very 
high rate of 3.7 per cent per annum.1/ Only during the last decade 
of the century will the rate of increase decline again to somewhat 
lower levels, and at the end of the century it is still at 2.7 per cent 
Per annum even with the assumption of sharply falling birth rates of 
the second experiment; in the intermediate type experiments the rate of 
increase is still at around 3.1 per cent per annum at the end of the 
century. 
One major consequence of this rapid increase in the young adult 
population is that it increases the number of births, and this increase 
may even be strong enough to substantially offset the effect of 
declining age specific birth rates. It is primarily in this age group 
that birth. rates are high lin 1970 about-30 per cent of all births were 
to women in the2039 year age group), so that a-rapid increase. will in 
itselfi mean. a. large rise in the number of births. 
The impact can be s een,.most stril:ingly in the results of the 
first simulation. Ar:e specific birth rates decline steadily in that 
experiment - although slowly, and there is not much shift to the 
cities with their lower birth rates -• but the decline is more than 
completely offset by the increase in the number of women in the fertile 
age groups. The number of births rises sharply throughout the 
30 year period, and the rate of total population increase rises from 
3.2 per cent per annum in 1970 to 3.5 per cent at the end of the 
century.2/ 
- ---- 
The rate of increase will be 3.4 per cent per annum during the 
first half of the 1970a, 3.3 per cent from 1975-1980, 4.1 per 
cent from 1930-1935, and 3.5 per cent during the second half of 
the 1930s. 
The number of births rises steadily from about 145 thousand a 
year in 1970 to about 370 thousand a year at the end of the 
century, an average rate of increase of 3.2 per cent per annum 
for the period as a whole, despite the fact that age specific 
birth rates are steadily, if only slowly, declining. The rate 
of increase rises slowly through 1935 and then declines somewhat 
to the end of the century, coinciding with the trend in the rate 
of increase of the young adult population. 
/The same 
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The same sort of influence ,is present in the other experiments 
although it is not so clearly indicated in the form of rising rates of 
population growth. In the intermediate type experiments, despite 
substantial declines in age specific birth rates, the rate of total 
population increase remains approximately constant until 1990 and then 
only declines slightly, to around 3 per cent per annum at the end of 
the century. -2ven in the second. experiment, where there is a mass 
movement to the cities and urban birth rates decline sharply (to the 
zero growth level in 1995), the rate of population increase falls only 
to 2.6 per cent per annum in 1990 and to 2 per cent at the end of the 
century. 
If birth rates fall substantially from 1970, this will begin to 
have an impact on the rate of increase in the young adult population 
in 1990, and from that point on this will be a further factor slowing 
the rate of population increase. But for at least the first two 
'decades of the projections the young adult population will continue 
to expand at a very rapid rate, and this,, through its impact on the 
number of births, will mean that the population itself will continue 
to increase rapidly. 
The second major implication: of the rapid increase in the young 
adult population is the importance this has for the rate of growth 
of the labour force. • Labour force trends are of central importance 
to the analysis and, including this aspect, are discussed in detail 
in the following section. 
Labour force trends and structures 
At the national level, and in aggregate terms, the situation 
is very similar to that already described in Venezuela. The labour 
force will continue to expand.rapidly until at least the end of this 
century; asain, from the present point of view this is perhaps the 
most important single conclusion of the:analysis. The expansion is 
somewhat larger than that to be expected in Venezuela, and there is 
even less margin of possible variation in this conclusion in 
El Salvador. Despite widely differing assumptions in the .different 
/experiments, the 
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experiments, the size of the labour force at the end of the century 
varies only from 277 to 291 (1970 = 100). The labour force is more 
or less certain to be somewhat more than 2 3/4 times its 1970 size 
at the end of the century. for the period as a whole this means an 
average rate of increase which varies only from 3.5 to 3.5 per cent 
per annum in the different experiments. 
This very rapid rate of expansion of the labour force is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in El. Salvador. During the 1950s the 
labour force grew at a substantially slower rate, around 2.2 per cent 
per annum. The 1960s witnessed a sharp jump, the rate of increase 
rising to about 3.2 per cent per annum. And from 1970 to the end of 
the century the rate is likely to remain fairly steady at the high 
level of 3.5 to 3.6 per cent per annum.1/ The only partial exception 
is the second experiment where - due to the assumed rapid decline in 
birth rates - the rate of increase, after rising to a peak of 3.7 per 
cent per annum around 1900, declines steadily, although only slowly, 
to the end of the century. 
At the national level then the pressure for adequate employment 
opportunities will remain strong throughout the rest of the century. 
further, the intensity of this pressure may well be of a different 
order of magnitude from that experienced in the past; as noted, from 
1970 the labour force will increase at a substantially higher rate 
than during the 1950s, which in its turn was already markedly above 
that of earlier years. In absolute terms the number of new entrants 
to the labour force is strikingly larger as time passes, and the 
• 	- 
The figures for the 1950s and 1960s were calculated on the 
assumption that labour force participation rates remained 
unchanged during those decades. 	estimates actually indicate 
a small decline in male participation rates during the 1950s so 
that if those estimates are used the rate of increase during that 
decade is slightly lower and the contrast with the following 
decades somewhat more marked. from 1970 the rate of increase is 
not completely constant; there is a small rise to 1930, with the 
rate then falling back to about the 1975 level. This is not of 
great importance however; the important feature is that the labour 
force will continue to increase at a very high, and relatively 




figures are useful as an indiCation of the nature. of the problem. In 
1955 the labour force was larger' than in 1950 by nearly 100 thousand 
workers; that is there were about 20 thousand new entrants a year 
during that five year period. From 1965 to 1970 there were about 
32 thousand new entrants a year and, using the figures from the 
intermediate type fifth Simulation, the number will rise to 
60 thousand a year during the early 1930s and to 97 thousand a. year 
during the last half decade of the century. The flow of persons 
seeking employment- for the first time will therefore both be quite 
large in :relation to the total labour force and,. in absolute terms, 
the numbers will be rising rapidly. -If a.t any point - the number of 
job opportUnities should decline, or even not expand much, the volume 
of "unemployment° will thus rise sharply. There isnot much margin 
of time available in which to work out solutions  in circumstances 
such as these; the situation deteriorates very quietly. 
While there- ds•little doubt regarding labour force trends at 
the national level', there, is a' wide range. of possibilities as to how 
the total'increaSe• might be divided.as.between therural and the urban 
areas. The •situation is quite similar to that :already analysed for 
the population at'a whole, but may well be of even greater importance 
insofar •aS-the labour. force is concerned. Employment pressures tend 
to be felt in quite different ways in the two areas; onthe whole they 
are Probably more intd,se in the cities. 
SOme 59 per cent of the total labour force was-'rural in 
El Salvador in 1970, and the rural labour force will cearly continue 
to be a Major. segment of the whole.1/ gut just how important can vary 
widely depending on the assumptions made - at the end of thecentury 
the rural IaboUr force ranges all- the way  from 22.6 to 56.4 per' cent 
1/ 	Again it must be noted- that conventions of classification are an 
important factor in the size of the rural labour force. In 
El Salvador nearly all men in 'the active age groups are 
classified as mem]Jers of the labour force, while very few women 
are so classified. The rural labour•force figures must be used 
with this reservation in mind. • 
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of the total in the, different simulations - and this involves great 
dif ferences in 'how the increase is divided as •between the rural and 
urban-areas,: and in. the rates of growth of the labour force in the 
two areas. 
The rural. labour force always expands somewhat more slowly than 
the urban labour force; although birth rates are higher in. the rural 
areas, this is more than offset by even a small amount of migration. 
But this does not necessarily mean that the need for additional 
employment opportunities will be heavily concentrated in the cities. 
The rural labour force of course increases most rapidly in those 
simulations where it is assumed there is not much migration (the first 
and fourth 	In these two experiments the rural labour force 
increases at an average rate of 3.3 to 3j.- per cent per annum over 
the 30 year period as a whole121 and the absolute increase is larger 
than that in the urban area - despite the .fact. that the rate of 
increase is substantially higher. in the cities even in these 
experiments. That is, if there iz little movement to the cities 
(similar. to the situation in the recent past)1 even though the urban 
labour force will increase faster in relative terms, the majority of 
the 'labour force will still live in the rural areas and it is there 
that the larger number of additional employment opportunities will 
still have to be found. 
To the extent that migration to the cities becomes more 
substantial the situation changes. In the fifth experiment the 
average rate of growth of the rural labour force is 2.3 per cent per 
annum and for the seri odd. as a whole somewhat more than 30 per cent of 
..1101.411111=•••••111.■••-ar ynarawa■•• 
1/ 	In the first experiment, with little change in any of the 
population parameters, the rural labour force increases at a 
rate which rises gradually from 3.1 per cent per annum in 1970 
to 3.5 per cent at the end , of the century. In the fourth.  
experiment, where birth rates are assumed to fall substantially 
and labour participation rates: move to the urban level, the rate 
is higher.during the 1970s 0.4 per cent per annum) and 
thereafterdsat 3.3 per cent. These latter figures must be 
qualified' by the fact that the change in labour participation 
rates involves the problem that the 1970 rates reflect 
conventional rather than "real" classifications. 
/the growth 
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the growth in the entire'labour force will ,occur in the rural area. 
In the third experiment, with, more substantial migration, the rural 
labour force increases at the rate of 1.4 per cent per annum and the 
relative importance of employment requirements. in the rural area drops 
sharply - to about 16 per cent of the total for the period as a whole. 
And with the mass migration assumed in the second and sixth experiments 
there is essentially no 
entire exlpansion occurs 
• In the absence of 
will expand at.moderate 
population density, the 
productive agricultural  
increase in the rural labour force and the 
in the urban area. 
mass migration then the rural labour force 
or even quite rapid rates and, given the 
increase will not be easily absorbed in 
employment. Considerable pressures might be 
generated in 




of growth in  
such a situation probably in the form - of demands for 
other agrarian reform measures. 
is in the urban area that the labour force will grow 
and where the greatest. pressures for employment are 
felt. For the Period. as a whole the lowest average rate 
the urban labour force is 3.7 per cent per annum in the 
fourth simulation (rural oriented development), and even this figure 
is higher than the rural increase in any •experiment. This is the 
minimum increase, in an experiment which assumes almost no migration 
and in which there is an.. important. decline in urban birth rates; in 
these conditions the urban labour force expands quite. steadily to the 
end of the century, the• rate rising to 3.3 per cent, per annum during 
the 1975-1905 period and then declining only mildly to 3.6 per cent 
per annum at the end of the century. 
-From this minimum the rate rises with the varying assumptions 
of the other experiments. In the first experiment, with less of a 
decline in urban birth rates, but still little migration, the , rate 
of increase is 4 per cent per annum and there is no decline even at 
Lhe end of the century. in the other experiments migration is more 
substantial and as a result the urban labour force increases much 
more rapidly. litli only ,:moderate migration (the fifth experiment) 
/the average 
-94- 
the average increase is 4.3 per cent per annum, and with relatively 
large scale .movement to the cities (the second, third and sixth 
experiments) the rate averages from 5.4 to 5.3 per cent per annum. 
These are extremely high rates of increase to be sustained over a 
period of three decades; as- can be seen in table 12, at the end of 
the century the urban labour force would be around 5 times its 1970 
size. 
The pressure for urban enployment will thus be strong and 
persistent until at least the end of the century in El Salvador. 
During these years the urban labour force will be increasing rapidly, 
at a rate which will probably represent the culmination of a rising 
trend, and hence the period of maximum pressure. During the early 
1950s the urban labour force expanded at-perhaps 2.5 per cent per 
annum, and the rate has been rising steadily since; it was 3.4 per 
cent per annum in the latter 1960s, and was probably at about 4 per 
cent per annum in the early 1970s. - 
Thus, even if there is no important migration the urban labour 
force will be increasing at a rate well above that of the recent 
past; and at the same time it will be necessary to absorb a 
continuing- rapid increase in the rural labour force, also faster than 
in the recent past, and in circumstances where the rural labour force 
continues to account for the bull: of the total and must in itself 
represent a major preoccupation. To the extent that migration to the 
cities becomes more substantial, the pressures in the rural area will 
ease, but this will then mean a considerable period of extremely rapid 
growth in the urban labour force much more rapid than anything 
experienced in the past. 
Just how fast the urban labour force might expand in such 
circumstances can be better appreciated by noting the absolute size 
of the increase in the third simulation (urban concentrated development 
with substantial migration and subantial declines in urban fertility 
rates). During the latter 1960s the increase in the urban labour 
/force was 
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force was about 14 thousand a year; in the third experiment that 
figure rises to about 50 thousand a year by. the mid -1900s and to 
-nearly 90 thousand 	by the end of the century. Such a sharp 
increase in the number .of new urban jobs required is almost certain 
to create severe economic and social pressures. 
the situation is similar to that already analysed with respect 
to the population as a whole except that the pressures are apt to be 
somewhat more serious' as 	labour force will increase more rapidly 
than the general population during the remainder of the century. The 
pressure will be substantiallygreater than in the pastt and the 
principal.uncertainty is how it will bedivided as.between.the rural 
and the urban areas. Again migration trends will have toabe 
carefully watched as this is the factor that will determine the 
balance. If there is a mass movement to the cities the next several 
decades will be -a period of transition from a basically rural to a 
basically urban structure. This would probably . be similar in many 
respects to the transition which occurred in Venezuela during the 
1940 to 1970 period, and again some indications of the problems 
likely to arise and i,pssible solutions, could no doubt be obtained 
from a careful stud of that experience. 
In -:mil Salvador the total increase in the labour force varies 
little from one experiment_to another, and the increase is always 
larger than the increase in the population as a whole. 'This is 
similar to the situation already described in Venezuela, and has 
implications which are similar, although of less importance.here. 
Firsti population trends change more with varying_assumptions in the 
different experiments, and so again the rate of population growth is 
not a very reliable indicator of the labour force trend. Second, 
as the labour force will- grow fasterl athis will mean rising labour 
participation rates and some increase in 'ler capita incomes quite 
apart from changes in productivity levels. in Venezuela.this was 
shown to be of considerable importance, but is li=vely to be less so 
in hi Salvador, essentially because the, change in the demographic 
/structure is 
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structure is likely to be smaller. The total labour participation 
rate rises in all of the experiments, but only with the extreme 
assumptions' of the second experiment (mass movement to the cities and 
a decline in urban birth rates to the zero growth level) is the rise 
a large one. As a consequence, even if average productivity per 
member' of the labour force should remain constant, for example, the 
per capita income at the end of the century in the second experiment 
would be somewhat more than one-quarter above the 1970 level; in the 
intermediate type experiments the increase would be around 12 per cent. 
These increases are significant, but smaller than the corresponding 
figures in Venezuela. The latter country is somewhat further along 
in the process of demographic transition, and at a stage where the 
benefits of this sort are likely to be of greater importance. 
Subtantial changes are likely to occur in the structure of the 
labour force during the coming decades. iluch the most. important is 
likely to be the decline in the relative importance of the rural 
sector, an aspect which has been discussed in some detail above. In 
addition, there is likely to be a substantial increase in the relative 
importance of women in the labour' force and, finally, a decline in the 
relative importance of adolescents, offset largely by an increase in 
the importance of young adults. Again, to make clear the meaning of 
these shifts it is necessary to note the current activity coefficients 
and assumptions in the experiments about how these coefficients may 
change. This aspect was discussed more fully in the Venezuelan 
analysis; the situation in El Salvador is similar in general terms and 
so is noted here mere briefly, and in reference to the Venezuelan 
situation.1/ 
Women are here too a minor part of the total labour force, 
although in the urban area relatively more women work. than is the case 
in Venezuela. In general labour participation rates are somewhat 
higher in El Salvador, but the difference is particularly great for 
1/ 	See pp. 62-67 for a more complete discussion related to 
VeneZuela. 
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urban women: 18.3 per• cent ab against only 14.2 per cent in Venezuela. 
As a result, women account-ferclose to 30 per cent of the urban 
labour force in El Salvador. from the age of 15 to the age of 451  
30 per cent or more of all Urban women are active members of the 
labour fercel• significantly higher. figures than in Venezuela. There 
is a similar high proportion of the very young - those 13-29 account 
for about half the female urban labOUr••ferce• but again this is as 
much due to tie age structure of the population as to higher 
Participation rates in this age group. 
Bale participation rates are 	quite high. In the rural 
area they aro-particularly high, anCLprobablY reflect in part,- 
conventions ofclassiflcation; but they are also consistently high in 
the cities. AMong- adolescents and older Men-Participation rates are 
substantially higher than in Venezuela' (wherei.- as' noted, they are in 
turn well above ':"!ester:.'_ European rates) and probably reflect a greater 
for these groups to enter,-and.remain'in, the labour force, 
The sort of changes which are likely to occur are thus quite 
clear. I' r males, labour partiCipatien rates for the young and for 
the older population may decline, and there is significantly= more 
scope for such a decline'in'El Salvador than-in VenezUela as the rates 
are initially a good deal higher. Labour •participation rates for the 
male population• as a Whole'thight therefore -decline imprtantly-in • 
certain circumstances. - female participation rates. are much more 
likely to rise and, combined with falling male participation .rates', 
the relative importance of women in the labour force can be expected 
to rise, Perhaps substantially. 
These are the 	of change postulated in the simulation 
experiments, again with•the rates in Trance in 1968 taken asa• possible 
'target 	The second experiment assumes that urban participation' 
rates fully reach the 1963 'french levels at the end of•the•-•denturyl in 
the third experiment they move most of the way. to that level; and ;in 
the other'eXperiments in the same direction but by lesser . amounts. The 
greatest change in rural part=icipation rates is in the fourth 
/experiment, where 
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experiment, where urban-rural differences in this respect are assumed 
to gradually disappear. Smaller rural changes are postulated in 
the other experiments. 
Despite the rather considerable scope for change in the labour 
Participation rates, such changes are not a significant factor in 
the overall growth of the labour force. In part this is because the 
important changes are in opposing directions: the greater number of 
women. in the labour force as a result of rising female participation 
rates must be set against the decline in the number of males due to 
lower participation rates in the very young and'in the older age 
groups. But the major factor is simply that the population of working 
age is growing so rapidly that this completely overwhelms any effect 
of changing labOur participation rates. In the,•second experiment, 
where labour participation .rates change the most, 'such changes account 
for less than 4 per cent of the total increase in the labour force 
to the end of the century; this is an even smaller impact than in the 
corresponding experiment in the case of Venezuela. 
Changing labour participation rates can be of considerably 
greater importance in determining the structure of the labour force, 
although here too the impact is likely to be less in El, Salvador than 
in Venezuela. The principal change may well be the shift in the 
urban-rural composition of the labour force, and participation rates 
are not a factor here; the extent of the shift will be dteruined by 
the extent of migration. 
The second most important shift is likely to be the rise in the 
relative importance of women, and here changing participation rates 
can be of major importance. The relative importance of women in the 
labour force rises in. all of the experiments, and except for the 
first experiment the riseHis a substantial one. A large part of this 
rise reflects the movement from rural areas (where female participation 
rates are very low .and-male participation rates very high) to the 
cities (where female rates are much higher and male rates somewhat 
lower), but changing participation rates can produce substantial 
/shifts within 
shifts within each area as well. Thus, it the second and third 
eXperiments the 'proportion of women it the urban labour force rises 
from 2904 . per'Cent in 1970 to 55.7 per cent and 34.6 per cent 
respectively at the end of the century.1/ One important aspect of 
this is that the -number of women "in the labour force .can rise very 
rapidly in certain circumstances. In the second experiment, for the 
thirty year period as a whole, the female urban labour force increases 
at an average rate of 6.3 per cent per annum, and while migration is 
an important factor, well over one-quarter of:the total increase is 
the result of the assumed rise in female paa:ticipation• rates. 
Finally, there are'liizely to be substantial changes in the age 
structure of the populon, with adolescents and older workers 
(those 65 and over) declining and the other groups, particularly young 
adults, rising in relative impOrtance.--- A shift of this sort occurs 
in all of the experiments andf except in the first experiment, it is 
of considerable magnitude. A variety-et factors lie behind these 
changes, and they differ in force, and even in direction, in the two 
extremes of the age span. 
With respect to adolescents, if there is a.stbstantial decline 
in birth rates this will reduce somewhat' the. relative importance of 
this group in the population, and thts in the labour force itself; 
but this is tot the major factor in El:Salvador.. More important are 
the possible changes in labour participation rates. -First,. to :the, 
extent the urbat -population becoMesan increasing proportion of the 
total, adolescent workers will be of declining importance, as the 
percentage of adolescents in the labour force is smaller in the 
if In the fourth experiment .(rural oriented development) the 
proportion of women in the rural labour force rises much more 
sharply -. from somewhat more than o per -cent in 1970 to 27 per 
cent at the end of the century - but the low initial figure 
prObably reflects a conventional system of classification to an 
important-extent and so the magnitude of the shift is no doubt 
exagerated. 
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cities than in the rural area.1/ Second, .oarticipation rates for 
,male adolescents are quite high and may well decline; for example, 
participation rates are assumed to decline substantially for urban 
male adolescents in the second and third experiments, and for rural 
male adolescents in the fourth experiment. Finally, to the extent 
that female participation rates rise, this will affect primarily 
adult women and this too will reduce the importance of adolescents in 
relative terms. Combined, these different influences can result in a 
sharp decline in the proportion.of adolescents. In 1970 adolescents 
were 23 per cent of the total labour force, and in the intermediate 
type third and fifth simulations this figure falls to about 17.5 per 
cent at the end of the century; the decline is greater still in the 
second and fourth experiments. 
There is also likely to bea decline•in the relative importance 
of workers 65 and over. The importance of this age group in the 
population as a whole will rise slowly, but the scope for decline in 
labour participation rates is so large that this can be expected to 
more than offset such an increase. Female participation rates are 
quite low, for this as for other, age groups; but in 1970 over 80 per 
cent of all males 65 and over in the rural area and over 70 per cent 
of those in the cities were still members cf the labour force. The 
male "target" labour participation rate (that of France in 1969) for 
this age group is less. than 20 per cent, so the decline can be very 
large in certain circumstances, and this is what mostly accounts for 
the fall in the relative importance of older workers in the different 
experiments. 
---------------- 
It has been estimated that, for males, in 1970 more than 40 per 
cent of the 10-14 year age group and close to 90 per cent of 
those 15-19 were members of the'labour force in the rural area, 
whereas in the cities the co=esponding figures were only 11 per 
cent and 60 per cent respectively. For females, the percentage 
is approximately the same in the two areas for the 10-14 year 
age group, and is actually substantially higher in the cities for 
the 15-19 gram) (31 per cent in the cities as against only 14 per 
cent in the rural area). This again probably reflects in part 
the customary way of classifying rural women, but nevertheless 
it is a factor in the calculations, partially offsetting the 
decline in working male adolescents which results from a populatio: 
shift to the urban area. 
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liature but still fully active worers (those 20 to 6• years 
of ago) can thus be expected to be increasingly dominant during the 
coming decades: from 72.7 per cent of the total in 1970 their 
relative importance is likely to rise to around 80 per cent at the 
end of the century. And the lab,)ur force will remain a very young 
one. At the end Of the century . .young • adult_workers (those 20 to 39) 
are more than twice as numdrous as any other single age group, and 
are likely to account for well over half of the total labour force. 
Mese total results however do reflect' primarily the structure of 
the urban labour force; in the rural-area adolescent workers were in 





A. The Situation in 1970 and the Main Variables 
The demographic situation in Argentina is very different in 
fundamental respects from that in either of the two countries 
analyzed above. Argentina is a high income country, and although 
the agricultural sector is of key importance, particularly as a 
source of export earnings, the economy is nevertheless basically 
organized around modern type urban activities. This is reflected 
in the fact that the population is also predominantly urban, the 
cities accounting for well over three-quarters of the total in 1970. 
In this respect the population structure is similar to that of 
Venezuela. But whereas in Venezuela this reflects mass migration 
to the cities and a transformation from a predominantly rural to 
a predominantly urban population during recent decades, in Argentina 
recent changes have been less drastic and it reflects more a long 
standing situation. From the early years of the century the 
mejority of the population has been urban in Argentina, and although 
the degree of urbanization has increased steadily it has been a 
more gradual process than in Venezuela. 
But the demographic aspect which most distinguishes Argentina 
from the other countries in this study is the rate of population 
growth. In each of the other countries (and in the region as a 
whole) the rate of increase has risen substantially during the 
post-World War II period, and currently stands at a high level. 
In Argentina by contrast, the rate of increase has declined during 
this period and in the years immediately preceding 1970 was at the 
moderate level of 1.4 per cent per annum. In this context the 
urbanization process itself takes on a rather different meaning. 
Although the migration flow to the cities has been less massive 
than in Venezuela, it has nevertheless been more than sufficient to 
drain off the entire natural increase in the countryside; the absolute 




The changes which have occurred, as well as the existing 
situation, can be more fully appreciated with the greater number 
of subdivisions used. While for Venezuela and El Salvador the 
analysis distinguished only two areas -7 rural and urban - four 
separate areas are used in the simulation experiments for Argentina. 
The country is first divided on a regional basis, the north being 
separated from the rest of the country, and within each region 
there is then a rural-urban separation.1/ The basis for the 
regional division was broadly the lower level of per capita income 
which characterized the north, and the.rather general belief that 
this reflects a meaningful difference in the forms of social- 
administrative-economic 01-ganization. 
There are major differences in thepopulation parameters in 
the different areas, and this is an important aspect of the Argentine 
situation. The most important underlying variable is the fertility 
rate, and here the differences can be clearly seen. In both Venezuela 
and El Salvador there are significant differences in fertility rates 
between the urban and the rural areas, but they remain high everywhere.2/ 
1/ 	The division can be considered only approximate, and is based in 
part on the familiar necessity to follow political rather than 
conceptually desirable dividing lines. The provinces of La Rioja, 
the northern part of Cordoba (not including the city of Cordoba) 
the northern part of Santa Fe, and the province of Entre Rios 
form the dividing line and, along with all provinces further to 
the north, are included in the North region. All other provinces 
are included in what is here called the South. Some of the 
provinces in the South have relatively low per capita incomes, 
but the division has been made here so as to form two 
geographically united areas. Further divisions could be 
usefully made - in particular the Pampa region could be shown 
as a separate unit - but this has not been done, both for 
reasons of simplifying the analysis and because of the additional 
statistical effort this would have required. In both the North 
and the South communities with 1,000 or more inhabitants are 
considered urban and the rest rural. 
The total fertility rate around 1970 was estimated at 5.4 in 




In Argentiria.the- situatiOn- is quite different: fertility rates are 
in general lower, and there is greater variation from one area to 
another. In 1970 the total - fertility rate is estimated to have been 
as follows in the different areas: 5.9 in the rural North, 3.8 in 
the urban North,'3.'9 in -the ruralTSouth, and 2.3 in the urban South. 
There are several .aspects here worth noting.- First, the 
differehce between the North, and the South is substantial, both in 
the cities and in the rural areas. Within each region there is again 
the rural-urban differenCel with birth rates in the cities a good 
deal lower. But it is cleat that:there are other factors involved 
in addition to urbanisation. The total fertility rate in the cities 
of the North is nearly as high as in the.. rural area in the South, 
and is much higher th-611 in the Southern cities. But the fertility 
rates even'in the North of Argentina are well below those. in Venezuela 
and El SalvadOr. Finally, the unusually low fertility rate in the 
urban South is of great importance. It is not much above the rate 
of zero population grOWth (inan eventual stable population),. and 
given the large proportion of,the total population which lives in 
this zone, values of the population parameters in the urban South 
weigh heavily in the figures' for Argentina as a whole 	Within - the 
urban South, Greater. Buenos Aires is in turn of predominant importance, 
and the total fertility rate here appears to be at, or even 
marginally below, the eventual zero growth level. At a distance 
from the Buenos Aires region, even'Withinthe South, urban birth rates 
are significantly higher. 
The fertility rate estimates in Argentina can be accepted with 
reasonable confidence., The numberof births, clasSified by the age 
of the mother, are available separately for each province, so that 
regional differences between the North and the South can be quite 
accuratery'estiMated. Rural-urban differences within each region 
were estimated largely by calculating the ratio of infants to women 
of child7•bearing age in primarily urban and armarily rural districts 
within the different provinces, and these estimates-must .be regarded 
/as more 
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as more aPproxiMate.' In the-South hoWever this is less of a problem 
as the more complete -data are available for Greater Buends Aires, 
which accounts for a major part of the southern urban-population. 
As in the other countries, the'area estiMates were adjusted so as 
to be consistent with the agregate CELADE estimates for Argentina 
for 1970. 
With birth .rates at relatively low levels, any given amount 
of internal migratiOn will haVe a greater'impact on population trends 
in the different areas, and migration in 'recent years has been 
fairly substantial in Argentina and has in fact had a large impact 
of this sort. Estimates for the four zones used in the experiments 
were made both for 1960 and for 1970 (from the respective census 
data) in order to be able to calculate recent trends, and these 'serve 
to illustrate the situation. During the 1960s, within each region, 
there was migration from the rural to the urban areas, and in 
addition there was an important movement of people from the North 
to the South. As a result, despite the low fertility rates, the 
population' increase in the urban South accounted for nearly 90 per 
cent of the population increase in the country as a whole during 
the decade. There Was also an'impertant increase iri the population 
of the urban North 	the percentage increase was somewhat larger 
than in the urban South - while the population of the rural North 
declined by more than 10 per cent and there Was a smaller decline in 
the rural South as well. 
Migration has therefore been a major factor in the population 
growth of the urban South; during the 1960s new arrivals from the 
North and from the rural areas within the South itself appear to have 
accounted for well over half of the total increase. This proportion 
is'even higher than the corresponding figure for Venezuela, but 
placed in the context of the size of the total increase, the impact 
is bound to have been considerably smaller. Whereas the'urban 
population in Venezuela was increasing at an average rate of 5 per 
cent per annum during the 1960s, the population of the urban South 
in Argentina was expanding at a rate of only 2.1 per cent per annum, 
/so that 
-106 - 
so that even.though,mpre than half of the increase represented an 
influx. from other areas, this was a much smaller proportion of the 
resident population, . 
Even if internal. migration continues on a substantial scale 
the impact can be expected to decline further from its present 
moderate level. The bulk of the population already resides in the 
South, and in the urban areas, so that continuing large-scale 
migration would.fairly rapidly depopulate the rural areas and/or 
the North. The-situation here is similar to that already observed 
in Venezuela: the basic transformation to an urban society (and in 
Argentina one concentrated in the South). has already occurred. But 
whereas in Venezuela this meant that. the growth of the cities will 
increasingly reflect the natural increase in the cities themselves, 
this will not necessarily be the case in the urban South in Argentina. 
The low fertility rates may well mean that although the impact .of 
migration is declining, it may nevertheless remain an important 
factor in the population trend in the urban South. 
Estimates of the structure of migration are more difficult to 
make in Argentina, and must be regarded as more approximate. First, 
because it is necessary to estimate the north-south flow as well as 
the movement to the cities; and second, as there is the complicating 
factor of international migration, in this case in-migration, 
predominantly from neighbouring countries in recent years. Nevertheless, 
the structure which emerges from the estimates is fairly similar to 
that described in some detail in the Venezuela analysis, and is 
adequate for present purposes. 
More women than men migrate to the cities, and again this is 
reflected in the population structure. In 1970, some 80.6 per cent 
of all women lived in the urban areas (15 per cent in the North and 
65.6 per cent in the South) whereas only 77.3 per cent of the men were 
urban residents (1401 per cent in the North and 63.2 per cent in the 
South). It might. be expected that regional migration,.' with the longer 
distances and greater changes involved, would be predominantly male, 
but this does not appear to have been the case in Argentina. In 1970 
/some 73.6 
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some 73.6 per cent of all:women lived in the South, as against 
73.0 per cent of the men, and-the estimates of regional migration 
during the 1960s indicate a-slightly, but not particularly significant, 
excess of women. The differential movement by sex can be seen quite 
clearly by noting the percentage distribution among the different 
areas of the country of particular age groups. Several age groups, 
selected to show the pattern are as follows: 
SELECTED AGE GROUPS: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION 


















0-4 17.4 17.6 9.6 55.4 ,17.9 17.3 9.8 54.9 
15-19 12.9 18.0 307 6004 ' 1509 15.6 10.6 57.9 
20-24 11.3 15.7 3.5 64.5 12.5 14.2 10.7 62.6 
30-34 8.6 13.8 7.4. 70.2 9.8 12.8 905 67.9 
45-49 7.8 12.4 6.8 73.9 9.5 1109 904 69.2 
60-65 7.3 11.6 5.9 75.2 9.4 1102 9.4 70.0 
The first age group basically shows the distribution of births, 
and is nearly the same for males and for females, By the time the 
15-19 age span is reached there is already a sharp drop in the 
proportion of females in the rural North and a mild drop in the rural 
South; for males by contrast the drop in the rural North is mild and 
there is actually a rise in the rural South. That is, substantial 
movement out of the rural areas by women begins at an earlier age than 
for men; and much of this movement is regional as the large relative 
increase in the urban South is primarily at ths expense of thsNorth. 
At this age level many more females than males live in the cities: 
78.4 per cent as against 73.5 per cent. The next age group shows a 
sharper movement of males from the rural North and the difference is 
narrowed somewhat, onlyto widen again in the higher age groups. Of 
particular note is the steady decline in,the proportion of females 
living in the rural South, where, the proportion of males does not 
/change markedly. 
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change markedly. And it is the urban South where women concentrate 
to a substantially greater extent than men; the proportions in the 
urban North are much more similar. Other details can be seen through 
examination of the figures. 
It is again primarily the young who migrate, but the age 
structure is somewhat different in. Argentina than that in Venezuela 
and El Salvador. In general there'is less migration both of - young 
children and of older people114-gration appears tojwye been 
concentrated more heavily in the 15 to 35 yearagerange. The 
heaviest migration of women occurs several years earlier than for 
men, as shown in the figures above, and similar to the situation in 
the other countries. But, contrary to the situation in Venezuela 
and El Salvador, women do not appear to continue to migrate in large 
numbers throughout the age range; after about 35 women do migrate 
more than men, but the proportions are not large for either sex. 
There are significant differences depending upon the particular 
migration flow involved. Migration from the rural area in the 
North is more similar in structure to the movement from the rural 
areas in Venezuela and'El Salvador: larger proportions of children 
are involved, and rather more older women continue to'migrate. 
Migration from the ruralSouth•is of-"an intermediate sort (for 
Argentina), with fewer children and older adults - involved. And, 
finally, 'migration from the lq.c:Irth to the South is very heavily 
concentrated , iii the 15 to 35 year age range 
With respect to death rates, there are also substantial 
differences between the North and the South, particularly for women. 
For males we have estimated death rates for infants and children in 
1970 to be somewhat more than 50 per cent higher in the North than 
in the South. The differential then declines with age until for 
those over 50 death rates appear to be about the same in the two 
regions. For females, death rates in 1970 are estimated to have ranged 
around 80 per cent higher in the North up to the age of 50, and the 
differential, while declining thereafter, remains important to the 
age of 70. These large differentials are not the result of 
/particularly high 
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particularly'high death rates in the 'North of Argentina 	on the 
contrary these are in general lower thatithe death rates even in 
the urban area in Venezuela,- and still fUrther below the rates which 
prevail in El Salvador. Rather, the differential reflects 'the 
unusually low death rates which have been achieved in the South. 
Within the two regions the available data donottlearlyindicate 
any significant difference in death rates as between the rural and 
the urban areas and, within each-region, these-are:asSUmed to'be 
the same in 1970.1/ 
B. Results of the Simulation Experiments 
As is clear from the above discussion, the demographic structure 
in Argentina has evolved to a point where it is strikingly different 
from that in most of the region. The principal implication of this 
for the simulation experiments is that there is less room for 
varying the underlying population parameters than is the case 4n 
other countries included in this study. The population is already 
largely urban, and concentrated in the South, so while internal 
migration may continue to be an important factor there is no 
possibilityof,massmovments involving a basic change in structure. 
Fertility rates, especially in the urban South where the bulk of the 
population lives, are already- much lower than in the other countries 
1/ 	The available data are similar in nature to the situation 
already noted with respect to birth rates. By province, 
registered deaths by age group' are available and so a relatiVely 
good estimate can be made of regional differences.  Data on. 
rural-urban differenceS are not directly available however, and 
the estimates had to be based- for the most part on figures for 
primarily urban, and primarily rural districts within the 
different provinces. Even these figures show only total deaths, 
rather than by age group. As noclear pattern emerged' from 
comparisons of this sort it was assumed that death rates in the 
rural and urban areas within each region were the same. Although 
this may not be accurate, it is an adequate approxithation for 
present purposes. As has been noted before, death rates have 
less of an impact on the calculations than other variables, 
and this is especially true with the low level these have reached 
in Argentina. 
/so there 
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so there is less scope for postulating possibilities of further 
decline in the future. And death rates are also already relatively 
low and so again the possibility of further decline is more 
limited. All of this means that, in absolute terms, future 
population trends in Argentina can be defined within more narrow 
boundaries; that is, the variation from one simulation to another 
will be smaller. But in relative terms, as will be seen, there is 
still the possibility of important differences, depending on the 
assumptions made. 
The second and third experiments involve assumptions which 
are most similar to trends in the recent past in Argentina: 
concentration on urban modern type activities, with substantial 
migration, both regional and rural-Urban, and continuing important 
declines in fertility rates. The third experiment is a close 
approximation to a continuation of the trends of the very recent 
past; the second experiment involves more extreme assumptions 
which would steed up this process of change. 
Although it would imply a sharp departure from past trends, 
the fourth experiment is also in its way a more realistic alternative 
than in many countries. In Argentina this would involve concentration 
on the North and'On the rural areas. The general resource base is 
probably sufficiently strong to enable this to be done without 
completely foregoing progress in the urban South. The North plus 
the rural 'South accounted for only 37.5 per cent of the total 
population in 1970, not an overwhelming proportion, and the general 
economic'level of this area is already fairly high so that there is 
an unusually good base on which to build; the rural South in 
particular is characterized by high productivity levels and 
substantial capacity for further development. But as noted this 
would mean a departure from past trends. 
The fifth experiment represents a compromise between the third 
and fourth, and is probably a more real possibility. The first 
experiment (little change from the 1970 situation) implies a trend in 
which the process of demographic change which has characterized the 
recent past essentially stops, or more exactly, continues but only at 
a much reduced pace. 	
/The results 
The results of the different simulation experiments are 
shown in table 13. 
Po ulation trends 
The population of Argentina is likely to increase about 
35 per cent from 1970 to the end of the century; from somewhat less 
than 24 million to around 32 million. There is relatively little 
variation in this respect from one experiment to another. In the 
second experiment, with the greatest assumed declines in fertility 
rates and with substantial migration toward the areas where 
fertility rates are lowest, the increase is 30 per cent, to 30.9 million 
at the end of the century. At the other extreme, in the first 
experiment where there is little change in fertility rates and not 
much migration, the increase is only 42 per cent, to 33.8 million 
at the end of the century. 
The rates of population increase involved are in all cases only 
moderate. For the 30-year period as a whole the range is only from 
an average of 0.9 per cent per annum in the second experiment to 
1.2 per cent per annum in the first experiment. In all of the 
experiments there is a steady decline in the rate of population 
growth, from the 1.4 per cent per annum of the 1960s, and there is 
somewhat greater variation in the rates reached at the end of the 
century - from the 0.5 per cent per annum reached in the second 
experiment to the 1.1 per cent in the first experiment. But the 
predominant characteristic of the population trend in Argentina is 
still that, starting from an already relatively low level in 1970, 
there is a steady but slow decline to the end of the century in 
each of the diffP 
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Table 13 
ARGENTINA: RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS ti 
1970 
The year 2000 
Expert- 	Expert- 	Expert- 	Expert- 	Experi- 
ment I ment II ment III ment IV ment V 
Population (millions) 	 23.75 	33.82 	30.8631.77 	32.73 	32.25 
North rural 	 2.89 4.4o 1.60 4.71 3.22 
North urban 3.63 	6.56 	5.18 	;:g 
	
6.95 	6.31 
South rural 	 2.09 2.58 1.41 1.71 	2.93 1.91 
South urban 15.14 	20.28 	22.67 	22.01 18.14 	20.81 
Population (1970 = 100) 	 100 142 130 134 	138 136 
North rural 	 100 	152 	55 	82 163 	112 
North urban 100 181 143 157 	192 174 
South rural 	 100 	124 	68 	82 140 	91 
South urban 100 134 150 145 	120 137 
Rate of increase (A p/a) 12/ 	 1.4 	1.1 	0.5 	0.7 0.9 	0.8 
North rural 	 -1.1 1.5 -2.3 -0.9 	1.4 0.2 
North urban 2.9 	1.8 	0.1 	0.7 1.8 	1.3 
South rural 	 -0.5 0.7 -1.8 -1.0 	1.0 -0.7 
South urban 2.0 	0.8 	1.0 	1.0 0.4 	0.9 
Population distribution (%) 
North rural 	
10049:947::  100 	10105  
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5 - 14 16.5 14.8 14.0 	 14.5 
15 - 19 	 8.7 	7.6 	7.7 7.7 7.3 7.6 
- 113 - 
Table 13 (cont.) 
1970 











Labour force (1970 = 100) 100 141 153 150 139 146 
North rural 100 153 63 89 172 117 
North urban 100 187 170 182 211 195 
South rural 100 113 70 82 133 91 
South urban 100 134 176 163 119 148 
Bate of increase (% p/a) lai 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
North rural -1.1 1.5 -2.1 -0.7 1.9 0.4 
North urban 3.0 2.0 0.8 1.3 2.2 1,7 
South rural -0.7 0.6 -1.8 -1.0 1.2 -0,6 
South urban 1.9 1.0 1.7 1.5 0.5 1.2 
Male labour force (1970 = 100) 
Female labour force (1970 = 100) 
Rate of increase (A p/a) 
Male labour force 
Female labour force 




















































By area 100 100 100 100 100 100 
North rural 10.8 11.7 4.4 6.4 13.4 8.7 
North urban 14.2 18.8 15.9 17.3 21.7 19.1 
South rural 9.2 7.4 4.2 5.0 8.8 5.8 
South urban 65.7 62.1 75.5 71.3 56.1 66.4 
By sex and area 100 100 100 100 100. 100 
Male North aural 9.5 10.0 3.9 5.6 10.1 7.0 
Male Nor-it urban 10.4 13.8 10.4 11.7 16.1 13.1 
Maie Soo*.h :,”•al 8.3 6.4 3.4 4.2 6.6 4.9 
Male South urban 49.7 46.7 49.7 48.1 42.3 46.7 
Female North rural 1.3 1.7 0.6 0.8 3.3 1.6 
Female North urban 3.8 5.o 5.4 5.6 5.6 6.o 
Female South rural 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 2.2 0.9 
Female South urban 16.0 15.4 25.8 23.2 13.8 19.8 
Labour participation rates (0): total 37.9 37.7 44.6 42.6 38.2 40.8 
Male North rural q.,1 ;c - Q 49_7 6n_14 52.4 55.6 
Male North arban 
Male South rural 
Male South urban 






Table 13 (conc.) 
The year 2000 
Expert- 	Expert- 	EXperi., 	Expert- 	Experi- 
ment I ment II ment III ment IV ment V 
South urban labour force age 
structure (0) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
10 - 19 12.4 10.7 7.4 8.2 10.4 8.9 
20 - 39 50.0 48.0 49.6 48.8 46.1 48.o 
4o - 64 34.5 37.2 40.5 40.2 38.9 39,8  
65 and over 3.1 4.1 2.5 2.8 4.6 3.3 
Male South urban labour force age 
structure (0') 100 100 	' 100 100 100 100 
10 - 19 
20 - 39 
40 - 64 
65 and over 
Female South urban labour force age 
structure 0) 
10 - 19 
20 - 39 
20 - 64 




















































Note: The 1970 CELADE estimates of population, by sex and 5 year age group, provided the basis for the 1970 
estimates shown. Rural/urban differences were estimated. with the use of a few aggregate figures which 
were available from the 1971 census plus the detailed data from the 1961 census. The CELADE estimates 
of age specific birth rates and death rates were used as the starting point in all of the experiments 
- again with rural/urban breakdowns estimated from oensup data. Labour participation rates, by sex 
and 5 year age e'roup,, were estimated directly from the census data. The principal assumptions which 
determine the results of the experiments relate to migration rates, fertility rates, and labour 
participation rates. The different migration rates assumed can be roughly judged from the table on the 
basis of the peppIation shift from the rural to the urban area in the different experiments. The 
assumptions about fertility rata= 1,, -yre as follows. In the 1965-1970 period the total fertility rate 
in the North rural area was .:.f.'7ima•,3d to be 5.93, in the, North urban area 3.81, in the South rural 
area 3.93 and in the South ,,roar. area 2.27. The 1995-2000 estimates (with lineal interpolation from 
the first to the last period) were: experiment I, 5.0, 3.4, 3.5 and 2.2 respectively in the four areas; 
experiment II, 4.2, 2.5, 2,6 and 1.8 respectively; experiment III, 4.5, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.0 respeotively; 
experiment IV, 3.5, 2.6, 2.6 and 2.2 respectively; and experiment V, 4.0, 2.7, 2.7 and 2.1 respectively. 
Assumed changes in labour participation rates to the end of the century were: experiment I, little 
change; experiment II, to 1968 French levels in the urban areas, half way to the urban levels in the 
South rural area, little change in the North rural area; experiment III, 80% of the wey to the 1968 
French levels in the urban areas, one-quarter of the way to the urban levels in the South rural area, 
little change in the North rural area; experiment IV, little change in the urban areas, rates in the 
rural areas move to the urban level; experiment V, intermediate between experiments III and IV. There 
were also assumptions about the other variables. The trend in total mortality rates is that used in 
the CELADE projections. 
Only the results at the end of the experiments that is the year 2000 - are shown as this is the single 
figure of most interest; the 1970 figures are shown for comparison. The trend is not necessarily smooth 
throughout the 30 year period however, and this is often of considerable importance. Several instances 
of this sort are noted in the analysis. 
12/ The rates of increase shown are the annual rates of increase during the 5 year period up to the date shown. 
That is, in the first oolumn they are the annum rates during the period 1965-1970; in the other columns 
during the period 1995-2000. 
/differences in 
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differences in the population trend from one experiment to another 
is one illustration of the general point noted earlier: the population 
structure in Argentina has already evolved to-a position where 
possible future changes are more limited and there is thus less 
variation in the results of the different simulations. 
The population increase in Argentina during the coming decades 
will thus be markedly less than that experienced in most of the 
region. With respect to the countries already analyzed, the probable 
increase to the end of the century of around 35 per cent in Argentina 
compares with'a population likely to multiply 2.3 times in Venezuela 
and 2 1/2 times in El Salvador. Not only is the total increase much 
smaller in Argentina, the trend is also more steady and there is 
less uncertainty due to possible changes in the underlying population 
parameters. 'Taking the extremes, for example (the first and second 
experiments), the maximum .population projection at the end of the 
century is only 9.2 per cent higher than the minimum projection in 
Argentina; in Venezuela and El Salvador the corresponding figures 
are 21.6. per cent 'and 29 	cent respectively. 
In the most general 'terms-,Argentina could well occupy a unique 
position in Latin America at the end of the century in so far, as 
population .is concerned. Even in 1970 the country had , onecif, the 
largest resource endowments per capita in the region, and as the 
population will increase less.rapidly than in other countries this 
position will become steadily more favourable in relative terms. 
Using the gross, but still suggestive, indicator of inhabitants per 
square kilometer, the figure for. Argentina in the early 1970s was 9, 
compared with 15'for the region as a whole. At the:end of the 
century the figure will probably be around 30 for the region as a. 
whole, but will, have risen on1T.tO about 12 in Argentina, indicating 
a sharp improvement, in the country's relative position in this respect. 
Of course this is not necessarily_a good indicator: of total resources, 
but it is clear that at least with respect to agricultural resources 
the country is very richly endowed, and in a world increasingly 
/concerned with 
-116- 
concerned with the adequacy of food production, this is of great 
importance. Even without detailed analysis it seems clear that 
the per capita resource availability in Argentina at the end of 
the century is likely to be unusually favourable. 
At the same time, the total population is fairly large, and 
given the relatively high level of per capita incomes already 
achieved, the national market is of substantial size. This market 
is currently large enough to support a fairly wide range of 
economic activities and if a reasonable rate of economic growth 
can be maintained the situation will improve. In general it is 
reasonable to believe that the national market is large enough to 
provide a firm foundation for a reasonably diversified and expanding 
economy. 
These aspects taken together - an unusually favourable ner 
capita resource base and a fairly large national Market With per 
capita incomes already at relatively high levelS - could well as 
noted place Argentina in a uniquely favourable position in terms 
of per capita welfare in the years to come. 
Although the population trend at the national level can be 
estimated within fairly narrow margins of possible variation, there 
is more uncertainty about how the increase will be shared among the 
different areas of the country. The major variable which will 
determine the division is internal migration, but this will interact 
with the divergent rates of natural increase in the different areas. 
In the absence of migration the population would increase most 
rapidly in the North and in the rural South, where fertility rates 
are highest. To the extent there is migration it will be away 
from these areas and the population increase will be shifted to the 
urban South. 
The possible extremes are illustrated by the second and fourth 
simulations. In'the fourth simulation (rural and regional oriented 
development) there is a modeSt flow of migration from the rural to 
the urban area within the North, bUt no net migration out of the 
North to the South and no movement to the cities within the 
/South itself. 
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South itself.1/ As a consequence the bulk of the total:increase as 
well as the highest rates, of increase occur in the North,and in the 
rural areas. In this fourth experiment the relative importance of 
the North rises from 28 per cent of-the, total population.in 1970 
to 36 per ,cent at the end of the century; during the 30-year period 
it accounts for over 57 per cent of the total population increase 
There are two points worth emphasizing from this aspect. of 
the fourth experiment. First, it shows.clearly the-extent to which 
the population growth in the urbanSouth is a function of migration. 
In the absence of migration the population of the urban South 
increases only 20 per cent to the endof the century, an average 
rate of increase of 0.6 per cent per annum. Already in 1970 the 
rate of natural increase was less than 0.9 per cent per annum, and 
this declines slowly to,0.4 per cent per annum at the endof the 
century. Without migration the relative importance ofthe urban 
South declines significantly, from 62.5 per.cent of the.total 
population in 1970 to less than 55 per cent of the total at the end 
of the century. If calculated separately the figures. 	the Buenos 
Aires area would show an even more marked tendency of this sort as 
fertility rates are lower there than in the rest of the urban South. . 
The second point to note is that the rate of population growth 
is not extremely high in any area. The, rate of natural increase 
even in 1970 in the rural North.was only-about 2.2 per cent per 
annum, and some decline has been assumed over the period. The most,  
rapid overall increase, taking into account the effects of migration, 
is in the urban North where the population increases over 90 per cent 
to the end of the century, an average rate of ,increase of,2.2 per 
cent per annum, Even this figure is small compared with. some of 
the possible increases noted earlier in the Venezuelan and El Salvador 
analyses. 
Although from Etnational viewpoint Argentina is highly urbanized, 
the situation is quite different in the two regions. Within . 
the South only about 12 per cent Of:the population'IS still rural, 
but in..-the North the proportionl.s.still well over 40.per cent. 
For this reason, even in the fourth experiment it has been assumed 
there will be a continuing modest amount of rural-urban migration 
within the North. 
/At the 
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At the other extreme is the second experiment, which assumes 
great change within a context of continuing urban oriented development 
and so involves substantial migration, bOth from the rural areas to 
the cities and from'the North to the South. As a result there is an 
increasing concentration of the population in the urban South. The 
absolute increase in population to the'end of the century in the 
urban South is actually larger than the increase for the country as 
a whole, and the relatiVe importance Of the area rises steadily from 
62.5' per cent of the total in 1970 to 72.5 per cent at the end of 
the century. There is also an important increase in the population 
of the urban North, offset by substantial declines in the size of 
the rural population, both in the North and in the South. 
While this second experiment includes the most extreme assumptions 
about migration, and hence the concentration of population growth 
in the urban South, these assumptions represent a quite real 
possibility; the projections are in fact not very different from 
the actual trends of the 1960s. During that decade the population 
of the urban South increased about 2.7 million, compared to an 
increase of 3.1 million for Argentina as a whole, while the population 
of the rural North declined over 10 per cent and that of the rural 
South nearly 5 per cent. 
If migration continues to be substantial then this sort of 
trend will continue, either as in the second experiment or in the 
more moderate form shown in the third experiment. Even with migration 
playing a major role however (migrants account for around two-thirds 
of the population increase in the urban South in the second experiment), 
it is important to note that the rate of population growth in the 
urban South is still not particularly high. In the second experiment 
it averages 1.4 per cent per annum for the 30-year period as a 'whole, 
and declines slowly but steadily throughout the period. 
The impact on the rural areas is much greater. The population 
of the rural North declines at an average rate of 2 per cent per annum 
for the 30-year period as a. whole, and that of the rural South by 
1.3 per cent per annum. By the end of the century only 10.5 per cent 
/of the 
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of the total population of the country would be rural,• and even. 
within the .North,the proportion would have fallen from its present 
40 per cent-to less than 25 per cent. Thii reflects a situation 
similar to that described earlier in Venezuela: since the population 
is already largely urban continuing large scale migratio.n.will have  
a large impact on the rural areas - in the, case of Argentina the 
population actually declining fairly rapidly - whereas the impact 
on the urban areas will be smaller and of declining importance.. 
This is especially true of the urban South and, combined with the 
low natural increase, means that the really rapid expansion of this 
area is past; the rate of population increase will decline, probably 
to a fairly low figure at the end of the century. 
The other experiments yield varying intermediate type results. 
As can be seen from table 13, rates of growth and the relative 
importance of the different areas at the end of the century vary a 
good deal from one experiment to another and so migration trends will 
have a good deal of importance in Argentina, But in noexperiment 
is there a consistently high rate of increase in any individual area 
and so the problems posed will not be of the same magnitude as in 
many other countries. A large part of the total population increase 
will continue to be in the urban South, both because it holds the 
majority of-the 'pbpulatiOn-at the beginning of the period and because 
it is the traditional objective of much of the internal migration; 
but the rate of increase in this major area will be moderately tow,. 
and falling. The highest 17.ALe of increase is likely to occur, as has 
been the case in the recent past, in the urban North;.but even there 
the highest average rate for the 30-year period as a whole is 2.2 per 
cent per annum in the fourth experiment, and here too the rate 
steadily declines in all of the experiments 
The principal regional population problem raised by migration 
in Argentina"could well be of a quite different sort. Namely, 
continuing rapid migration could well depopulate the codntryside 
- particularly in the South - to the point where labodr shortages could 
/impede adequate 
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impede adequate exploitation of the country's rich agricultural 
resources. Labour productivity in agriculture is already estimated 
to be close to the non-agricultural level in the South, and complaints 
of labour shortages have been made. If rapid migration continues 
this situation could become increasingly serious. 
The age structure 
In 1970 Argentina had, by a considerable margin, the most 
mature population age structure of any of the countries included in 
this study. During the remainder of this oentury the age structure 
will continue to evolve in.this general direction, but the changes 
will probably be fairly moderate,: and will occur only gradually 
over the thirty year period. At least at the national level, the 
shift will be quite steady and such fluctuations as may occur will 
not be of the same sharp nature of those likely to be experienced 
in some other countries. 
For the country as a whole the changes likely to occur are 
clearly defined.. Perhaps the most significant change will be a 
persistent decline in the relative importance of both children and 
adolescents (that is, all those up to the age of 20). With the 
assumptions of thesecond experiment - relatively large declines in 
fertility rates and substantial migration - the proportion-of 
children and adolescents in the population would fall oharply, from 
38.2 per cent of the total in 1970 to 30.8 per cent at the end of 
the century. With the less extreme assumptions of the other 
experiments the decline is less, but it occurs in all of the experiments 
and, except in the first experiment with its assumptions of little 
change from the 1970 situation, is fairly substantial. In the 
intermediate type fifth experiment fore example the proportion of 
children and adolescents declines to 33.5 per cent at the end of the 
century. 
Under most assumptions the relative importance of all other 
age groups rises. The single exception is in the first experiment, 
where there is a small decline in the relative importance of both the 
/young and 
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young and the older adult groups, and-only the over-65 group rises 
as a proportion of the whole.1/ But although the active adult age 
groups do rise somewhat in relative importance in all of the other 
experiments, the largest increase regularly occurs in the over-65 
group. Those 65 years of age and over already accounted for 
7.2 per cent of the total population in 1970, and by the end of 
the century this proportion will probably rise to around 10 1/2 per 
cent. 
Just as the age structure in 1970 is already much more mature 
in Argentina than in- Venezuela or El Salvador, so the continuing 
evolution to the end of the century is different from that analyzed 
earlier for those countries. In Venezuela and El Salvador the 
young adult age group (those 20-39 ydars of age) will increase 
rapidly during the coming decades, and assumptions of more rapid 
declines in fertility rates (and -hence declining relative importance 
of children) will increase even-further the relative importance of 
this group;' these populations will consequently remain very young 
ones. In Argentina by contrast young adults will not increase 
rapidly, and declining relative importance of children will be offset 
primarily by rising relative importance of the older population. 
But while at the national level the changes to be expected 
are clear, and will occur only gradually, there is a considerable 
divergence from one area to another within the country, and more 
uncertainty about futurs trends. It is firSt important to stress 
that, both because of differences in fertility rates and because of 
migration, the age structure was quite different from one area to 
another in 1970. The figures are shoWa in table 13, but are 
reproduced here for easier comparibon. 
In the first experiment the changes in the age structure are 
for the most part very small. There is a substantial rise 
in the proportion of those over 65, and this is offset by 
small declines in the relative importance of all other age 
groups. 
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o-4 15.3 12.8 11.4 8.2 
5-14 27.5 22.4 20.4 16.5 
15-19 9.0 11.1 7.6 8.7 
20-39 21.6 29.0 24.1 30.4 
4o-64 21.0 19.9 29.2 28.2 
65 & over 5.6 4.8 7.3 8.o 
It is clear at a glance that there are sharp differences from any one 
area to another, a mixture of urban-rural and North-South variations. 
The extremes are the rural North, where children and active adults 
are approximately equal in number (42.8 per cent and 42.6 per cent 
of the total respectively)., and the urban South, where children are 
a much smaller minority and active adults are the dominant group by 
a wide margin (24.7 per cent and 58.6 percent of the total 
respectively). 
Because of the importance of migration in shaping these age 
structures, and the significance of regional as well as rural-urban 
movements, they do not follow closely the changes which would 
otherwise occur as a population becomes, more mature. For example, 
the porportion of children in the rural North is moderately lower 
than the proportion in Venezuela; but whereas in a closed society 
this decline would normally first be offset by a rise in the relative 
importance of young adults, in the rural North the percentage of 
young adults is in fact very low, because this is the group which has 
migrated heavily. The proportion of older adults is by contrast. 
a good deal higher than in Venezuela or El Salvador, even though 
much lower than in the South of Argentina itself. 
As to future trends, it is intuitively clear from this situation 
that much will continue to depend on the extent of migration, and this 
is shown in the results of the simulation experiments. Too much 
emphasis should not be placed on these figures since, as was noted 
/earlier in 
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earlier in the Venezuelan analysis, once the population in the 
areas from which the migrants come (in this case the 'rural areas 
and to a degree the North) has been reduced to a minor part of the 
national total, the age structure of the migrants may assume 
particular forms, and the simulation model may not give an accurate 
description of this aspect. Nevertheless, it does give an 
approximate idea of the major changes. 
The general situation can be shown by Considering the results 
of two of the simulation experiments, the first and . the second.' 
When substantial migration is assumed (the second experiment) it is 
primarily the young who move and so decline in numbers in the rural 
areas, while the older age groups tend to remain and so increase 
greatly in relative importance. In the rural North those 40 and over 
account for 37.7 per cent of the popUlation at the end of the 
century in the second experiment, compared to only 24.3 per cent in 
the first experiment, with its assumption of little migration. In 
the rural South the contrast is similar: those 40 and over are 
46.9 per cent of the total at the end of the century in the second -
experiment but only 33 per cent in the first. The differences in 
the urban areas are more in line with the differences at the national 
level, although for different reasons. In the urban North migration 
does not have much of a net effect as the movement into the area 
from the rural zone is approximately offset by the movement out 
toward the South. In the urban South the'reason is that, although 
the total net migration flow is toward this area, the bulk of the 
population is already concentrated there and so further Migration 
no longer has a major impact. 
Other possible changes can be seen by examining the results of 
the different experiments in table 13, The point to stress here is 
that migration flows can be a major ,.factor in determining how changes 
at the national level are 'reflected in the different areas of the 
country, even with respect to changes in the age structure. 
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Analyzing some of the implications of these changes makes clearer 
the general aspects described above. The first aspect to be noted 
is the size of the dependent population (those under 15 and those 
65 and over). The dependent population was a considerably smaller 
proportion of the total in Argentina in 1970 than in any of the 
other countries included in this study, and the proportion may 
decline further to the end of the century.1/ Any decline will be 
smaller however, and of only a transitory nature; in an eventual 
stable, zero growth, population the dependent population would be 
about the same porportion of the total as in. Argentina in 1970. 
While the overall size will not change much, there will be 
substantial changes in the composition of the dependent population, 
and this will have important implications for social and economic 
policy. Those 65 and over will increase steadily in relative importance 
during the coming decadeS, While the proportion of children will 
decline, how much depending on assumptions about fertility rates.2/ 
The temporary nature of any decline in the dependent population is 
also due to this changing structure: the decline in the relative 
importance of children in the years ahead will eventually be offset 
by a further increase in the relative importance of older people. 
There are again very wide variations in the size and composition 
of the dependent population from one area to another, and changes vary 
substantially with the assumptions of the different experiments. At 
the extremes, in 1970 the dependent population was 48.4 per cent of 
the total in the rural North but only 32.7 per cent of the total in 
the urban South; and within these totals children were much more 
predominant in the North than in the South. As an example of 
1/ 	In the first experiment (little change from the 1970 situation) 
the proportion rises somewhat, but in all of the other experiments 
it remains constant or declines. 
2/ 	In 1970 children were 80 per cent of the dependent population. 
In the first experiment, with little change in fertility rates, 
the proportion falls t• 73 per cent at the end of the century; 
in the second experiment, with substantial change, to 67 per cent. 
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differences in trends, when relatively heavy migration is assumed 
the proportion of those 65 and over rises sharply, and to high levels, 
in the rural areas. These and other details are shown in the figures 
in table 13. 
Children will continue to account for over two-thirds of the 
dependent population at the end of the century, even in Argentina, 
and within this group perhaps the most important aspect is the likely 
change in the school age population, with its implication6 for 
educational planning. The primary school population (those 5-14 years 
of age) has been increasing only slowly in recent years, and this 
will continue to be the case in the years ahead. Reflecting the 
steady decline in fertility rates, and the relatively low level these 
have reached, the rate of increase of the 5-14 year age group fell 
from 2.2 per cent per annum during the 1950s to 1.0 per cent during 
the 1960s, and will decline further to about 0.7 per cent per annum 
during the 1970s. Thereafter the rate will depend on changes in 
fertility rates, but is likely to remain low. At one extreme, with 
the assumption of little change from the 1970 situation in the first 
experiment, the primary school population increases more rapidly 
again during the 1980s (at a rata of 1.3 per cent per annum), after 
which the slowing trend is resumed (the increase during the 1990s is 
1.0 per cent per annum). At the other extreme, with the assUmptions 
of substantial change in the second experiment, there is a further, 
but quite small, increase in the size of the primary school age 
population during the 1980s, and then during the last decade of the 
century this age group declines slightly in number. 
Requirements of additional educational facilities to meet the 
needs of an expanding primary school age population will therefore 
be relatively modest inArgentina in the years to come. They will 
be sharply less than the likely requirements in Venezuela and El 
Salvador. It is even possible that by the end of the century the 
primary school population will decline slightly in size, a situation 
similar to that experienced in a number of the high income industrial 
countries in recent years. 
/As important 
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As important as the overall increase is the question of how 
that increase will be distributed among the different areas of the 
country, for in Argentina this can mean very different requirements 
in different places and in different circumstances. A wide range of 
possibilities is revealed in the simulation experiments and it would 
be tedious to describe all or even most of these. The point'that 
needs to be stressed is that with different assumptions, but most 
particularly with different levels of migration, primary school 
requirements can change sharply, and this will need to be a basic 
consideration in educational planning. This can be illustrated by 
results from two of the simulation experiments, the second (continuation 
of the concentration in the urban South), and the fourth (rural and 
regional oriented development). 
In the second experiment, even though at the national'level 
there is no net increase in the primary school population from 
1980 to the end of the century, there is a continuing increase in 
the urban South due to the migration flow. The increase is moderate 
(0.8 per cent per annum during the 1970s, 1.2 per cent during the 
1980s and 0.4 per cent during the 1990s), but it would be necessary 
to add steadily to educational facilities in the areA. In the rural 
areas by contrast the primary school age population declines steadily 
and substantially;'by the end of the century it is only about half 
its 1970 size. In these circumstances it is unlikely that additional' 
facilities would be required, even to raise attendance ratios. The 
situation in the urban North is different still with these 
assumptions: there is a substantial increase' during the 1970s, 
further marginal increase during the 1980s, and then a decline 
during the last decade of the century. 
With the assumptions Of the fourth experiment trends are quite 
different. In the urban South, with no migration inflow the increase 
is much less and so over the period as a whole only a very small 
/increase in 
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increase in educational facilities would be required.1/ In the rural 
areas and in the urban North however there is for the same reason 
a steady, if varying, increase in the primary school age group and 
additional facilities would be required on a moderate scale.2J 
Migration trends will thus have to be carefully watched in 
planning additional educational facilities. The situation will be 
easiest to predict in the urban South: there is sure to be a modest 
increase at least until 1990, and even substantial migration flows 
will not require much faster expansion in relative terms; the 
highest rate of increase in any of the experiments is only 1.2 per 
cent per annum during the 1980.s in the second experiment. This is a 
clear example of the fact that, since there is already a considerable 
concentration of the population in the urban South, further migration 
will have a limited impact on the area. But in the other areas 
there is much greater variation depending upon the assumptions made. 
This is especially true of the rural areas, where without migration 
there will be a moderately rapidinorease in the primary school 
population, but where substantial migration could readily result in 
a decline in the size of this age group. 
At the other extreme of the dependent population, the number 
of those 65 and over will increase more rapidly than any other age 
group, and will be a steadily rising proportion of the dependent.  
1/ 	The primary school ase population remains approximately 
constant during the 1970s, increases at the rate of 0.5 per 
cent per annum during the 1980s, and declines slightly 
during the last decade of the century. At the end of the 
century the population of primary school age would be only 
5 per cent larger than it was in" 1970. 
2! In the rural North, for-example, the rate of increase of this 
age group rises steadily from 0.5 per cent per annum during 
the 1970s to 1.7 per cent during the last decade of the century. 
In the urban North the rate of increase fluctuates but is on 
the average higher than in the rural North; and it is in this 
area that the greatest increase occurs with these assumptions. 
The rate of increase is less in the rural South due to the lower 
fertility rates, but there is a continuing rise in the primary 
school age population. 
/population as 
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population as a whole. From less than 20 per cent of the dependent 
population in 1970, elderly persons will increase to perhaps 30 per 
cent at the end of the century. This is sharply higher than the 
corresponding figures in the other countries analyzed: in Venezuela, 
for example, elderly people are likely to comprise only somewhat 
more than 10 per cent of the dependent population at the end of the 
century, and in El Salvador only around 8 per cent. Argentina is 
one of the first countries in the region to be faced with the quite 
different requirements of an elderly dependent population of 
substantial size, and this is likely to be an increasingly significant 
factor in social and economic planning in the years ahead.1/ 
Here too the situation is quite different in the different 
areas of the country, and trends will vary greatly depending upon 
the extent of migration- In 1970 the relative importance of elderly 
people was subttantially higher in the South than in the North of 
the country and, reflecting the impact of migration, the proportion 
was particularly low in the urban North. The proportion will rise 
in all areas, and will reach fairly high levels in the South, so 
it is there that most attention will have to be given to the 
problems raised. Migration will again have its principal impact on 
the rural areas, not by directly involving the elderly, but by 
draining away the younger age groups so that the former are a larger 
proportion of the remaining population. In the rural South the 
- — 
It is of some interest to note that the rate of increase of 
the 65 and over group, although remaining consistently higher 
than that for the rest of the population, has already begun 
to slow, and the tendency will continue in the decades ahead. 
During the 1950s this group increased in number at the rate of 
4.7 per cent per annum. During the 1960s the rate of increase 
had already declined to 4.1 per cent per annum, and is 
expected to fall further: to 3.1 per cent per annum during 
the 1970s and to 1.3 per cent per annum at the end of the 
century. This reflects the earlier beginning and more gradual 
nature of the population transition in Argentina. The slowing 
process has already worked its way through the entire age 
structure and begun to affect the oldest age groups. 
/substantial migration 
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substantial migration assumed in the second experiment results in 
the 65 and over group comprising nearly 20 per cent of the total 
population at the end of the century. This is approaching the sort 
of age structure which migration to the cities has created in the 
agricultural areas in several of the Western European countries 
in recent years. 
The other age group which needs to be mentioned, again largely 
because the situation contrasts sharply with that in the other 
countries studied, is young adults (those 20-39 years of age). 
This age group will expand as fast as the total population to the 
end of the century, and probably somewhat faster. But the difference 
will not be large and so the group does not increase much in 
relative importance in any of the experiments - in marked contrast 
to the results obtained for Venezuela and El Salvador. Equally' 
important, the rate of increase is fairly moderate, much lower than 
that which will prevail in the other countries analyzed.1/ It is worth 
noting again that the increase in the.number of yoUng adults is 
essentially predetermined until 1990i and even during the last 
decade of the century the different-assumptions in the simulation 
experiments have only a mild effect. 
The two important implications of this situation have to do 
with trends in the number of births, and hence the rate of population 
growth itself, and with trends in the-size of the labour force. The 
young adult population is the age group which accounts for the bulk 
of total births, and so if the number of young adults is increasing 
very rapidly the number of births will tend to follow, and this 
influence may offset rather substantial declines in age Specific 
fertility rates..- This was earlier seen to be the sort of situation 
which will prevailtin'Venezuela and El Salvador in the coming decades. 
1/ 	The 20-39 age group will increase at the rate of 1.5 per cent 
per annum during the 1970s and 1.2 per cent during the 1980s. 
The rate during the last decade of the century varies somewhat 
with assumptions about fertility rates, ranging from 0.6 per 




In Argentina, by contrast, young adults will be increasing in number 
much more slowly, and so the impact of a decline in fertility rates 
will be reflected to a larger extent in the trend of total births. 
This is reflected most clearly in the second experiment, 
which assumes the greatest overall decline in fertility rates. In 
that simulation there is a small increase in the number of births 
during the 1970-1975 period, then a slight decline over the following 
15 years, and a somewhat faster decline during the last decade of 
the century. This contrasts with the results of the second 
experiment in Venezuela, for example, where despite a much faster 
assumed decline in fertility rates the number of births continues 
to rise for a 20-year period; in 1990 they are about 25 per cent 
above the 1970 level in Venetuela but slightly below the 1970 level 
in Argentina.' The contrast reflects the much more rapid increase 
in the number of young adults in Venezuela, which is more than 
enough to offset the greater assumed decline in age spetific birth 
rates. 
The relatively sloW increase in the number of young adults in 
Argentina also means that the number of births will rise only 
moderately (and the rate of population increase will remain moderate) 
even if there is not much further decline in fertility rates. This 
is shown in the first experiment (little change from the 1970 
situation) where the number of births increases throughout the 
30 year period, but quite slowly; at the end of the century the 
number of births in a year is only about one-third more than in 1970. 
For comparison, in the corresponding first experiment in El Salvador, 
for example, the number of births at the end of the century is more 
than 2 1/2 times the 1970 level. The contrast, with similar 
assumptions about the trend in fertility rates, again reflects the 
fact that the number of young adults will increase much more 
rapidly in El Salvador. 
As with other aspects of the age structure there are considerable 
differences from one area to another, and much depends on the amount 
of migration assumed. The main features of this situation have 
/already been 
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already been aescribed and need only be mentioned here. The trend 
of births in the urban South can be most confidently projected. 
Fertility rates in this area are already quite low and so there is 
relatively little scope for further declines in the future.1/ And 
as there is already a considerable concentration of population in 
the area, even substantial mic,ration will not in the future have a 
major impact. As a consequence the birth trend is fairly similar 
in all but one of the experiments: a slow increase, most of which 
occurs in the first half of the period, with the number of births 
at the end of the century around 20 per cent higher than in 1970. 
The single exception is the fouth experiment; with these assumptions 
(rural and regional oriented development and a complete cessation 
of migration to the urban South) the number of births would be 
approximately constant throughout the period of the!projection. 
There is again much greater uncertainty in the rural areas. 
If there is substantial migration it is primarily the young who 
move and so the potential impact is especially large when considering 
the young adult group. The sharply diverging results which follow 
from the use of different assumptions can be illustrated with the 
projections for the rural North in the first and in the second 
experiments. In the first experiment,there is relatively little 
migration out of the area, so the number of young adults increases 
fairly rapidly and this is reflected. in the rise in the number of 
births. In the second experiment substantial migration from the 
rural North is assumed, resulting in_a fairly rapid decline in the 
number of young adults and so also in—the number of,births. In 1970 
there were about 94 thousand births ,a year in the rural North, With 
these different assumptions the numberof,births in a year either 
rises to 135 thousand at the end of, the century (in the first 
1/ 	Again it shduid be noted that :it is possible to envision 
circumstances in which fertility rates in the urban South 
might rise from present levels. Such a possibility has not 
been 'considered in any of the simulation experiments, but 
might mean a somewhat greater degree of uncertainty about the 
future level of births in this area. 
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experiment) or falls to 35 thousand (in the second experiment). 
Assumptions about fertility rates in the rural North are quite 
similar in the two experiments so these sharply differing trends 
are a clear illustration of the possible impact of migration on 
the population structure of the rural areas, and of the need to 
watch migration flows carefully in the formulation of social and 
economic policies affecting these areas. 
The second major- implication of trends in the number of young 
adults is with respect to the labour force, but as labour force 
trends are of central iMpOrtan6e to the analysis these are treated 
more fully below. 
Labour force trends and structures 
In marked contrast to‘trends in the other countries analyzed, 
the labour force in Argentina will increase only moderately in the 
years to come. There is zome variation from one experiment to 
another, but the labour force will not expand by much more than 
one-half from 1970 to the end of the century, and with some 
assumptions the increase will be significantly less. 1'or the 30 year 
period as a whole the average rates of increase in the simulation 
experiments range from..1.1 per cent to 1.4 per cent per annum, 
sharply lower:thanthose which will prevail In!ihe other countries 
analyzed. 
Further, and again in contrast to the situation in the other 
countries analyzed, postulated changes in labour participation rates 
account for an important part both of the variation from one 
experiment to another,. and of the total increase in thOSe'experiments 
where this is largest. If it is assumed that labour participation 
rates remain.unchanged ,during the period of the projection the 
labour force increases less than 40 per cent from 1970 to the end 
of the century - an average rate of increase of only 1.1 per cent 
per annum - and there is very. little uncertainty about the projection. 
Despite considerable differences in assumptions about changes in the 
other variables, if participation rates are held constant the 
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IparticiPatitn rates have remained 
increasing at 1.7 per cent per 
constant, 
annum in 
is assumed that labbur 
then the labour force was 
- 133 - 
increase in the. labbur force ranges only from 36 per cent to just 
under. 40 per cent in the different experiments. 
'TheA.ssue of adequate employment opportunities will therefore 
probably not be of the same central importance in Argentina as in 
many countries of the region. Not only will the increase in the 
labour force be much less rapid under any assumptions, but if the 
rate rises above 1.1 per cent per annum (for the period as a whole) 
it will be due to rising participation rates. This introduces 
an element of flexibility as participation rates may indeed rise 
if adequate employment opportunities are available, but may simply 
remain around present levels if the employment situation is 
unfavourable. This element in the potential increase in the labour 
force is unlikely to exert the same degree of social and political 
pressure as an increase in the number of persons of working age. 
This general situation is a continuation of an already well 
established trend in Argentina - throughout the post-war period 
the labour force has increased at a rate ranging only around 1.5 per 
cent per annum - and is a further reflection of the fact that the 
population transition began much earlier in Argentina than in most 
countries of the region, and has been of a more gradual nature. 
The precise form of this past trend is itself dependent on recent 
changes which have occurred in labour participatir'n rates. If it 
the early 1950s, and the rate then gradually declined to 1.4 per cent 
in 1970 (see table4, 'Chapter I ). Available estimates however 
show an important decline in labour participation rates during the 
1950s, followed by a small rise during the 1960s, so that the actual 
rate of increase in the labour force may have been more or less 
constant; the estimates vary somewhat. 
The simulation experiments indicate a continuation of this 
sort of situation. If labour participation rates should remain 
apprOximately constant there will be some further decline in the 
rate of increase in the labour force, 'how much depending on the other 
/assumptions made. 
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assumptions made. In the first experiment (little change from the 
1970 situation) the rate of increase would be about 1.1 per cent 
per annum at the end of the century, while with the substantial 
migration and lower fertility rates assumed in the second experiment 
it would decline further, to 0.7 per cent at the end of the century. 
But if labour participation rates move toward Western European 
levels the increase in the labour force will be a good deal larger. 
In the second experiment for example, where it is assumed that 
these levels are fully reached at the end of the century, the rate 
of increase is again higher during the 1970s (1.6 per cent per annum); 
and while the declining trend is then resumed, the rate remains at 
1.2 per cent per annum at the end of the century. This second 
experiment shows how great a difference changing labour participation 
rates might make in Argentina: with no change the labour force would 
increase 36 per cent over the 30 year period (an average rate of 
increase of 1.0 per cent per annum), but with the changes actually 
assumed the increase is 53 per cent (an average rate of 1.4 per cent 
per annum). The somewhat different structure of labour participation 
rates in Argentina and the changes assumed are discussed more 
fully below. 
As with nearly all other aspects of the projections in Argentina, 
there are substantial differences from one area to another and, 
depending upon the assumptions used, particularly with respect to 
migration, quite different trends are possible. During the 1960s 
migration was sufficiently large to result in an important decline 
in the labour force in the rural areas, while the urban labour force 
expanded correspondingly more rapidly. The rural-urban migration 
was greatest in the North, so that the rural labour force declined 
more there and it was in the Northern cities that the labour force 
expanded most rapidly. 
There is least uncertainty about future trends in the urban 
areas: there will be a steady increase in the labour force under all 
assumptions, and there is no possibility of the very high rates of 
increase which will be characteristic of the urban labour force in 
/many countries. 
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many countries. In most of the experiments the labour force 
continues to increase fastest in the urban North, but even there 
the highest average rate for the 30 year period as a whole is only 
2.5 per-cent per annum in the fourth experithent (regional oriented 
development). The smallest average increase for the urban North 
is 1.8 per cent per annum, so that the possible trends range within 
fairly narrow limits for this area. In the cities of the North then 
the labour force can be expected to increase fairly rapidly, so that 
serious general labour shortages would be unlikely to occur even 
with major regional oriented.industrial development programmes; while 
at the same time there is little chance'of the extremely high 
rates of increase which lead to rapid deterioration of the'employment 
situation with any even temporary slowing of the growth rate. 
In the urban South the rate of increase will probably be less, 
and there is somewhat more variation from one experiment to another. 
With the assumptions of the second experiment (growth concentrated 
on the urban South) the average increase for-the 30 year period is 
1.9 per cent per annum, and this is the only experiment in which 
the labour force expands slightly faster in the cities of the South 
than in those of the North (1.9 per'cent vs. 1.8 per Cent per annum). 
At the other extreme, in the fourth experiment, where there is no 
migration to the urban South, the average increase is only 0.6 per 
cent per annum. The increase in the labour fOrce in the cities of 
the South will therefore probably. be quite moderate, and the 
achievement of reasonable growth rates should prevent any serious 
deterioration of the employment situation.' Even a modern oriented 
growth process, with the rapidly rising prOductivity levels which 
this is likely to imply, could probably be carried through in this 
area without the strains and contradictions which would be involved 
in most of the region. 
The rural areas will at most account for only a minor 	of  
the total increase and,,because of the large potential impact of 
migration there is much more uncertainty ahout trends in these areas. 
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Even in the fourth experiment (rural and regional oriented growth) 
the rural labour force expands only slightly faster than that of 
the cities, and accounts for less than 28 per cent of the total 
increase in the labour force to the end of the century. And if 
there is substantial migration, as assumed in the second and third 
experiments, the absolute size of the rural labour force will 
decline steadily in the decades ahead. Especially in view of the 
substantial agricultural resources available, it is unlikely that 
rural employment opportunities will be a serious problem in 
Argentina in the coming decades. On the contrary, if rural-urban 
migration continues on a substantial scale it is quite likely that 
shortages of agricultural labour, at least in the South, will be 
of increasing concern. Labour productivity is estimated to be 
nearly as high in the agricultural as in the non-agricultural sector 
with the South itself, and concern has already been expressed that 
the flow of manpower to the cities has gone too far. If the flow 
continues such concern can be expected to increase. 
The structure of labour participation rates is rather different 
in Argentina and needs to be described more fully; it is important 
both to an understanding of the possible labour force trends 
described above and to the composition of the labour force itself. 
There are the usual differences in participation rates between the 
rural and the urban areas in Argentina: the proportion of males who 
are active members of the labour force is substantially higher, at 
all age levels, in the rural areas than in the cities while the 
proportion of females who are members of the laboUr force, by 
contrast, is substantially, lower in the rural areas. But these 
differences are for the. =Post part less sharp in Argentina than in 
many countries of the region.-"In the rural areas in Argentina 
participation rates for males are not as high as in either Venezuela 
or El Salvador, for example, and participation rates for females 
are not as low, particularly for the younger age groups. In part 
this may reflect a more realistic classification in Argentina, but 
in part it is probably a reflection of real differences in economic 
/circumstances; the 
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circumstances; the lower male participation rates are no doubt at 
least partially a reflection of relatively higher rural incomes, 
and the higher female participation rates are probably due to more 
opportunities for remunerated employment outside the home. 
In the cities female participation rates are also higher for 
the younger age groups in Argentina, but this difference does not 
extend consistently through the rest of the age range, and even for 
younger women it is much less striking than the similar comparison 
for the rural areas. The most notable feature of urban 
participation rates in Argentina is the relatively low percentage 
of older persons who are members of the labour force. From middle 
age, urban female participation rates are lower in Argentina than 
in either Venezuela or El Salvador, but as these rates are quite 
low everywhere the difference is not so striking. For males it is 
much more so. In El Salvador urban male participation rates remain 
quite high until after the age of 70; in Venezuela they drop quite 
sharply after the age of 60; but in Argentina the decline begins 
from the age of 50 and is much more substantial. Further, within 
Argentina male participation rates decline more in the South than 
in the North. The extent of these differences can be appreciated 
from the following figures. 
MALE URBAN PARTICIPATION RATES 
(Percentage) 








45-49 95 94 95 94 
50-54 95 94 88 84 
55-59 94 91 74 64 
6o-64 91 79 59 47 
65-69 87 7o 49 36 
70 and over 68 49 33 22 
These figures no doubt reflect the more widespread social 
security benefits available in Argentina, which enable more older people 
to withdraw from the labour force. And the extension of these 
/benefits to 
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benefits to the rural areas is reflected in somewhat lower participation 
rates for older males in the rural areas as well. But the very 
low figures for older males in the cities, particularly in the 
South, may also be due in part to involuntary withdrawal from the 
labour force because of difficulties in finding adequate employment 
opportunities. That this is the case is suggested by the fact that 
participation rates for urban males in the 50 to 65 year age groups 
in Argentina are low not only by comparison with those in other 
countries of the region, but are well below the level of participation 
rates in Western Europe as wel1.1/ This provides an important 
further element of flexibility in the urban labour force: an important 
proportion of males 50 and over are not now active members of the 
labour force, but might be drawn into that labour force under 
appropriate conditions. Added to the potential increase in the 
number of women in the labour force, this presents the possibility 
of relatively large expansion of the total labour force in certain 
circumstances and explains why,when it is assumed that labour 
participation rates move toward Western European levels, this becomes 
an important factor in the total increase in the labour force in 
Argentina. 
This structure of labour participation rates, and the changes 
which could occur in such rates, make them a potentially important 
factor in -aearly all aspects o.f the labour force projections in 
Argentina. Their role in the total increase has already been noted, 
and one major implication of this role is its predominant importance 
1/ 	These labour participation rates are well below those prevailing 
in France in 1968, and which are used as the "goal" in the 
simulation experiments. The rates in France are, in their 
turn, well below those in some of the other Western European 
countries. That these low rates in Argentina are in part 
involuntary is also suggested by the past trend. From 1950 to 
1960 participation rates for older males declined sharply. 
From 1960 to 1971 the participation rates for those 65 and over 
continued to decline, but for the 50 to 65 age groups there was 
a significant rise in'participation rates, although they 
remained far below the 1950 levels. 
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in any change in the total activity rates (the percentage of the 
population which are active members of the labour force) which 
occurs in the coming years. The total activity rate in. Argentina 
in 1970 was relatively high - nearly 38 per cent compared to rates 
of around 31 per cent in much of the region - and is. again a reflection 
of the much earlier beginning of the population transition in that. 
country. If labour participation rates should remain, unchanged 
there will be no important change in the total activity rate to the 
end of the century, no matter which set of assumptions about the 
other variables is used This reflects the fact that the age 
structure has evolved much further in Argentina so that tiae continuing 
decline in the relative importance of the non-working young is now 
approximately offset by the rise in the relative importance of the 
non-working older population. As shown in table 13, however, the 
total activity rate does rise substantially to the end, of the 
century in several of the experiments, and this is very largely the 
result of assumed changes in participation rates. In the second 
experiment for example the total activity rate at the end of the 
century is 44.6 per cent, and the bulk of this increase is due to 
rising participation rates. If participation rates should move to 
the Western European level, as assumed in thateximent, an 
additional 5 per cent of the entire population vr...ra)J.Ite drawn into 
the active labour force, an indication of the potential flexibility 
this element gives to the size of the labour force in Argentina. 
The changes in the composition of the labour force in Argentina 
will probably be more moderate than in most countries in the years 
ahead, again a reflection of the more mature population evolution, 
and to the extent such changes occur changing participation rates-
will almost always be a major cause. The principal possibilities 
are changes in the composition by area, by sex, and by age group, 
and each of these can be analyzed briefly in turn., 
In 1970 close to two7thirds,of the total labour force was 
concentrated in the urban South, and although the concentration will 
continue important variations are possible, depending upon the 
/orientation of 
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orientation of future development. As has been noted at several 
points, the rate of natural population increase in the urban South 
is low so that much depends upon the amount of migration; and with 
respect to the labour force in the area much also depends on changes 
in participation rates. At one extreme, in the second experiment 
(development concentrated on the urban South with a considerable 
inflow of migrants and with activity rates moving to the Western 
European level), the concentration increases and at the end of the 
century the urban South accounts for slightly over three-quarters of 
the total labour force. At the other extreme, with a regional and 
rural oriented development, with no further migration to the urban 
South, and with little change in participation rates in that area 
(as assumed in the fourth experiment), the degree of concentration 
declines and the urban South accounts for only 56 per cent of the 
total labour force at the end of the century. These contrasts 
emphasize the extent to which the growth of the labour force in 
the urban South will continue to depend on migration and/or rising 
labour participation rates; if there were no inflow of migrants 
and no change in participation rates the labour force in the area 
would increase only around 17 per cent over the 30 year period, and 
of course decline substantially in relative importance. 
The urban North is likely to be the area wit:k, the most significant 
rise in its relative share of the labour force in the years ahead. 
In 1970 the area accounted for only 14.2 per cent of the total 
labour force, but as was noted earlier the labour force in the area 
increases moderately rapidly under all sets of assumptions, and it 
is relatively more imnortant at the end of the century in every 
experiment. In the intermediate type fifth experiment, for example, 
the proportion of the total labour force accounted for by the urban 
North rises to just over 19 per cent. 
The greatest uncertainty, here as in other population aspects, 
is encountered in the rural areas. These accounted for 20 per cent 
of the total labour force in 1970, and while this percentage would 
rise somewhat with the rural oriented development projected in the 
/fourth experiment, 
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fourth experiment, it will decline by about half by the end of 
the century with a continuation of an urban oriented development, 
with its associated migration to the cities, as projected in the 
second and third experiments. 
On the basis of past trends the most likely projection 
appears to be a continuation of the concentration of the labour 
force in the urban South - but not much further increase in the 
relative share of this area; an important increase in the proportion 
of the labour force locate0_ in the urban North; and a continuing 
decline in the relative importance of the rural labour force in 
Argentina. 
The relative importance of women in the labour force will 
increase; but the change is likely to be less striking than it may 
well be in some other countries, simply because in 1970 women 
were 'already a somewhat higher proportion of the labour force in 
Argentina than in many countries of the region. From 22 per cent 
in 1970, the relative importance of women in the labour force 
could nevertheless rise to around 30 per cent by the end of the 
century. Such a rise is indicated in the second and third 
experiments and would be brought about both by a continuing 
shift to the cities (Where female participation rates are higher) 
and by the assumed rise in female participation 2-a !-.es toward the 
Western European level. In this respect the situation is the same 
in Argentina as elsewhere: the important factors in a rising 
porportion of women in the labour force will everywhere be the 
shift to the cities, and the extent to which participation rates 
within a given area rise. 
The impact of rising female participation rates is reflected 
in the activity rates shown in table 13. In the fourth experiment 
it is assumed that, as part of the rural oriented development, 
participation rates in the rural areas move to the rates prevailing 
in the urban areas; and as a result the female activity rate in the 
rural areas more than doubles by the end of the century. In the 
cities the greatest increase is in the second experiment, where it 
/is assumed 
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is assumed that urban female participation rates rise to the Western 
European level, and as a consequence the female activity rate in the 
urban South, for example, rises from 18.8 per cent in 1970 to 30.6 per 
cent at the end of the century. 
As can be seen from the table, male activity rates in the 
different areas are not likely to change much in the years ahead. 
To the extent that male participation rates move toward the Western 
European levels in the cities there are two opposing elements which 
approximately offset each other: participation rates of teenagers, 
and of those over 65, decline; but for the 50-65 year age groups 
participation rates rise. 
At the national level any important change in the age structure 
Will depend upon a change in participation rates, and this would be 
of the sort already described: the proportion of teenagers would 
decline as participation rates for this group fell, and the relative 
importance of older adults would rise as participation rates for the 
50 to 65 year age groups increased. Such a shift is shown in the 
second experiment, where the proportion of teenagers falls from 
13.7 per cent in 1970 to 8.2 per cent at the end of the century while 
the percentage of older adults rises from 34.7 per cent to 40.2 per 
cent. Most of this shift is caused by the change in participation 
rates, but it is reinforced by the assumed decline :a fertility rates, 
which leads to a significant drop in the proportion of teenagers in 
the population as a whole at the end of the century. 
There are, however, substantial differences from one area to 
another which are caused by factors other than participation rates. 
There are first already in 1970 major differences in the age structure 
of the labour force between the rural and the urban areas. The 
central feature of this difference is the much smaller proportion of 
young adults in the rural areas, largely a reflection of the heavy 
migration of the young to the cities. In the urban areas 50 per cent 
or more of the labour force is 20-39 years of age while in the rural 
North the corresponding figure is only 38.3 per cent and in the rural 
South only 35.2 per cent. The extent of migration assumed in the 
/projections does 
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projections does not change the age structure of the labour force 
much, in the urban areas but, again reflecting the impact migration 
can have on the rural areas, is of central importance there. In 
the experiments where it is assumed that rural-urban migration is 
sharply less than in the recent past (the first and fourth 
experiments), the proportion of young adults in the rural labour 
force rises to figures similar to, or even higher than, the proportion 
of that group in the urban labour force. 
There are also important differences in the age structure of 
the labour force as between the North and the South in Argentina. 
If the rural North is compared with the rural South, and the urban 
North with the urban South (see table 13), in 1970 the proportion 
of teenagers in the labour force is substantially higher in the 
North and the proportion of older adults substantially lower. This 
difference is primarily a reflection of the underlying difference 
in the age structure of the population in the North and in the 
South, rather than of differences in labour participation rates in 
the two regions. As can be seen from an examination of the figures 
in table 13, these regional differences will remain to the end of 
the century, but are likely to be reduced significantly in magnitude. 
Finally, the age structure of the female labour force is also 
quite different from that of the male labour forc,:, in the urban South 
in 1970, for example, the very young accounted for a much larger 
proportion of the female labour force and older workers a 
correspondingly smaller proportion (see table 13).1/ The difference 
1/ 	The data are shown only for the urban South in table 13 and the 
analysis here is limited to that area. It accounts for the 
predominant part of both the male and female labour force and the 
urban labour force figures are also likely to be more meaningful. 
In comparative terms the differing composition of the male and 
female labour force in the urban North is similar to that in the 
urban South. In the rural areas the very young appear to account 
for an even more disproportionate share of the female labour force. 
For example, in the rural North in 1970 teenagers were 30.9 per 
cent of the total female labour force as compared to 16.6 per cent 
of the male labour force; but as has been noted before rural labour 
force figures, especially for women, must be used with greater 
reserve. 
/is actually 
is actually concentrated in'a much narrower range than shown by 
the age classification used: those 15-24 years of age accounted 
for fully 37.6 per cent of the entire female labour force, 
compared to'26 per cent of the male labour force. The extent 
to which this situation changes will depend largely on the changes 
that occur in participation rates. If participation rates should 
move to Western European levels, for example, the composition of 
the female labour force by age group would become quite similar 






A. The Situation in 1970 end the' Main, Variables  
The demographic situation in Brazil is in general quite 
similar to the situation in the region as a whole, although in 
part of course this simply reflects the weight the country carries 
in the calculation of the regional averages. Brazil is a medium 
income country, but this medium figure is the result of averaging 
quite disparate areas and sectors. The country possesses probably 
the largest and most diversified modern industrial sector in the 
region, but there is also still a large traditional-type agricultural 
sector. In area terms income levels are much higher in the south than 
in the north. These disparities, as well as the resulting averages, 
are similar to the situation in the region as a whole, and they are 
reflected in the population structure. 
At the national level the demographic transition has proceeded 
in the manner described earlier for Latin America as a whole (see 
Chapter I, pages 12-14), and is now at a similar stage. The 19408 
marked the transition from the lower rates of pop„;lation growth 
of the pre-war period, and for that decade as a wficli.e the population 
increased at the rate of 204 per cent per annum in Brazil. There was a 
large further increase to a peak average rate of 3.0 per cent per annum 
during the 1950s and then, due to the decline in fertility rates 
- which began as early as 1950 bit has been very small - a mild 
decline to an average rate of increase of 2.9 per cent during the 1960s. 
This demographic transition has been significantly different 
from the trend in each of the other countries analysed however. 
In Argentina the transition began much earlier and proceeded steadily, 
without any upward surge in population growth in the post-war period. 
In both Venezuela and El Salvador fertility rates were at substantially 
higher levels than those reached in Brazil and so the post-war surge 
was greater and the peak rates of population increase reached were 
/much higher. 
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much higher. Rates of population growth remain higher in both 
countries than in Brazil, but in Venezuela the decline in fertility 
rates since the mid-1960s has been substantially faster and these are 
now approaching the Brazilian level. Although fertility rates never 
reached such high levels in Brazil, up to 1970 there had been only 
a very small decline from the peak rates of the early 1950s. 
At the national level the degree of urbanization is also 
similar to that for the region as a whole, but the process has 
again been rather different than in the other individual countries 
analysed. In 1970 some 56 per cent of the Brazilian population was 
urban, a much higher proportion than in El Salvador, but much lower 
than in either Argentina or Venezuela. There has been a substantial 
amount of migration to the cities - only 36 per cent of the population 
was urban in 1950 - but the population in the rural areas has continued 
to increase, and in 1970 was about one-quarter larger than it had 
been in 1950. The urbanization process has thus been less rapid than 
in Venezuela (where there was a much sharper rise in the relative 
importance of the urban population and where, despite the rapid 
natural increase, the rural population has remained approximately 
constant since 1940) or than in Argentina (where in a different 
context the rural population has declined steadily throughout the 
post-war period); but, in contrast to the situati.'In in El Salvador, 
migration to the cities has still been of very substantial magnitude. 
But behind this picture of similarity at the national level 
to the situation in Latin America as a whole, there are major 
variations from one area to another within the country. The 
Brazilian totals are themselves averages of widely differing 
components, and the inidividual areas are found to be more similar 
to some of the other countries analysed than to the national or 
regional aggregates. 
In an effort to analyse this entire situation as clearly as 
possible, six separate areas were defined for use in the simulation 
experiments for Brazil. First, there are three regions - the most 
highly developed, the intermediate, and the less developed - and 
/within each 
- 147 - 
within each region there-is the usual rural-urban division. The 
most developed region'is. basically the centre-south, where most 'of 
the modern industrial activity is concentrated and where there is 
also an important amount of modern type agriculture; the intermediate 
region is the extreme south of the country; and the less. develoied .  
region is the extensive northern and interior parts of the country...1/ 
In 1970.  he most highly developed regiOn, as' here' defined, accounted 
for 28.7 per cent of the population, the intermediate region 18.7 per 
cent and: the less developed region was much the largest with:53.5 per 
cent .of the total. 
The underlying population parameters vary greatly from one of 
these areas to another. With respect to fertility rates, the most 
important of the parameters, these are again found to be much higher' 
in the rural areas than in the cities. But as was shown to be the 
case in Argentina, other factors clearly exert a strong influence 
and there is considerable variation among the cities and among the 
rural areas themselves on a regional basis. The highest fertility 
rates. in 1970 were registered in the less developed regiOn. Within 
that region the total fertility rate in the rural area is about 40 per 
cent higher than in thecities, and both are closely similar to the 
very high rates which:prevailed in the corresponding areas in El 
Salvador and in Venezuela in 1970. At the other crz:.treme, in the 
developed region the total fertility rate even in the rural area is 
estimated to have been only slightly higher than in the cities of the 
less developed region; and the total fertility rate in the cities 
More precisely, the developed region has been defined as the 
states of Sao Paulo, Guanabara (Rio de Janeiro) and the 
Distrito Federal, plus the metropolitan area of Fluminense do 
Grande-Rio (across the bay from Rio de Janeiro) and Belo 
Horizonte. In 1970 the state of Sao Paulo alone accounted for 
about two-thirds of the population of this developed region, but 
the region is not a completely unified geographical area and this 
must be borne in mind in interpreting the results. The 
intermediate region is comprised of the three southern states of 
Parana, Sta. Catarina, and Rio Grande do-Sul. All remaining areas 
of Brazil are included in what is here nailed the leas developed 
region. It of course Includes the much referred to Northeast, 
but much more besides; in 1970 the Northeast itself accounted for 
56 per cent of the total population of the less developed region. 
/themselves is 
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themselves is much lower still. In relative terms, this regional 
comparison is closely similar to that already described between 
the North and the South in Argentina. But in absolute terms even 
in the developed region in Brazil fertility rates are much higher 
than the unusually low levels prevailing in the South of Argentina; 
they are in fact quite similar to the fertility rates in the North 
of Argentina. In the intermediate area fertility rates are in between 
the extremes of the other two regions, although here there is an even 
greater divergence between the rural and the urban areas, with the 
urban rates not too much higher than those in the developed region. 
Viewed in terms of numerical ranking, the total fertility rate 
is higher in all of the rural areas than in any urban area; and rates 
decline on a consistent regional basis. That is, the rural less 
developed are had the highest total fertility rate in 1970, followed 
by the rural intermediate and the rural developed area and then by the 
three urban areas in the same regional order. The total range in 
magnitude is substantial: the total fertility rate in the rural less 
developed area is considerably more than double the total fertility 
rate in the cities of the developed region. The exact estimates are 
shown in the note to table 14; they can be regarded as relatively 
reliable as the census data show by state, and by rural or urban area 
within the state, the number of births classified by the age of the 
mother. 
There are also large differences in mortality rates, following 
the same general area pattern as that shown by fertility rates. 
Mortality rates by age group on a rural-urban basis are not available 
in Brazil however and the estimates must be regarded as only very 
approximate. On the basis of such partial data as are available it 
appears that infant mortality rates, and perhaps also death rates for 
children and young adults, may be around twice as high in the less 
developed region as in the developed region of Brazil. 
The degree of urbanization varies greatly from one part of the 
country to another, and the national averages, both for the 1970 
situation and' with respect to the speed of the urbanization process 
/itself, are 
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itself, are again the sum of disparate parts. In the developed 
region over 80 per_cent of the population was,,,urban in 1970,1/ a 
proportion more similar to the high degree.of urbanization reached 
in Argentina and Venezuela than to the national:average in Brazil 
itself. Further, urbanization has proceeded:very rapidly in this 
developed region. In the state of Sao Paulo, which is the best 
indioator, less than 53,per cent of the population lived in the 
cities in 3950, but 20 years later the proportion had risen to over 
80 per, cent. This is aA even more rapid shift than occurred in 
Venezuela ‘during the same period, and has involved a substantial 
decline in the absolute size of the rural, population in the state. 
In relative terms the degree of urbanization is quite similar 
in the intermediate and in the less developed regions. Contrary to 
the situation for the country as a whole, and in even greater contrast 
to the developed region, the majority of the population (about 56 per 
cent) was still rural in 1970 in both of these regions. Urbanization 
has been proceeding rapidly, although at a somewhat slower pace than 
in the developed region.; the proportion of the population which is 
rural, in both regions, has declined froth a 1950 level of over 70 per 
cent. But although the degree of urbanization has remained closely 
similar in the two regions, the underlying developments have been 
quite different. In the., less developed region t?,.-movement to the 
cities probably reflects more the unfavourable conditions in the rural 
areas than the opportunities in the cities themselves, and there has 
been a substantial net movement out of the region. In the intermediate 
area on the other hand there has been substantial agricultural 
development, and the urban population in this region expanded more 
rapidly than in any other area of Brazil during the 1950-1970 period. 
The population of the intermediate region as a whole much more than 
doubled over that 20 year period while that of the less developed 
region, despite substantially higher fertility rates, increased only 
about 60 per cent. 
2-1 85.7 per cent of the population in the developed region was urban 
in 1970, but this overstates the true extent of urbanization 
because of the way the developed' region is here defined (see 
footnote page 103). The percentage of the population which is 
urban in the state of Sao Paulo alone - 80.4 per cent - is a 
better indicator here. 
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The migratory, flows among the different areas here defined 
are quite clear. There has been a general movement from the rural 
areas to the cities, although as just noted the intensity has varied 
from one region to another. In addition, there has been an important 
net movement away from the less developed region and toward both'the 
intermediate and the developed regions. Keeping in mind thd differences 
in natural increase among the different areas, the approximate 
magnitude of these shifts can be appreciated from the change in 
population structure and rates of increase in the inidividual areas 
during the 1950 to 1970 period. The figures are as follows:1/ 
Area Percentage distribution 
of the population 
Average annual rate 
of increase 
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As shown, the rural less developed area is still larger than 
any other, but the predominance is much less marked than it was in 
1950. Although relatively modest proportions of. the total in 1950, 
the cities in the less developed and in the developed regions, 
combined, accounted for over two-thirds of the total population 
increase during the 20 year period, and each now holds close to 
one-quarter of the total population of the country. These three 
areas are now the major population groupings. 
Because of the more complicated pattern of migration involved 
the age structure of the migratory flows is more difficult to,estimate 
1/ 	These figures should be regarded as only approximate as the 
1950 census data were not analysed in the same detail used to 
obtain the 1970 area classification. 
/in Brazil. 
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in Brazils/ Estimates were made in the same general way as described 
in the preceeding.country analyses, lut_they.must be regarded as 
subject to somewhat greater margins of ,error.and, indeed, the figures 
for the other countries were used as partial guidelines in making 
the Brazilian estimates. Nevertheless; the estimates are conSideted 
adequate for present purposes and although they are in general similar 
to those for the other countries analysed, there are also some 
significant differences in Brazil. 
As in all other countries analysed, more women than men 
migrate to the cities and this is reflected in the population 
structure. In 1970 some 57.3 per cent, of all women livea in the 
urban areas in Brazil whereas only 54.4 per cent of the men were 
urban residents. But whereas in Argentina it was found that there 
was a slight predominance of women even in regional migration, in 
Brazil, perhaps because of the even greater distances involved, 
somewhat more men migrate from the less developed to the other 
regions of the country. The intermediate and developed areas, combined 
held 46.7 per cent of the male population in 1970 as against 46.2 per 
cent of the female. But this difference is small, and perhaps. it 
would be more significant to conclude that even with the great 
distances involved in Brazil women are nearly as important as men 
in the regional migration flows. 
The differential movement by sex can be seen more clearly 
from the percentage distribution among the different areas of 
the country of particular age groups, and this is again worth 
noting. The intermediate and developed regions are combined, here 
for easier observation of the regional migration flow. The age 
groups shown are the same as those used in the analysis of 
Argentina so that comparison can be readily made..  
A contributing factor is that there are difficulties in using 
the 1960 census data. The 1950 census'data were used forthis 
reason, and the 20 year gap involved means much more =certainty. 
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SELECTED AGE GROUPS: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION, BY SEX, AMMO THE 
DIFFERENT AREAS OF THE COUNTRY 
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0-4 35.5 23.2 15.2 26.1 35.4 23.1 15.3 26.2 
15-19 28.4 26.3 13.2 32.1 30.9 23.2 15.2 30.6 
20-24 27.3 25.2 12.4 35.1  28.9 21.9 14.7 34.6 
30-34 26.1 24.0 12.1 37.8  27.2 20.9 14.2 37.7 
45-49 25.4 23.7 12.2 38.7 27.8 21.5 14.0 36.7 
60-65 25.4 24.3 10.5 39.8 30.1 21.5 13.4 35.0 
The 0-4 group reflects basically the distribution of births, 
and is approximately the same for males and for females. The 
15-19 age group shows a sharp drop in the percentage of both sexes, 
but especially of females, in the rural less developed area. This 
very large exodus of females is partially offset by a rise in the 
percentage of females in the urban less developed area, but the 
percentage of males in the urban less developed area does not change. 
In the intermediate and developed region there is also a substantial 
drop in the percentage of females in the rural area; but there is no 
decline in the percentage of males in this area. Finally, there are 
large increases in the percentage of both males ajid females (but 
especially the latter) in the urban intermediate and developed area. 
These changes taken together show that before the age of 20 there is 
already large scale migration by women; much more than by males. There 
is already an important amount of regional migration (more by males than 
by females), but the predominance of females among very young migrants 
is due to the large numbers of teenage girls who move from the rural 
to the urban areas. These findings are similar to that in Argentina 
(see pages 106-108), but the regional shift is less for teenage 
females in Brazil and there is somewhat more migration of very young 
males. As in Argentina, at this age level many more females than 
males live in the cities: 58.4 per cent as against 53.8 per cent. 
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From adolescence to the early 1930s thera is a somewhat greater 
decline in the proportion of males in the rural less developed area, 
and this differential is accounted for by regional migration.; it is 
offset by a correspondingly larger increase in the percentage of males 
in the cities of the intermediate and developed regions. Finally, 
after the early 1930s the direction of the shift is reversed for 
males: the percentage of males living in the less developed region, 
and especially in the rural area of that region, rises. For females, 
by contrast, the shift continues in the same direction, although at 
a slower rate. As a consequence, for those 60-65 years of age 
64.1 per cent of the women live in the urban areas compa.:.'ed to only 
56.5 per cent of the men; and even in regional terms there has been 
relatively more female migration by that time, 50.3 Ter cent living 
in the intermediate and developed regions compared to 48.4 per cent 
of the males. 
The direct estimates of the age structure of migration show 
similar results. In relative terms there appears to have been less 
migration of the very young (under 15) in Brazil than in Venezuela 
or El Salvador, but otherwise the age structure of rural-urban 
migration is much the same. Regional migration of males appears to 
have been heavily concentrated in the 15 to 35 yGar age range, as in 
Argentiha; but there has continued to be fairly linuvy regional 
migratiou of females into the highest age groups. 
B. Results of the Simulation Ex erimahts 
From the above discussion it is clear that the demographic 
structure in Brazil is at an intermediate stage of evolution when 
viewed as a whole, although there are marked variations from one area 
to another within the country. The implication of this situation for 
the simulation experiments is that a wide variety of assumptions 
are possible with respect to future trends. Migration has been 
substantial in recent years, but 44 per cent of the population was 
still rural in 1970 so there is still the possibility of a large 
shift to the cities in the years ahead. But the situation is not 
/uniform throughout 
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uniform throughout the country; within the developed region 
urbanization has already reached a high level and the possibility 
of further movement out of the rural area is much more limited. 
Regional migration has also been substantial, but over half the 
population still lives in the less developed region and the 
possibility of large scale movement to other parts of the country 
remains. Birth rates never reached the high levels observed in 
Venezuela and El Salvador, but up to 1970 there had been relatively 
little overall decline from those levels, and the decline which 
occurred appears to have been restricted to the more developed areas 
of the country. There is thus considerable scope for assumptions 
about future trends in this variable as well; although again there 
are closer limits in the more developed areas. Future population 
trends can therefore not be closely defined with any degree of 
certainty in Brazil; in both absolute and relative terms different 
assumptions produce quite different results, with respect both to 
the increase in the total population and to its distribution among 
the different areas of the country. 
With respect to the type of development followed (modern type, 
urban and regionally oriented), the assumptions of the second and 
third experiments are closest to the experience of the recent past. 
The assumptions of the second experiment are extreme and designed 
to explor,.   the consequences of a really massive migration flow out 
of the rural areas and, to a lesser extent, out of the less 
developed region as a whole. But the assumptions about fertility 
rates in these two experiments imply a sharp break with past trends: 
in both experiments, but especially in the second, it is assumed 
that they decline much more rapidly than in the past. In view of 
the extreme assumptions involved in the second experiment, reference 
is generally made to the third experiment to illustrate the results 
of an orientation of this kind. 
The first experiment is similar to past experience insofar 
as fertility rates are concerned - they are assumed to decline slowly. 
But little change of all sorts is assumed in this experiment, and this 
means much less migration and hence not much further change in the 
distribution of the population among the different areas of the 
country. 
/The fourth 
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The fourth experiment (rural and regional oriented development) 
must be regarded as relatively unrealistic in the Brazil situation. 
Considerable attention has for some time been given to the problems 
of the North and to the development of the interior areas of the 
country, but the development process has continued to be concentrated 
in the centre-south and it is unlikely that this emphasis could be 
shifted to the less developed region. At the same time, the rural 
population is still too large to be the centre of a development 
designed to restrain population flows (as would be possible in 
Argentina, for example); and the urban industrial development has 
been sufficiently successful and has sufficient future potential to 
discourage the adoption of such a policy as the only viable 
alternative (as might possibly be the case in a situation such as 
that of El Salvador, for example). 
The fifth experiment, an intermediate type, is perhaps the one 
most similar to the experience of the recent past in Brazil. This 
coincides with the "average", or intermediate type, population 
structure which characterizes the country. The experiment assumes 
there will continue to be substantial, but not extreme, migration 
flows and so a continuing shift in the population toward the more 
developed and urban areas. It does however diffsr from past 
experience in its assumptions about fertility rat-,3: these are 
assumed tc) decline quite substantially in all areas by the end of 
the century. 
The results of the different simulation experiments are 
shown in table 14. 
Po ulation trends 
At the end of the century the Brazilian population will be 
somewhat more than double its 1970 size; from about 95 million it will 
rise to around 200 million over that 30 year period. With the 
assumptions of the first experiment (little change from the 1970 
situation) the increase is considerably greater - to 225 million -
but in all of the other experiments the results are fairly similar. 
/Table 14 
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Table 14 
BRAZIL: RESULTS OF THE SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS Es/ 
Population (millions) 
Less developed rural 





Population (1970 = 100) 
Less developed rural 






Rate of increase (5 p/a) 
Less developed rural 





Population distribution (%) 
Less developed rural 





Population age stru-t,'re 	(%) 
5 - 14 
15 - 19 
20 - 39 
40 - 64 
65 and over 
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100 ioo 0 - 	4 
18.2 17.5 
loo loo loo 10o 
5 - 14 
28,6 28.1 
15,0 15.2 12.9 14.1 
II.o 
15 - 19 
 
27.3 27.1 24.4 25.5 




11.3 11,1 10.7 10.8 
40 - 64 
14.4 14.2 
26.5 27.1 31.0 29.3 
65 and over 
2.5 
15.6 15.6 17.3 16.5 
3.3 4,2 4.o 3.8 3.8 
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Table 14 (cont. 1) 
The year 2000 












100 100 100 100 100 100 
0 - 4 I4.0 11.7 3.7 9.9 10.9 10.7 
5 - 14 25.1 20.9 17.3 16.5 20.0 19.4 
15 - 19 11.o 9.3 8.6 8.8 9.3 9.2 
20 - 39 29.2 31.1 36.4 34.6 31.5 33.4 
4o - 64 17.3 22.0 24.2 23.4 22.8 22.4 
65 and over 3.4 5.1 4.8 4.8 5.4 4.8 
Developed rural, age structure (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 
o - 	4 16.4 15.9 13.3 13.6 12,0 12.9 
5 - 14 27.2 26.1 24.8 25.2 23.1 23.6 
15 - 19 10.7 10.4 10.6 10.6 10.4 10.3 
20 - 39 26.9 26.9 28.0 28.3 31.6 30.1 
4o - 64 16.1 16.4 18.3 17.7 19.7 18.6 
65 and over 2.7 4.2 5.0 4.6 3.1 4.5 
Developed urban, age structure (%) 100 100 100' 	, 100 100 100 
0 - 	4 12.8 11.3 8.9 9.6 10.3 9.9 
5 - 14 22.8 19.3 17.o 17.7 18.7 18.2 
15 - 19 10.2 8.9 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.7 
20 - 39 31.0 32.4 35.8 34.6 32.5 33.4 
4o - 64 19.4 22.7 24.3 23.8 23.8 24.0 
65 and over 3.8 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.9 5.8 
Labour force (millions) 30.18 73.63 79.00 77.51 71.35 74.48 
Less developed rural 8.78 16.80 5.86 8.42 18.76 12.70 
Less developed urban 6.26 16.55 21.26 21.85 15.51 19.30 
Intermediate rural 3.13 7.17 4.99 5.66 7.73 7.04 
Intermediate urban 2.37 7.80 12.71 11,08 6.19 9.14 
Developed rural 1.44 3.00 1.65 1.81 2.99 3.10 
Developed urban 8.20 23.11 32.53 28.68 20.12 23.21 
Labour force 	(1970 --,-- 100) 100 244 262 257 236 247 
Less developed rural 100 191 67 56 214 144 
Less developed urban 100 265 340 349 248 308 
Intermediate rural 100 229 160 181 249 225 
Intermediate urban 100 295 535 467 261 385 
Developed rural 100 209 115 126 208 216 
Developed urban 100 285 397 350 245 283 
Rate of increase CI p/a) 12/ 3.1 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.8 2.9 
Less developed rural 1.1 2.4 -1.5 -0.1 2.5 1.2 
Less developed urban 4.9 3.3 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.3 
Intermediate rural 2.5 3.o 1.4 1.8 2.8 2.5 
Intermediate urban 5.4 2.5 4.7 4.5 2.9 4.1 
Developed rural -3.1 2.8 0.4 o.8 2.5 2.7 
Developed urban 5.8 3.4 4.1 3.9 2.8 3.3 
Male labour force (1970 = 100) 	 100 	240 	225 	228 	214 	224 
Female labour force (1970 = 100) 100 259 403 366 322 335 
Rate of increase (;,, p/a) b./ 
Male labour force 
















Labour force distribution (%) 
By sex 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Male 79.4 78.2 63.3 70.6 71.9 72.1 
Female 20.6 21.8 31.7 29.4 28.1 27.9 
By area 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Less developed rural 29.1 22.8 7.4 10.9 26.3 17.0 
Less developed urban 20.7 22.5 26.9 28.2 21.7 25.9 
Intermediate rural 10.4 9.7 6.3 7.3 10.9 9.4 
Intermediate urban 7.9 9.5 16.1 14.3 8.7 12.3 
Developed rural 4.8 4.1 2.1 2.3 4.2 4.2 
Developed urban 27.2 31.4 41.2 37.0 28.2 31.2 
/Table 14 (cont. 2) 
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Table 14 (cont. 2) 
1970 
The year 2000 
 
Expert - 	Expert- 	Expert- 	Experi- 	Experi- ment I ment II ment III ment IV ment V 
By sex and area 	 100 	100 	100 	100 	100 	100 Male less developed rural 	 25.7 19.8 6.5 9.5 18.8 13.5 Male less developed urban 15.5 	16.6 	16.8 	18.2 	15.1 	17.7 Male intermediate rural 	 8.8 8.1 5.3 6.1 7.9 7.4 Male intermediate urban 
5.7 	7.1 	10.8 	9.8 	6.3 	8.5 Male developed rural 	 4.3 3.5 1.7 2.0 3.1 3.3 Male developed urban 19.4 	23.0 	27.3 	25.1 	20.7 	21.7 Female less developed rural 	 3.4 3.0 0.9 1.4 7.5 3.6 Female less developed urban 5.2 	5.9 	10.1 	10.0 	6.6 	8.2 Female intermediate rural 	 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.2 3.0 2.0 Female intermediate urban 2.1 	2.4 	5.3 	4.5 	2.3 	3.8 Female developed rural 	 o.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.1 0.8 Female developed urban 7.7 	8.4 	13.9 	11.9 	. Labour participation rates (5) 	 7 5	9.5  
Total 
	
31.7 	32.7 	40.8,, 4 38.4 	35.o 	36.3 Male less developed rural 	 52.8 51.4 50.5 	51.3 46.9 48.8 Male less developed urban 43.9 	43.6 	47.3 47.1 	47.2 	47.7 Male intermediate rural 	 53.9 54.3 57.2 	57.4 5o.4 54.2 Male intermediate urban 47.5 	53.4 	61.3 58.4 	54.8 	56.4 Male developed rural 	 61.1 56.1 60.8 	60.1  Male developed urban 51.3 55.2 5o.6 	54.7 	61.0 59.0 	55.7 	57.4 Female less developed rural 	 7.3 8.0 7.7 	8.0 18.8 13.2 Female less developed urban 13.6 	14.5 	26.624.0 	19.3 	21 Female intermediate rural 	 10.7 11.5 11.9 	11.9 19.7 15
.0  
.6 Female intermediate urban 16.9 	18.2 	31.3 27.8 	20.1 	24.3 Female developed rural 	 8.5 9.5 180 	13.5 20.5 14 Female developed urban 19.7 	20.1 	31.2 28.5 	20.3 	25
.8  
.3 Labour foroe age structure (j-',.): total 
10 - 19  
20 - 39 	
19.8 	17.9 	12.4 	13.7 	16.2 	14.7 
40 - 64 
50.5 51.5 53.8 53.3 54.1 53.4 
27.1 	27.5 	31.6 	30.6 	27.7 	29.5 65 and over 	 2.6 3.1 2.2 2.4  Less developed rural 	 2.0 2.4  
10 - 19 	 23.2 	24.7 	29.4 	27.1 	19.3 	23.1 20 - 39 45.8 46.8 38.9 42.2 55.2 49.5 4o - 64 	 27.2 	23.7 	23.1 	23.8 	23.6 	23.5 65 and over 	 3.8 4.8 8.6 6.9 1.9 3.9 Less developed urban 
10 - ly 	
17.5 	16.4 	13.0 	13.3 	18.4 	13.6 20 - 39 51.8  
40 - 64 	
53.7 55.1 55.3 52.6 54.9 
28.3 	27.130.4 	29.7 	26.7 	29.4 65 and over 	 2.4 2.8 	1.5 1.7 2.3 2.1 Intermediate rurel 
10 - 19 	 26.1 	25.0 	24.8 	24.2 	17.4 	20.3 20 - 39 46.8 47.1 45.0 46.1 40 - 64 	 54.6 50.9 24.3 	24.2 	25.5 	25.4 	26,1 	25.9 65 and over 	 2.8 3.7 4.7 4.3 1.9 2. Intermediate urban 	 9  
10 - 19 	 18.1 	14.8 	8.4 	9.5 	14.2 	11.5 20 - 39 
53.3 52.7 56.8 56.2 53.1 55.2 4o - 64 	 26.8 	30.2 	33.6 	33.0 	30.5 	31.7 65 and over 	 1.9 2.3 1.2 1.4 2.3 1.6 Developed rural 
10 - 19 	 24.0 	23,1 	20.5 	21.1 	14.8 	18.1 20 - 39 46.9 45.8 45.8 45.9 54.2  4o - 64 	 26.2 	26.6 	
50.5 
28.8 	28.2 	29.3 	28.2 65 and over 	 2.9 4.5 4.9 4.8 1.7 3.2 Developed urban 
10 - 19 	 15.3 	12.2 	8.3 	9.2 	11.9 	10.1 20 - 39 55.6 54.9 56.2 55.9 54.3 54.9 40 - 64 	 27.7 	31.0 	34.1 	33.5 	31.8 	33.3 65 and over 	 1.4 1.9 1.4 1.5 2.0 1.7 
/Table 14 (sons.) 
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Table 14 (cone.) 
1970 











Mlle developed urban 
10 - 19 11.4 9.5 -8.1 8.5 9.2 8.8 
20 - 39 56.7 56.1 56.7 56.6 55•3 55.7 
40 - 64 30.3 32.4 33.9 33.4 33.3 33.7 
65 and over 1.6 2.0 1.3 1.5 2.2 1.8 
Female developed urban 
10 - 19 25.2 19.6 8.7 10.4 19.4 13.0 
20 - 39 53.1 51.6 55.1 54.4 51.4 52.9 
40 - 64 20.8 27,4 34.7 33.7 27.7 32.6 
65 and over 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Note: The 1970 CELADE estimates of population,,by sex and 5 year age group, provided the basis for the'1370 
estimates shown. Area differences were estimated from the 1970 census data. The Cl‘i,4DE estimates of 
age speeitio birth rates and death rates were used as the starting point in all of the experiments 
- again with,area breakdowns estimated from census data. Labour partioipation'tatee,'by sex and 5 year 
age group, were estimated directly from the census data. The principal assumptionewhich determine the 
results of the experiments relate to -migration rates, fertility rates, and labour participation rates. 
The different migration rates assumed can be roughly judged from the table on the-badis.of the 
population shift from one area to another in the different experiments. The assumptionsiabout fertility 
rates were as follows. In the 1965.-1970 period the total fertility rate in the less developed rural 
area was estimated to be 7.53, in the less-developed urban area 5.43,.in the: intermediate:rural area 6.48, 
in the intermediate urban area 3.78, in the developed rural area 5.64, and in the developed ; rban 
area 3.45.  The 1995-2000 estimates (with lineal interPolatiOn'from the first to the last period) were: 
experiment I, 6.6, 4.7, 5.7, 3.3, 4.9, and 3.0 respectively in the six areas;:eXperiMent-II, 5.8', 3.5, 
4.7, 2.2, 4.0, and 2.2 respectively; experiment 1110.8, 3.7, 4.7, 2.6,4.0,and 2.5 respeotivelY; 
experiment IV, 4.2, 3.•, 3.5,-3•b, 3.2, and 2.8'respeativelk;-and eXPeriment V, 5.0, 3.7, 4.1, 2.8, 3.6, 
and 2.6 respectiuely. Assumed-changes in labour participativh "rates tothe'end of the century were: 
experiment I, little change; experiment II, to 1968 French levels in the urban areas, female rates half 
way id:the urbati-level'An the ruraldeveloped area, no change in male rates in any of the rural areas 
and little:ehange in female' rates in the other two riiral areas; experimAnt III, 80% of the way to the 
1968 French levels in the urban areas, little change in the rural areas; experiment IV, little change 
in urban rates, rural'iates shift to urban levels; experiMent V, intermediate between experiments III 
and pr, There were also assumptions about differential trends in mortality rates, but these have muoh 
less impact on the results than assumptions about the other variables., The trend in total mortality 
rates is:that Used'iri the CELADE projections. 
ate/ 004i.the results at the end of the experiments - that is the year 2000 - are shown" as this is the single 
figure of,most.interest; the 1970 figures are shown for comparison. The trend is not necessarily smooth 
thivughout the 30 year period however, and this is oftep of considerable importanca., Several,instanpes 
of this Bert are noted in the analysis. 
12/ The rates of increase shown are the annual rates of increase during the 3-year peridd up to the date shown. 
That is, in the first column they are the,annual:ratesdriripg;the period 1965-19704 in 'the other colUmns 
during the period 1995-2000. 
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The essential difference between the first and the other experiments 
here.ie that the first experiment assumes only a small decline in 
fertility rates while each of the others assumes, ian one form or 
another, a much more substantial decline. Up to 1970 there had been 
very little decline in fertility rates and a continuation of this 
trend would mean a population at the end of the century similar to 
that projected in the first experiment. If fertility rates should 
begin to decline much more rapidly the population at the end of the 
century will approximate the size projected in the other experiments. 
These figures involve fairly rapid rates of increase for the 
rest of the century. In the first experiment there is only a marginal 
decline in the rate of population growth,.this remaining at about 
2.9 per cent per annum throughout the period. In the other, experiments 
the average rate of increase over the 30 year period ranges only from 
2.4 per cent per annum in the.second experiment to 2.6 per cent in 
the fourth and fifth experiments. In all' of these experiments the 
rate of increase declines steadily, but at the end of the century 
remains at the moderately high level of 2.0 per cent per annum even 
in the second experimeht, and at.the highe;' rate of 2.3 per cent per 
.ahnum in the others. 
These popUlatibe trends for Brazil are likely to be of an 
J'average nature and similar to those for the reelz..n as ''a whole. 
The proj(:_rted increases are significantly smaller than those for 
Venezuela or El Salvador, but still much higher than those for 
.Argentina. The degree of uncertainty (that is, the difference 
between the minimum and maximum projections) is also of an intermediate 
sort, less than in Venezuela or El Salvador but more than in Argentina. 
The second half of the 20th century will have seen a fundamental 
change in this most basic aspect of social and economic organization, 
and again this change will have been similar to that experienced by 
the region as a whole. From 1950 to the end of the century, the 
Brazilian population will have been multiplied four-fold. At over 
200 million the total population will be very large; significantly 
larger, for example, than the 1970 population of the entire South 
/American continent. 
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American continent. In terms simply of tie number of potential 
consumers, even for modern type production processes with large 
economies of scale, Population has not been an important limitation 
to economic growth in Brazil for some time, and by the end of this 
century the population of the country will approximate the mid-century 
size of the two economic "super-powerS", the United States and the 
Soviet Union. In terms of resource base, the situation will of course 
be less favourable. Brazil, like Latin 'America as a whole, has long 
been regarded as an area wifh very large resources and unsettled areas 
in relation to the population; by the end of the century this concept 
will no longer accurately characterize either Brazil or tie region. 
At the end of the century the population density in Brazil will 
be about 24 people per square kilometer. This figure will not place 
Brazil among the more densely populated areas, either in the world as a 
whole or within the region, but it is likely to be too high to signify 
an abundance of as yet'undeveloped resources. For example, the figure 
is considerably more than double the 1970 density in the Soviet Union 
or in North America, considered to be resource rich areas; it is still 
slightly below the 1970 world-wide average, but the world as a whole 
is no longer thought Of as having an abundance,  of resources in relation 
to its population. As a point'of comparison within the region, the 
Brazilian population density at the end of the certary will be 
approximately the same as the 1970 figure for Mexico. How adequate 
the resource base will be is likely to depend to an important, extent 
on the resources which can be developed in the as yet largely 
unexploited interior areas of the country. 
• 
There are large differences in the projected population increase 
from one area to another, and much more uncertainty about the size 
of-the increase in individual areas than for the country as a 
As noted earlier, there are major differences in fertility rates 
among the different areas so that rates of natural increase vary • ,3• 
substantially. '&t-'the possibility ot majormigration flows can be 
of even greater importance and'tbis ie the factor which produces the 
uncertainty. The rural areas, combined, accounted for 44 per cent of 
/tie population 
• y.63: 
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the population in 1970, and the.less developed region as a whole for 
well over half of the population. Since these are the areas from 
which migrants will come, the potential flow is still very large and 
can still have a major impact on population trends in all areas of 
the country; and so different assumptions about the extent of 
migration can produce large changes in rates of population increase 
everywhere. This contrasts with the situation in countries such as 
Argentina or Venezuela, where the, mass shift to the cities (and in 
Argentina to the South) has already occurred and where different 
assumptions about migration therefore no longer have ,a major impact 
on the area of destination (the cities, and in Argentina especially 
the South), although they remain of.crucial importance to trends in 
the rural areas from which the migrants comg. 
There are two ways of looking at the, possible population increase 
in the different areas, and each is important. There is first the 
question of the rate of increase in, the individual areas, which 
matters as it indicates the relative changeAn the area and hence the 
extent to which additional facilities will be-required, etc., within 
. 	. 
that area itself. The second way of looking at the increase is to 
determine how it is spread among the, different areasrfrom the 
national point of view; that is in which areas wil,1 most .of the 
population increase be concentrated? 
Vielled in terms of rates of increase, the urban areas in 
general can be expected to expand a good deal faster than the rural 
areas. Although fertility rates, and hence the rates of natural 
increase, are lower, the inflow of migrants can be, expected,to 
continue to be of sufficient magnitude to more than offset this 
factor. But the extent of this differece will vary widely depending 
upon the extent of migration (see table 14). In the fourth experiment 
very little migration is assumed and the tota increase.to the end 
of the century is of the same order of magnitude in all of the 
different areas of the country; but at the other extreme, with the 
large scale migration assumed in the second experiment, there are very 
large differences, ranging from the rural less developed area, where, 
the population declines about 30 per cent, to the urban intermediate 
area)  where at the end of the century it is 3 2/3 times its 1970 size. 
/Viewed in 
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Viewed in terms of the distribution of the population increase 
among the different areas, there are two areas - the cities of the less 
developed and of the developed regions - which between them always 
account for at least half the total population increase, and up to 
nearly 85 per cent in the second experiment. The rural less developed 
area and the urban intermediate area are the other areas which, with 
some sets of assumptions, account for a substantial proportion of the 
total increase. The rural areas in the intermediate and,in the 
developed regions are never of major importance in this sense. This 
aspect is of particular interest in Brazil and it is worth showing 
the figures for the different simulation experiments. 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION INCREASE 














Less developed rural 21.1 (-)9.2 (-)0.6 25.9 10.9 
Less developed urban 27.3 36.4 37.5 23.1 31.5 
Intermediate rural. 9.2 4.7 6.1 11.7 9.5 
Intermediate urban 9.2 20.2 17.0 8.4 14.0 
Developed rural 3.9 0.1 0.7 3.9 4.4 
Developed urban 29.3 47.8 39.4 27.0 29.7 
It is first of all clear that, looked at in either of the above 
ways, the population increase will affect primarily the urban areas: 
the rate of increase is faster, and most of the total increase is 
concentrated in these areas. Even in the two experiments which 
assume that migration flows will be much slower than in the recent 
past (the first and fourth experiments) the bulk of the population 
increase occurs in the.cities, and, when it i8 assumed that migration 
will continue to.be. substantial the cities account for three-quarters 
or more of the total increase.. It'is therefore primarily in the- cities 
that additional employment-opportunities will be required, housing and 
other infrastructure will have to be expanded educational and.health 
facilities provided, etc. 
/Rates of 
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Rates of increase will be quite high. Even if very little 
migration is assumed urban populations will ingrease at an average 
rate of around 3 per cent per annum over.  the 30.year period as a 
whole; and when it is assumed that migration will continue to be 
important the figures range from 3 to 4.4 per cent per annum, depending 
upon the region and the precise assumptions used. But while these 
figures are fairly high, they are well below the rates experienced in 
the recent past. The rate of expansion of the cities in Brazil has 
passed its peak, and will probably continue to decline to the end of 
the century. 
Possible trends can be illustrated with the results of the third 
experiment (modern type development, oriented toward the urban areas and 
the developed region, with large scale migration and substantial 
declines in urban fertility rates). During_the 1950 to 1970 period 
the urban areas of the developed_region-expanded at a rate of 5.4 per 
centjper annum. In the third simulation experiment this rate is 
sharply lower - about 3.7 per cent per-annum—..,  during—the 1970s and 
early 1980s, and then gradUally declines further to about 3.1 per cent 
per annum at the end of the century. 
There are two reasons for this anticipated much slower rate of 
population growth in the'urban developed area. First, fertility rates 
have already begun to decline, and the third simu?...tion assumes a 
significantly faster decline in the years ahead. But this is the less 
important factor;'ik it is assumed that fertility rates decline only 
slOWly the rate of population increase during the 1970s remains nearly 
unchanged and then falls to about 3.3 per cent per annum at the end 
of the century. 
The most important reason is that'a substantial part of the 
migration to the cities of the developed area has in the past come from 
the rural areas within the same region. In 1950 nearly half the 
population of the state of Sao Paulo, the heart of the developed region, 
was still rural, and during the following '20 years there was a massive 
shift to the urban areas. This shift has nowbeen largely completed 
(over 85'per cent of the population of the state was urban in 1970), and 
rural-iurban migration within the developed region itself will no longer 
/be a 
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be a major factor in the growth of the cities. With the rather sudden 
disappearance of this source of migrants the population growth of the 
urban developed area can be expected to slow substantially. 
Trends in the cities of the intermediate and less developed regions 
are likely to be fairly similar in this respect. 'In 1970 more than half 
the population was still rural in both regions, but again there has been 
a substantial shift in recent decades: in 1950 over 70 per cent of the 
population was rural in both region's.' So while there is still a great 
deal of scope for rural-urban migration in these regions - and this is 
assumed to occur in the third experiment - the relative impact on the 
urban areas will be progressively leSs. And of course in the less 
developed region the impact is reduced by the assumption of large net 
migration out of the region as a whole. So in these urban areas'as 
well the future rate of population growth can be expected to be slower 
than that of'the recent past. 
In the urban less developed- area however the pattern of the 
decline may be somewhat different due to the nature of the migratory 
flows: in the third experiment the 'iate'of population growth during 
the 1970s is nearly as high as during the 1950 to 1970 period, but then 
declines rapidly to 1.7 per 'Cent per annum at the end of the century./ 
This is due to the pattern of migration assiKop.d. It is generally 
bel5eved that migration occurs first by moveo-Jnt from the rural 
areas to towns in the vicinity and only then from the towns to 
larger cities at greater distance'. It has therefore been assumed 
that during the period of the projection there is a steady flow 
of migrants from the rural to the urban area within the less 
developed region, and also a steady flow' from the urban area to 
,urban areas outside the region (both flows are expressed in the 
'model
, 
 as percentages of the different age groups involved). 
'During the early years of the Projection the out migration 
from the ,utrban area 4s more than ,offset hy the inflow from the 
rural area and so the rate of population increase is relatively 
high. But az the shift to the urban area proceeds the relative 
importance of these two flows changes* with the result,that the 
rate of increase in the population of,the urban less developed, 
area declines qUite rapidly. these assumptions seem to be 
realistic, although simplified- ones, and throw-an interesting_ 
light on the likely population trends in the rural,and urban 
areas of the less developed region. This' is another Situation 
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The urban areas then can be expected to continue to expand at 
a fairly rapid rate, but at a rate Substantially lower than that of 
the recent past. For the country as a whole the third experiment 
projects an average rate of increase in the urban population of 3.6 per 
cent per annum to the end of the century, compared to a rate of 5.2 per 
cent per annum actually experienced in the 1950 to 1970 period. There 
is a decline during the period of the projection from somewhat more 
than 4 per cent per annum during the 1970s to 2.8 per cent at the end 
of the century. A slower decline in birth rates would raise these 
figures slightly, and less rapid migration would reduce them. 
On balance it seems quite clear from the simulation experiments 
that the period of most rapid urban population growth in Brazil has 
passed, that rates of increase in the years ahead will be substantially 
below these peak levels, and will very probably decline further to the 
end of the century. This will of course have major implications for 
economic and social policy as the pressures for urban employment, 
infrastructure, and social services can be expected to ease considerably 
in relative terms; that is, their expansion will not have to be as 
rapid as'in the past. 
Here too the situation appears in different terms in different 
regions of the Country." In the developed region tYa lower rate of 
population growth will certainly make urban problpr.s easier to deal — 
with. B1.1c absolute increases could create increasingly serious problemS 
in this region'. The post-war economic expamsfon has been concentrated 
to a considerable extent in a few major metrcpQlitan areas - particularly 
Sao Paulo and RIO de Janeiro. These metropolitan areas, particularly 
the former, have grown to enormous size, and this size alone, quite 
apart from continuing expansion, creates a multitude of problems which 
, 
are difficult and costly to deal with. If this concentrationcontinues 
- that is if these major metropolitan areas , continue to expand at 'a 
rate similar to that of the urban areas as a, whole - absolute increases 
could well become increasingly important. It could become increasingly 
difficult to integrate an additional million inhabitants into the city 
of Sao Paulo, despite the fact that each additional million was a 
smaller proportion of the total and that the population was thus 
increasing at a declining rate. 
/In the 
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In the less developed region the problems are of a different 
n4ture. Here income, levels are much- lower-and problems of'Vrban 
employment much more serious. The problem is in a sense more one 
of dealing with an accumulated backlog than of integrating the 
current population increase. A slower rate of population increase 
will mean that the inflow into this backlog is less rapid, and this 
may mean lesser social and economic pressures and a less distant 
solution to the major difficulties. But so long as there continues 
to be substantial increases in the urban population, and this will 
continue to be the case at least to the end of the century, the 
magnitude of the problems could well continue to mount. 
Finally, it needs to be noted that a substantial proportion of 
the population will continue to be rural, most of which will be in the 
lessdevelopedregion, so that conditions of rural poverty are likely 
to continue to bulk fairly large in 'the total. Even with the extreme 
assumptions of the second experiment nearly 20 per cent of the 
population is still rural at the end of the century; in the third 
experiment the proportion, is nearly one-quarter; and in the intermediate 
type fifth .experiment it is over one-third. The rural population is=''; 
not likely to expand very rapidly, and could even remain approximately 
constant in size so that it will b.e c. 	to imp1.3ve conditions than 
in the past. Most, or perhaps all, o.f. the resouroc,  put into the rural 
areas can 1:e_used to improve prevailing, conditions rather than for 
providing for.additional numbers at about the:: same level. But although 
declining, the rural.population will remain.too large a proportion of 
the-total to be handled,_ easily; the resources required to effect basic 
changes will continue to represent an important proportion of 'those 
available to the economy as a whole. 
Viewed in regional terms, the population will increase 
substantially in all three regions, but more rapidly in the more 
developed parts of the country. Even in those experiments where little 
migration is assumed the increase is slower in the less developed 
region, and the disparity of course increases with increasing migration. 
The average rates of increase for the 30 year period as a whole are 
as follows: 
/AVERAGE PERCENTAGE 
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Exper- Exper- Exper- Exper- 
iment 	iment 	iment 	iment 
II III IV 
Less developed, region 2.7 1.4 1.9 2.4 2.2 
Intermediate region 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 3.1 
Developed region 3.2 3.4 3.2 2.7 2.9 
As a consequence the relative importance of the developed region can 
be expected to rise in the years ahead. From 28.7 per cent of the 
total population in 1970 the proportion rises, only slightly when 
little migration is assumed, but to 34.7 per cent in the third 
simulation, for example. 
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the less developed 
region, as this is here defined, will remain the most populous single 
region in Brazil. Even with the extreme assumptions of the second 
experiment the less developed region continues to 'account for 40 per 
cent,of the population at the end ofthe century,•and the proportion 
ranges up to half in those experiments where little migration is 
assumed. The population will continue to expand toderately rapidly as 
shown by.the figures,  above. Oven in the second expe'z-iment the population 
Of. the region increases by somewhat more than half to the end of the 
century, and withtkie more realistic assumptions of the third and fifth 
experiments the increase is three-quarters and 90 per cent respectively. 
This is one of the more important conclusions to be drawn from 
this aspect of the experiments. The developed and intermediate regions 
combined will not, within this century, account for much more than half 
of the total population. The less developed region, again as this is 
here defined, will probably still account for 45 to 50 per cent of the 
Brazilian population at the end of the century. If income levels of 
the mass of the people are to be raised to higher levels this will of 
necessity involve a pattern of development which spreads to this region. 
/The age  
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The age structure  
The Brazilian population is a very young one, but with respect 
to the age structure as well as most other aspects it resembles the 
situation in the region as a whole and is intermediate when compared 
to the other countries analysed. Children (those less than 15 years 
Of'age).  were 42.7 per cent of the total population in 1970, significantly 
less than the corresponding figure for either Venezuela or El Salvador. 
But the evolution of the age structure, which as shown in the Argentine 
analysis has already gone quite far in that country, has hardly begun 
in Brazil. The lower proportion of children, when compared to Venezuela 
or El Salvador, is not so much a reflection of a greater evolution in 
Brazil as it is of the fact that birth rates never reached the same . 	_ . 	 _ _ . 
high levels in this country and so the proportion of children never 
rose to quite the extent it did in countries such as Venezuela or El 
Salvador. The proportion of children,and the age structure in general 
in'Brazil, did not change much during_the 1950 to 1970 period. 
8uch changes as occur to the end of the_century will depend 
primarily on the trend of fertility rates. If these continue to 
decline only slowly (as in the first .experiment)there will be little 
change in the age structure: the proportion of children and adolescents 
will decline somewhat, and the proportion of the e,.1.1.tage groups will 
rise. To the extent that fertility rates decline 717-" 	rapidly there 
will be 'fever children and adolescents at the end of thecenturyand 
the age structure will experience a correspondigly greater,shift. 
the figures for the different experiments are shown in stable14.. In 
general the shift is more moderate than that projected by:the 
corresponding experiments in Venezuela; and even with the extreme 
„ 
assumptions of the second experiment the Brazilian population at the 
end of the century shows a considerably younger age structure than that 
of Argentin& in 1970. 
Again, the total figures are averages ofvery , different age 
structures in the different areas of the country. The figures are 
shown in table 14 but are repeated here for easier comparison. 
/1970 AGE 
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0-4 19.2 16.2 18.2 14.0 16.4 12.8 
5-14 28.3 27.0 28.6 25.1 27.2 22.8 
15-19 10.6 11.4 11.0 11.0 10.7 10.2 
20-39 24.7 26.4 25.3 29.2 26.9 31.0 
4o-64 14.5 15.9 14.4 17.3 36.1 29.4 
65 and over 2.7 3.1 2.5 3.4 2.7 3.8 
The differences are of the sort which have already been analysed in 
some detail in earlier parts of the study: the urban areas have 
consistently more mature population structures than the rural areas, 
and the more developed the region the more mature the population 
structure. The rural area in the developed region thus has a population 
structure closely similar to that of the urban area in the less 
developed region.-`Various comparisons can be made with the other 
countries analysed.' Perhaps the most interesting to note is that 
eVen in the urban develoied area in Brazil the age ;:tructUre has not 
evolved to -611e -degree of 'maturity shown by the age structure in 
Argentina; it is fairly similar to the age 'structure in the urban 
North area in Argentina, but much younger than that of the urban South. 
In general the age structures of the different areas appear to 
have been much less affected thus far by migration in Brazil than was 
seen to be the case in Argentina; the differences shown reflect more 
completely differences in the underlying population parameters. That 
these have been very different is indicated by a single comparison: in 
the less developed rural area the proportions of children and active 
adults in 1970 was 47.5 per cent and 39.2 per cent respectively, while 
at the other extreme, in the developed urban area, the ratio was more 
than reversed and the corresponding figures were 35.6 per cent and 
50.4 per cent. Such different ratios, as has been noted before, involve 




The;-projections for the individual areas of the country can vary 
substantially from the national trend due to the impact of migration. 
For example, with the large-scale migration assumed in the third 
experiment the proportion'of active adults, which over the period of 
the projection are the groups most heavily affected; declines from an 
already low 39.2 per cent in the rural less develcped'area in 1970 to 
34.8 per cent at the end of the century. 'In the fourth experiment 
by contrast (little migration from the area and also a substantial 
decline in fertility rates) the proportion rises to 44.2 per cent at 
the end of the century. The impact of migraLion is not as important in 
any of the other areas but similar, if smaller, variations - in the 
opposite direction of course in the urban areas-` can be seen from its 
figures in table I4 
The major iffiplications of shifts in the age structure have already 
been discuasdd in detail in the other country analyses and can be 
treated more briefly here; as the age 'structure and the shifts likely 
to occur are of an intermediate sort in Brazil these can be readily 
placed in context by reference to results in the other analyses. 
The dependent population- (thoSe less than 15 and over 65) was 
45.8 per cent Of' the total in' Brazil ini970, a ntic,h higher proportion 
than in Argentina (36.4 per Cent) but significant?„; 
approximaeiy half the population which was depen6H. in countries such 
as VenezucLi or Ei Salvador. As in these latter counbries, the elderly 
group was not' yet a very important part of the dependent population. 
There were major variations among the different areas of the country, 
with the dependent'population ranging from 39.4 per cent in the urban 
developed area-to 50.2 per cent in the rural less developed area; but 
while the elderly age 'group was in general more important in the urban 
areas, it was everywhere less than' 10' per cent of the dependenf 
population ae'a. whole. 
The' bver -65 age group will'rise in relative size in the years 
ahead but will continue to be of-minor' importance to the drid'of the 
century some 10-12 per cent of the ddpendent population 'at the national 
level and up to perhap6 17 per cent in the urban deVelOped area. Such 
/figures would 
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figures would still be well below those found in Argentina in 1970 
and in Brazil, as in most countries of the region, it will only be into 
the next century that the elderly population is likely to become a 
major aspect of the dependent population, with the shifts in social 
and economic policy which this will require. 
So the trend in the dependent population as a whole will be 
determined very largely by the trend in fertility rates, and hence 
the number of children. At the area level, however, migration is a 
further factor which can significantly influence this trend. The end 
results can be seen from table 14. If there is only .a slow decline 
in fertility rates (as in the first experiment) there will be very 
little change in the dependency ratio at the national level; but, 
combined with the impact of the modest amount of migration assumed, 
there may still be significant changes in individual areas. In all of 
the other experiments larger, declines in fertility rates are assumed 
and so the dependency ratio declines further, to somewhat more than 
40 per cent at the national level, in the intermediate type third and 
fifth experiments, for example. 
The most important single aspect of the dependent child population 
is probably the number of primary school age children and the 
implications this has for educational planning. na primary school age 
population in Brazil will continue to increase fa-: rapidly to the 
end of the century, but the rate of increase will be lower than in the 
recent past and may decline steadily, so that the pressures for 
additional primary school facilities can be expected to ease somewhat. 
The primary school age population (those 5 to 14 years of age) 
has increased quite rapidly,in Brazil during the post-war period. From 
3.0 per cent per annum in the early 1950s the rate of increase rose to 
a peak of 3.7 per cent per annum during the second half of that decade,. 
before falling fairly rapidly to 2.5 per cent per annum, during the late 
1960s. This rise and fall is typical of the transition to sharply higher 
rates of population increase which began in most countries of the region 
in the 1940s and which set up wave-like movements through the age 
structure. But the rise and fall is more moderate than that which 
occurred in Venezuela, for example, and again reflects the fact that 
fertility rates did not reach the same high levels in Brazil. 
/If fertility 
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Iftertility-rates continue to decline only slowly (as in the first 
experiment) the rate of increase will rise again, to 2.9 per cent per 
annum,.during the 1980s and then fall slightly to 2.7 per cent per annum 
at the end of the- century. If'fertility rates decline more rapidly, as 
assumed in one form or another in all of the other experiments, then the 
rate of increase will become gradually more moderate, reaching 1.8 per 
cent per annum at the end of the century in the intermediate type third 
and fifth experiments for example. 
At the'national level then the period of greatest pressure on 
primary school facilities occurred during tho 1950-1965 period, and has 
now passed. Even if there is not much fufther decline in fertility rates 
the primary school age population will 'not again increase as rapidly as 
during the period, and if there is an important decline in fertility rates 
the pressures will continue to moderate further to. the end of the century. 
Again there are major differenceS froM one area to another, and the 
deceleration from past rates of inCrea.ie'islikely to be even greater in 
some of the major areas. As already noted; detailed estimates of the 
population structure in 150 have not'been Made and so complete figures 
of past trends cannot be given. But on the basis of approximate estimates 
it appears that over the 1950 to 1970 period the elementary school age 
popilation increased at an average rate of around 6-jeer Cent per annum 
in the urban 'areas - somewhat faster in the more d .Aoped regions and 
somewhat e'cwer in the less developed region; in the rural areas the rate 
of increase in the intermediate region was close to 3 per cent per annum, 
but it was less than half that in the less developed region and was 
negative in the developed region.1/ 
Complete data are readily available for the intermediate area and 
these show rates of increase of 6.8 per cent and 2.9 per cent for 
the urban and rural areas, respectively. Data for the state of Sao 
Padlo can be used as an indication of trends in, the developed 
region: they show a rate of increase. of 6.4 per cent per annum for 
the urban area and a 15 per cent decline in the rural school age 
population over the period. For the less developed region data for 
Northeast region (as defined in the census data) should give a 
reasonable idea, and these show rates of increase of 5.5 per cent 
and 1.2 per cent for the urban and rural areas. In all cases these 
estimates were obtained from unadjusted census figures. 
/These high 
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These high rates of increase,will drop to sharply lower levels in 
the urban areas in the years ahead., During the 1970s the rate is only 
about 3.2 per cent per annum forethe urban areas as a whole even if 
large scale migration is assumed (as in the third experiment), and is 
of course lower still in the experiments which assume more moderate 
migration. That is, during the 1970s the primary school population in 
the cities will expand only about half as rapidly as during the 
preceeding 20 year period; and the pressure for rrimary school 
facilities will therefore ease substantially from the levels of the 
recent past. The rate of increase is likely to rise somewhat during 
the 1980s, although it should remain below 3.5 per cent p: annum, and 
will then probably decline substantially again during the last decade 
of the century. With different assumptions the trend is of course 
somewhat different, and there are.significant -differences in the 
increase in different regton;11but in general it is clear that 
although the urban primary school age population will continue to 
increase at a moderately rapid rate for the rest of the century and 
there will have to be a continuing,' and,quite rapid, expansion: of 
educational facilities for this group, the needs will be less pressing 
than during the 1950 to 1970_period. 
If ruraI,,.urban migration continues to be puhz.%antial there will be 
only modest increases in the primary school age 1,--.7ation in the rural 
areas. In ..c.he third experiment, for example, there is a :continuing 
increase in the rural intermediate area (at an,average rate of about 
1.5 per cent per annum) from 1970 to the end of_the century; but the 
primary school population in the rural developed area remains 
••111■11•• ■ 
In the third experiment, for example, this age group increases• 
most rapidly in the urban less developed area at 3.9 per cent 
per annum during the 1970s, 3.6 per cent during the 1980s, and at 
2.2 per cent during the 1990s. In the urban developed area by 
contrast the rate of increase is only 2.3 per cent per annum 
during the 1970s, rises to 3.3 per cent during the 1980s,and 
falls back to 2.2 per cent during the 1990s. The differences 
result from the different age structures and the migration 
patterns assumed. 
/approximately constant; 
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approximately constant; and in the rural less developed area this age 
group increases about 15 per cent during the 1970s and then declines 
in size.' Most if not all resources devotea to rural elementary school 
education could therefore be used to raise standards rather than to 
simply provide equivalent facilities for a growing school age population. 
In terms of distribution from the national point of view, the 
bulk of the increase -will occur in the urban areas and it is there that 
. 	, 
most of the additional facilities will be required. Even if there is 
not much migratiOn ('as assumed in the first experiment) 60 per cent of 
the total increase in the elementary school population to the end of 
the century will Occur in the cities, and if large scale -Agration 
continues (as in the third experiment) nearly 90 per cent of the 
increase will be in the urban areas. In regional terms the most 
significant aspect to note is that about half of the total increase in 
the primary school age population will continue to occur in the less 
developed region, so that maintaining, and especially improving, basic 
educational standards will require the assignment of a very large 
proportion of available resources to this- region. 
The decline in the proportion of children and adolescents will 
be offset by increases in the relative importance of all "of the adult 
age groupe. Perhaps the princiPal aspect to note here is that the 
young adult'groUp (those 20-39 years of age)does aot increase its 
relative _Aportance more than the Other'grOups in Brazil; on the 
, 	 . 
contrary, the number of young adults will increase somewhat less 
rapidly'than either of the older adult age groups. This contrasts 
with the situation in countries such as Venezuela or El Salvador, where 
the young adult group will increase particularly rapidly, with the 
consequences which were noted in the analyses of those countries. The 
young adult group will increase more rapidly than the general population 
in Bratil,"and thiS'WilI have similar imPlications, but the impact will 
be lesS than 'in'the other countries and the discussion need not be 
repeated here.' 
For a discussion of these aspects see the Venezuelan analysis, 
Chapter II, pages 55-57. 	 e 4 
/Migration, as 
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Migration, as well as differential changes in fertility rates, 
can result in quite different trends for the active adult.age groups 
in different areas of the country, and this can have major implications. 
The proportion of active adults is largely the counterpart of the 
relative importance of the dependent population, and is an important 
factor in the determination of per capita income levels in an area. 
As already noted, these proportions were,quite different in different 
areas in 1970, and the divergences could well increase. For example, 
in 1970 the active adult age groups accounted for only 39.2 per cent 
of the population in the rural less developed area but for 49.4 per 
cent in the urban developed area. With,theasoumptions of the third 
experiment (large scale migration and substantial declines in urban 
fertility rates) the divergence increases greatly with the opposing 
trends in the, two areas: the proportionofactive adults declines to 
34.8 per cent in the rural less developed,area while rising to 
58.4 per cent in the urban developed area.. The,trends in other areas 
and in the different experiments are shown in. table 14.  
Labour force trends and structures 
As in most of the region, the labour,forcein Brazil will continue 
to increase rapidly at least to the.end of the century. The. 
simulation experiments indicate that at the end cf the century the 
labour force will be a minimum of two and one-thy7':a timesjts 1970 size, 
and may .;:=.11 be more than two and a half times that size; euch figures 
correspond to average rates of increase over the. 30 year period as a 
whole ranging from 2.9 to 3.3 per cent per.  annum. This expansion of 
the labour force in Brazil is somewhat less rapid than that to be 
expected in either Venezuela or El Salvador, however, and the possible 
variation in trend indicated by the simulation experiments is somewhat:  
larger than in those, countries. 
The increase in the labour force in Brazil during the coming 
decades is likely to be a good deal larger than the increase irk the 
population as a whole. This is similar to the situation already 
described in the other countries analysed, although the reasons are 
more of a mixture in Brazil. There are two major reasons why this 




with the active age groups increasing more rapidly than the rest of 
the populatien; this will be the predominant factor in Venezuela and 
El Salvador, where espedially the young adult group will be increasing 
very rapidly in the years ahead. Second, activity coefficients may 
rise; as was Shown, this'is a major factor in Argentina. In Brazil 
both reasons are preSent but as will be seen in more detail below, the 
second may be of - greater importance. 
As is again common to most of the region, the labour force in 
Brazil is how increasing more rapidly than in earlier years: during 
the 1950s the increase was at the rate of 2.7 per cent per annum, but 
had risen to 3.1 per cent per annum 1-:y the latter half of the 1960s. 
The future trend will depend to an important extent on the evolution 
of labour participation rates. If these do not change the rate of 
increase in the labour force will remain approximately constant to the 
end of the century (as-in the first experiment). If labour participation 
rates rise more or less steadily then the rate of increase will rise 
to a peak around 1980 (of 3.5 per cent per annum in the second 
experiment or 3.3 per cent in the third experiment, for example) 
and then decline slowly, to about its present level at the end of the 
century. 
ThiS riSe•and fall'in the rate of expansion of the labour force 
is much-m.)re moderate in Brazilthan 'in a country elo'9. as Venezuela, 
where theite of increase was slower in the early 1950s (2.5 per cent) 
and can 14 expected to rise to a much higher peak during the 1970s 
(ardUnd-3.8-per cent). Essentially this is a reflection of the: greater 
stability in the age structure in Brazil which, in its turn, follows 
largely from the fact that fertility rates never reached such high 
levels. 
At the national level then the labour force will expand rapidly 
to the end of the century in Brazil, and the expansion is. likely, to .be.. 
a relatively steady one; there is not the same process of rapidly rising 
rates of expansion which culminate in a period of extremely rapid 
growth after which the pressures subside, also fairly rapidly. In 
Brazil the pressure for additional employment will remain, to the end 
of the century, at levels similar to that experienced in the recent past. 
/The growth 
- 178 - 
The growth of the labour force, and the associated problem of 
adequate employment opportunities will in the future need to be dealt 
with primarily in the urban areas. Even if there should be relatively 
little rural-urban migration (as assumed in the first experiment) well 
over two-thirds of the total increase in the labour force to the end 
of the century would occur in the urban areas; and if large scale 
migration is assumed (as in the third experiment) these areas will have 
to absorb practially all of the increase. In an intermediate type 
development, with only moderate migration (significantly less than in 
the recent past) and with considerable orientation toward the rural 
areas - the assumptions of the fifth experiment - the urban areas would 
still account for close to 80 per cent of the total expansion of the 
labour force. 
In regional terms, each of the three major regions can be 
expected to absorb an important proportion of the expansion. The 
intermediate region, the smallest of the three, still accounts for 
from one-fifth to one-quarter of the increase in the different 
experiments. There is more variation in the relative importance of 
the two larger regions, depending upon the amount of migration assumed: 
with large scale migration the developed region will absorb the 
largest proportion of the increase in the labour force (44 per cent in 
the third experiment, for example), but if migrat5:n should be slower 
the less Goveloped region would account for the largest proportion. 
So, here too it is useful to stress the continuing importance of the 
less,developed region. Even with large scale regional migration, as 
assumed in the third experiment, close to one-third of the total 
increase in the labour force will occur in the region; and if migration 
is less substantial the proportion will be higher. Thus if adequate 
employment opportunities are to be available a major proportion of 
these will have to be created within the less developed region in 
the years ahead. 
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VieWed in terms of rates of increase in the individual areas-of 
the country, it is primarily the cities, in all regions of the country, 
which will experience a'rapid expansion of the labour force. Migration 
will clearly be a major factor and migration flows will need to be 
watChed closely; but here again Brazil is in an "averageu_position in: 
the region. Rates 'of natural increase in the cities remain fairly 
high, so that even in the absence of migration the urban labour force 
will expand at a rate of close to 3 per cent per annum in the immediate 
future (whiCh contrasts with the situation in Argentina). The rural 
population is still a large proportion of the total so that rural-urban 
migration can still be a major factor 	the grGwth of tM urban labour 
force (considerably more so than in Venezuela); but at the same time 
the majority of the labour force is now urban so that the impact of 
migration also has limits (more so than in El Salvador). Natural 
increase and migration can therefore both be expected to contribute 
importantly to the expansion of the urban labour force for some time 
to come. 
The actual increase varies considerably with the different 
assumptions used. With the large-scale migration And substantial 
shift in urban participation rateeassumed,:in the third experiment 
the urban labour force. is 3 2/3 times' itS 1970sira'at the end of the 
century, an' average rate of increase for the perinj az a whole of 
4.4 percen.; pet annum. With the much slower migration and:much 
smaller'chift in urban participation rates of the intermediate type 
fifth experiment the urban labour force somewhat more than triples 
over the period, implying an average rate of increase of 3.8 .percent 
per annum.1/ In both experiments the increase, is somewhat 'larger,  in 
the cities of the intermediate area, but quite similar in the two 
The results of the.other. experiments are shownin table 14. 
At the extremes, with the massive shift to the cities of the ,  
second experiment the urban labour'force multiplies'four-fold 
to the end of the century, while if rural-urban migration 
should nearly stop, as assumed in the fourth experiment, 




largest urban areas, those of the developed and of the less developed 
regions./ The pattern however is rather different in these. two latter 
regions. In the third experiment, for example, the increase is much 
faster in the urban less developed areas in the early years of the 
projection, but from the 1980s on the reverse is true. This reflects 
the pattern of migration assumed and is an interesting aspect of the 
trend in the less developed region.2/ 
For the urban areas as a whole, if large 
migration continues (as assumed in the third experiment).the rate of 
expansion of the labour force during the 1970s will be similar to that 
of the recent past, and will then decljne gradually to the end of the 
century. But there could be important differences between the developed 
and the other regions in this respect.. During the 1950 to 1970 period 
Too much significance should not be attached to the higher rates 
of growth projected for the intermediate region. This results 
from the migration flows postulated, and while these are 
considered reasonable there is,considerable uncertainty involved. 
Over the 1950 to 1970 period the population increase was most 
rapid in the intermediate region, but this was primarily due to 
trd.ds during the first decade, of that p;:ricC.; dilring the 1960s 
the increase was more rapid in the developed 7:ogion. Much 
will depend  upon the pattern of development, and it is 
poss,Lble to envision a substantial migration from the extreme 
south toward the Sao Paulo area, in which case the increase 
in the intermediate region would be a good deal less than 
shown in the projections..  
Essentially it is assumed that a steady and substantial 
Migration out of the region occurs. In the early years of 
'the projection this is in effect a large net outflow from 
the rural area, and the urban labour force increases very 
rapidlY. As the rural area declines in relative importance 
however (it remains approximately constant in absolute' site 
in the third experiment) the continuing migration out of the 
region increasingly affects the .urban labbUr force and its 




the urban labour .force in the more developed regions increased at 
the very rapid rate of around 5 1/2'per cent per annum, while in the 
less developed region the increase was significantly lower, less than 
4.5 per cent per annum.1/ 
In the developed region this rapid rate of increase of the 
recent past has almost certainly already fallen to a more moderate 
level. Thus in the third experiment, which assumes continuing large 
scale migration and also a substantial shift in urban labour 
participatift rates, the labour forceAn the urban developed area 
increases at the somewhat lower rate of 4.6 per cent per annum during 
the 1970s and the rate then declines steadily to 3.9 per cf.nt at the 
end of the century. As was noted in the discussion of trends for the 
population as a whole, the principal factor here is that the massive 
rural-urban shift has already been completed in the developed region 
and the potential for further increases in the urban labour force from 
this source is no longer very large. 
The situation is different in the other regions, where the rural 
labour force was still much larger than the urban in 1970 and where 
the potential for large'additions to the urban labour force from 
rural-urban:migration within the region therefore still exists. Thus 
in the third experimenf the labour force in the urban intermediate 
area increases at a rate Of 6 per cent per annum d,l_ing the 1970s and, 
although 	declines steadily throughout the 30 year period, the rate • 
of increase is still at the high level of 4.5 per cent per annum at 
the end-of the century. In the urban less developed area the increase 
is nearly6s fast during the early 1970s but then declines more rapidly, 
Again these estimates must be regarded as only approximate. As 
noted before, a detailed analysis of the 1950 census was not made 
and figures for the state of Sao Paull:5 are used as an indication 
of the trend in the developed region and in the Vortheast as an 
indication of the less developed region. As labour,,par4cipation 
m rates by area for 1950 are ot'aVtlilable, for the same reason, 
it has been assumed that they were the.same as those estimated" 
for 1970. "W"ith these asstimptions, the estimated rate of increase 
for the 1950-1970 period were 5.3 per cent, 5.7 per cent, and 
4.2 per cent per annum in the developed, intermediate, and less 
developed urban areas respectively. 
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to a rate of 3.1 per cent per annum at the end of the century; the 
greater decline in the rate here is the result of the assumed 
continuing- heaVy migration out of the less developed region as a whole. 
It is worth noting the results of the second experiment here, 
as this experiment was specifically designed to show the results of 
a possible massive population shift. in,Brazil (the rural population 
as a whole declines about 10 per cent over the 30 year period). 
CoMbined with the assumption that labour participation rates in the 
urban areas move to the Western European levels at the end of the 
century', this suggests an upper limit to the expansion of the urban 
labour force in the decades ahead. In. this experiment th:, urban 
labour force as a whole multiplies nearly four-fold .to the end of the 
century, an average rate of increase of 4.7 per cent per annum over 
the 30 year period. During the 1970s the increase isleast rapid 
in the urban developed area; at 5.3 per cent per, annum it is similar 
to the rate of increase in the recent past. The rate of increase in , 
the urban intermediate and less developed regions however is over 7 per 
cent per annum during the early 1970s, considerably higher in both cases 
than in the immediate paSt. In all of the urban areas the rate of 
increase then declined steadily to the end of the century, but the 
decline is particularly marked in the urban less developed area, due 
again to the continuing heavy migration out of the 1-egion. 
If ri.ral-urban migration should slow in. the years ahead then of 
course the expansion of the urban labour force would be less rapid. 
In the intermediate type fifth experiment for example (much less 
migration and a smaller shift in urban labour participation rates) 
the average rate of increase to the end of the century for the urban 
areas as a whole is 3.7 per cent per annum; less, as noted, but Still' 
substantial, -:Irr this'experiment the rate of expansion in the urban 
develoPed area is'well below. that of the recent past from the beginning 
of the projection, but in the ether two urban areas the rate in the 
1970s is closer to that of the preceeding period. In all of the urban 
areas the rate then again declines to the end of the century, but'more 
slowly in this experiment. 
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Ih summary, the simulation experiments clearly indicate that the 
urban labour forcein Brazil will continue to increase rapidly at least 
to the end of the century, although the amount of rural-urban 
migration and pOssible changes in urban labour participation rates 
will be important determinants of just h.ow fast the-expansion is. 
Leaving aside the more extreme assumptions, the range for the urban 
areas as a whole over the 30 year period is still from 3.7 per cent 
to 4.4 per cent per annum (in the fifth and third experiments 
respectively). Of perhaps greater importance is the fact that there 
is considerable variation from one urban area to another, and the 
problems faced in providing sufficient,employteLt opportunities to 
absorb the projected increase are likely to be quite different in the 
different regions. 
The problems are likely to bejaost readily resolved in the urban 
developed area. Employment problems have never been as severe in this • 	, 	- 
area as "theeconomy has expanded. greatly during the post-war period 
and this expahSion has been concentrated to a major extent in the 
cities of the developed region. The large_spale migration into the 
area probably reflected more the attraction_pf_the opportunities 
offered by this expansion than a flight from severe distress, at least 
from the nearhy'rural areas. So while difficulties Nere;Always present, 
and thei - Were periods of serious dislocation, in c.s7eral-the 
employment situation has probably been)nore satisfactory in the urban 
developed area of Brazil than in many of the important urban areas 
of Latin America. And this despite the fact that the labour force 
in the urban developed area was increasing very, rapidly during the 
1950 to 1970 period. As noted, the labour force in this area can: be 
expected to increase less rapidly during the coming decades; the , 
rate of'increase has probably already dropped significantly from the 
peak level of the 1960s, and should continue to fall to the-end of 
the century. If moderately rapid economic growth continues in the 
developed region the employment problem 'should thus be easier to 
handle in this urban area. 
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The provision of adequate employment opportunities is likely 
to be a progressively more serious problem in the cities of the 
intermediate and less developed regions. In both regions the bulk 
of the labour force was still rural in 1970 so that the potential 
future impact of rural-urban migration is large, and this is reflected 
in the higher growth rates in these areas when large scale migration 
is assumed. in both areas the labour force could well expand more 
rapidly in the 1970s than it did in the preceeding decade. 
The situation is mitigated in the intermediate region by the 
general economic environment in which this expansion will occur. 
Income levels are moderately highl'and there has been substantial 
development in both the rural and urban areas during the post-war 
'period. As a result there has not been a large scale flight from 
the land and the urban employment situation has been sufficiently 
good to attract substantial migration from outside the region. A 
further mitigating factor is the proximity of 8ao Paulo, the heart of 
the developed region, to which migration would be relatively easy 
should the employment situation become more difficult in the intermediate 
region4/ While the continuing very rapid expansion of the labour 
force in the urban intermediate area is likely to be more difficult 
to absorb than'in the develbied area, and could well become a source 
of serious concern, it is for these reasons likely to be manageable 
if a rapid economic growth can be maintained in the region. 
The situation in the cities of the less developed region is 
much more serious. Income levels are much lower and the employment 
situation has already been a source of major concern for some time. 
The expansion of the labOur force in the urban less developed area 
appears -to have been significantly faster during the 1960s than during 
the 1950s, and the possibility of continuing rural-urban migration on 
2.1 	This has not been assumed in any of the experiments; but as the 
labour force in the, urban developed area in 1970 was about 
3 1/2 times as large as in the urban intermediate area, a 
migration sufficient to ease the pressure in the intermediate 
area would not be overly difficult to absorb in the 
developed area. 
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a large scale holds the prospect brian even faster expansion during 
the,1970s.. Large scale migration but of the region as a whole would 
eventually reduce the pace, but it seems likely that until at least 
the mid.-1980s the labour force in the area will expand at a very 
rapid rate. It is clearly in this-region that the employment 
situation will remain most critical in Brazil, and substantial 
resources will be required simply'to prevent deterioratioh of an 
already critical situation; the reeolution of that situation would 
require resources on an even larger-scale. 
If rural-urban migration continues on the scale of the recent 
past, rural employment should not be a major problem in Brazil in the 
decades ahead, but here too the eittation will vary substantially 
from one region to another. Within the developed region, the rural 
labour.force has already been reduCedto a minor proportion of the 
total and this relative decline will-continue. During the past 
decade the rural 'labour force.in • the "state of Sao Paulo declined 
substantially in absolute size; and•eiien if this draining of labour 
from the rural areas stops-(as is assumed:in the simulation experiments) 
the labour force is not likely to increase much in size. It is 
eattier to envision the poesibilitY of laboUr shortages "in this area 
than serious employment prtblems; the situation is somewhat similar 
to that already analysed in the rural South of Arcvtina, although 
urbanization has not'gone as far as in the Argentine South, nor are 
'rural productivity levels as high. 
In both of the: other two rural areas the labour force has 
continued to expand moderately rapidly, and is still the bulk of the 
total in each region. But again the situation is more favourable 
in-the :intermediate region, the more rapid increase in the rural 
labour force being more- an indication of the-expansion of agricultural 
production in the region. It is inthe lees developed region that the 
most serious probleme:of rural employment' are COncentrated, but even 
here the prospects for the future are somewhat better. -The rural 
labour force' appears to have increased at not much more than 1 per cent 
per annum during the 1960s as a result of the'increasing movement to 
/the cities. 
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the cities. Continuing large scale migration could well hold the 
rural labour force more or less constant, in the decades to come, and 
the opening up of interior areas of the country will 9pen better 
opportunities, still within the rural areas, and make possible the 
easing of the pressure in the densely settled coastal zones. Poverty, 
and the pressure for adequate employment opportunities, will remain 
a serious problem in the rural less developed area, but there appear 
to be good prospects for improvement during the period of the 
projections. These problems will remain to be faced primarily in the 
less developed region in Brazil, but the focus is, likely to increasingly 
shift from the rural to the urban area, - 
As noted several times in this analysis, changes in labour 
participation rates can be an important factor in the expansion of 
the labour force in Brazil, and it is useful to explore this situation 
somewhat further. The principal factor here is that,- as in most of 
the region, relatively few women yeremembersof the labour force in 
1970 so that there is very considerable scope for increasing the 
female participation rates, and to the extent this occurs the labour 
force will of course increase more rapidly.- The possible impact this 
can have can be readily illustrated from the results of the second 
experiment, where it is Assumed that labour particiption,rates in 
the urban areas shift to the Western European level at the end of the 
century. In that experiment the female labour force increases trom 
6.2 million in 1970 to 25 million at the end of the century, and half 
of the total increase is the, result of the higher participation rates 
assumed; if female participation rates had remained at their 1970 level 
the increase would only have been to 15.6 million. 
A further factor is that male labour participation rates are not 
as high as in some countries, and this:adds to the possibility of 
expansion. In the rural areas, although male participation rates 
are quite high throughout the age range, they are closer to the 
levels in Argentina, and significantly lower than in Venezuela or 
El Salvador. In the cities male participation rates tend to be lower 
than in any of the other countries analysed. The proportion of 
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teenagers who work is quite low, in contrast to the situation in 
other countries, and throughout the active adult age groups the 
proportion is somewhat lower than elsewhere. Finally, there is a 
substantial decline in male participation rates in the older adult 
grotps, similar to that already described in the analysis of Argentina; 
the principal difference is that it begins at the somewhat earlier 
age of 40 to 45 in Brazil. The total result is that whereas the male 
labour force declines in most countries with the assumption that 
labour participation rates shift to the Western European level, this 
is not the case in Brazil. In the second experiment the male labour 
force at the end of the century with participation rates Lt the 
Western European level is 54 millioh; if participation rates had 
remained at their 1970 levelethe figure would have been slightly less 
than 53 million. 
Thus the assumption that labour participation rates shift to the 
Western European level results in a larger innrease in the labour 
force in Brazil than in most countries. There is the same (or even 
larger) increase in the female labour forde, 'and this is not offset 
by any decline in the male lahour force.1/ In the second experiment, 
for example, more than one-fifth of the entire increase in the labour 
force over the 30 year period of the projection is thej.csult of the, , 
_shift in laboUr participation rates, and the•laborir force at the end 
of the cenury is 15 per cent larger than it would have been had 
labour participation rates remained at their 1970 level. With the 
somewhat smaller. shift assumed in the third experiment this factor 
accounts for 17 per cent of the total increase and the labour force 
The.decline in most countries results from the substantial 
reduction in the proportion of teenagers and older males who 
-are members of 'the laboUr force.,. In the urban areas of Brazil 
the proportion of teenagers working i8 already less than in 
France in 1968 and so does mot decline, and there is onlY a 
moderate decline in the proportion of those 65 and over who 
are active members of the labour force. As the coefficients 
rise somewhat throughout the rest of the age range the net 
result of a shift to Western European participation rates is an 
increase in the male labour force. 
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is nearly 12 per cent larger at the end of the century than if 
labour participation rates had remained unchanged. 
As it is primarily female urban participation rates,which change 
in these two experiments these are worth considering somewhat further.1/ 
They are relatively low in,all of the urban areas, but are much the 
lowest in the cities of the less,developed region, somewhat higher in 
the intermediate region, and higher still in the developed region ..2/ 
If it is assumed that female participation rates shift to the Western 
European level, as in the second,  experiment, the impact is very large 
in all of the urban areas. For the urban areas as a whole about 
half of the total increase in the female labour forr,te.to 	end of 
the century is due to the shift in participation rates; bj region this 
factor accounts for from 42 per cent of the increase in the urban 
developed area to 58 per cent in the urban less developed area. 
With the smaller shift assumed in the third experiment the impact 
is of course somewhat less, but still large: the ,shift in 
participation rates accounts for from 37 per cent of, the increase 
in the female labour force in the urban developed area t 2 per cent 
of the increase in the urban less developed area. 
As has been noted several times, thFrre is m•e, doubt about rural 
laboor participation rates and assumed shifts. have ,to be,  
interpreted more carefully. The fourth experiment (rural oriented 
development) assumes that rural participation rates move,  
toward urban levels, and in that experiment this results in ,a 
large increase in the number of women in the labour force and 
so is a major factor in the expansion of the rural labour 
force. 
These differences are suggested by the overall female-- 
participation rates, by area, shown in table 14, but those 
.;figures exaggerate .the disparity due to the :fact that the 
active age ,groups r- to which the labour participation rates 
ar-applisd - are a smaller proportion of,the population in 
the less developed area, and this alone would'give a somewhat 
smaller aggregate figure. But most of the difference indicated 
by these figures does reflect differences in female labour 
participation rates of the individual age groups. 
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This .situation :imparts a flexibility to the potential expansion 
of the, labour force in Brazil similar to that already discussed in 
the analysis of-Argentina. But whereas in Argentina this flexibility 
could be an important advantage during periods of rapid growth, 
because the labour force will be increasing fairly'slowly, in Brazil 
the situation is different. The labOur force will be expanding 
rapidly in any case, and is not likelyto be a limiting factor even 
during periods of rapid growth '(except possibly at times in the 
developed region). In these different circumstances the flexibility 
may rather be viewed as a factor which makes :it more difficult to 
improve the employment situation. c.s more employment is .covided 
this induces, or permits, more workers, especially women, to enter 
the labour force and so the'situation does not change, or changes 
less than was expected. 
Another aspect which can be readily illustrated at this point 
is the inadequacy of projecting labour force trends on the basis of 
expected changes ,in the population as a wholew At the national level 
it has already been noted that the two trendd will often diverge 
due to shifts in the age structure. , For many countries the labour 
force probably increased:less: rapidly .than-the total population 
during much of, the post-World War IIpel-iod,freflPcting the fact 
that the number of children often increased a good rteal faster than 
the rest of the population during the• period of transition to higher 
rates of population, growth.1/ As this- initial bulge moved through 
the age structure these relations were reversed, and from around 1960 
the labour force has probably been increasing more rapidly than the 
total .population: in , many coUntries; and` this will continue 'to be the 
case for• some, time to oOme. In the case of Brazil, inthe •third• 
21 	As already noted in other parts of this study, the shift to , 
higher rates o'f' population growth was• due primarily to falling 
mortality,, rates, and as a large proportion of total deaths had 
earlier occurred among infants and small children,,it was 
primarilY' these groups which benefitted with the improveMents 
in health conditions. Asa. result the proportion of children 
in the total population often increased substantially. 
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experiment for example,with,1970 as a base of 100, the total 
population increases to 212 at the end, of the century, but the 
labour force increases much more, to 257. In addition to the 
changing age structure, the assumed shift in labour participation 
rates is an important factor in producing the. disparity. 
When individual areas within , a country are considered there 
is the further complicating factor of migration to be considered, as 
this is likely to affect disproportionately the active age groups, 
and hence the labour force. Comparisons for all of the different 
areas and in each of the different, experiments can be made from the 
figures shown in table 14, but the sitnation can be illust2ated by 
mention of two of the more disparate comparisons. In the third 
experiment, the labour force in the less developed rural area increases 
somewhat less than the population as a whole; more accurately with 
1970 = 100, it declines to 96 at the end of the century while the 
population declines only to 98. In the developed urban area by 
contrast the labour force increases much more than the population: 
again with 1970 = 100, the figures are 350 and 279 respectively. 
It is clear that population trends alone are a poor guide to changes 
in the labour force in conditions of this sort. 
The structure qf the labour force in Brazil can be expected to 
change sul)stantially in several different ways in tae years to come. 
The most important are the geographical shifts discussed above:,  
the urban labour force will be an increasing proportion of the 
total, and the same will, be true of the labour force in the more 
developed regions.. In 1970 some 55.8 per cent of the labour force • 
Was urban, and by the end of the century the proportion rises to 
close to. 70 per cent in the intermediate type fifth experiment, and,  
to nearly 80 per cent in the third experiment with its assumption of 
continuing large scale rural-urban migration. Just over half of the 
labour force was in the intermediate and developed regions, combined, 
in 1970,..and this 'proportion rises to 57 per cent at the end of the 
century in the fifth experimeni, and to 61 per Cent in the third 
experiment. The relative Shift to the titles can thus be expected to 
/be much 
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be tuch,"to're'substantial than theregiOnal shift, and it is worth 
noting again that a large proportion of the labour force will remain 
in the'less developed region at least to.'the end of the centuryCif 
adequate emplOyment opportunities are` to be 'Provided for the mass 
of the labOUr force much will 'have to be dOne in this region. 
A second substantial shitt whiCh is likely to occur in the 
structure of the labour force is that women are likely to become a '  
much larger proportion of the total; This will be a cdtmon 'feature 
in labour-force trends in most of the region and has already been 
discussed in the other country analyses.- The reasons "for the shift 
in•Brazil are the sate as elsewhere: migration to the cit.ies 
increases the proportion of women"in -the labour force (more women 
"Work in the cities that.' in the rural 'areas); and fe'mal'e` labour 
participation rates are likely to' ride, as even in the cities these 
are still very low. The increase in relative importance is 
substantial - from 20.6 per cent of the'labour force in 1970 to 
29.4 per cent at "the end Of the Century in the third experitent for 
example - but in this respect as -in nunierous' others the situation 
in BraZil appears to be el naverage" 'One in the region. 
. 
Finally, there'will'be sOnie change in' the' age- structure in the 
labour force, and if migration-contInues On a larGe- 8cale'a'nd there 
is a subs■;antial shift in labour participation rates toWard Western 
European"lewels the 'change will be. fairly substantial. The proportion 
of teenagers will deeline (from 19.8 per cent of the total in 1970 
to 13.7 per cent at-the end of the century in the third experiment 
for example) and the proportiOA'of the" two large active adult age 
groups will' rise. The increase is somewhat larger iA the 'more 
mature age group'(those'40 to 64 Years of age)' and this group may 
become somewhat more important in Brazil than in countries such as 
Venezuela br'El. SalvadOr; but- the age" structure of the labour force 
will remain'younier than-that which CharacteedArgentina even 
in 1970 .  
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This aggregate age structure is again an average, and the age 
structures in different areas of the country vary greatly. In general 
the proportion of teenagers and elderly workers (those 65 and over) 
is much higher in the rural than in the urban areas, reflecting the 
fact that participation rates are much higher for these age groups 
in the rural areas. How these area structures change will, depend 
upon the extent of migration and upon how labour participation rates 
change, and the large potential impact can be illustrated from the 
results of the third experiment. With the large scale migration 
assumed in that experiment there is a substantial rise in the 
proportion of teenagers and elderly wo7•1,.ers in the rural ..,;.bour force, 
due to the fact that it is the active adult age groups which, over 
the 30 year period. are most affected; in the rural legs developed 
area, from which migration is heaviest, the proportion of teenagers 
rises from 23.2 per cent in 1970 to 27.1 per cent at the end of the 
century and the proportion of elderly workers from 3.8 per cent to 
6.9 per cent. The opposite sort of shift occurs, in the urban areas, 
and it is reinforced by the fact that labour,participation rates in 
the cities are assumed to shift toward the Western European level,
•thereby reducing the numbers of teenagers and older workers lathe 
labour force. In the urban intermediate area, fog! example, the 
proportion of teenagers drops sharply from 18,1 per cent of the 
labour force in 1970 to 9.5 per cent et the end of the century, and 
there is also a decline in the proportion pf elderly workers. There 
is a good deal of variation from one urban (or rural) area to 
another due to varying population age structures and the type of 
migration flows postulated in the simulation experiments; figures for 
the other areas and results of the other experiments are shown in 
table 14. 
There is also a great difference in the age,structures of the 
male and of the female labour forces, which can be illustrated with 
estimates of this sort for the urban developed area. The female 
labour force is much younger: teenage workers accounted for 
fully one-quarter of the total in 1970, and more mature workers 
/(40 and 
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(40 and over) were correspondingly a much smaller proportion. In 
the third experiment the assumed shift in labour participation rates 
toward the Western European level is the primary factor in the 
movement to quite similar age structures for the male and the female 
labour forces in the area at the end of the century; there is a 
. 
decline in the pro'p'ortion of teenagers and an offsetting rise in the 
- - ,- 
proportion of the more mature active adult group in each age 
structure,but* the shift is much greater for female workers. 
' Although not shown in table 14 the differences in the other 
urban areas are of a broadly similar type. In the rural areas 
labour participation rates'for teene.ge malles arc mi.v.,h hieler and so 
the age structure for the male and for tha female labour force are 
more similar. As has been noted before however, labour participation 
rate estimates in the rural areas, particularly for women, are 
.:) „ iz 
probably less meaningful and so such comparisons Are of less interest 




COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The preceeding chapters have analyzed the 1970 situation and 
likely trends to the end of the century in four countries of the 
region, and there remains only to loOk at these individual studies 
as a group with the view of drawing possible conclusions for Latin' 
America as a whole. In several'important aspects this can be done, 
but one of the principal general conclusions must be that, at least' 
with respect to population parameters-1nd trends, there is an 
impressive range of variation within'the region. 'Any statement 
about conditions in "Latin Amdrica" is'apt to refer to some kind 
of average, around which there ,is _considerable dispersion, rather 
than describing a situation which, in the common norm throughout the 
region. 
A. The  Situation around 1970 
To begin with, the two major underlying population parameters 
- fertility rates and death rates - have evolved in quite different 
ways in the countries analyzed, so that in 1970 rates of population 
growth and age structures, as well as the parameters themselves, 
varied considerably. At the national level fertility rates in 
Argentina have been declining for some time and are now at moderately 
low levels; in the other three countries they remain very high, 
although in Brazil and Venezuela there has been a modest decline in 
recent years. Death rates have been greatly reduced in all countries, 
but with the partial exception of Argentina, there is still 
important,scopw•,for further reductions. It is well to note at once 
that the setting apart of Argentina already noted will tend to 
continue throughout this analysis; the general population structure 
has evolved much further in Argentina than in any of the other 
countries studied and when different aspects are considered it will 
often be found that the values or trends characterizing that 
country are markedly different from those prevailing elsewhere. 
/But these 
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But these values at the national level are already averages of 
widely differing conditions in major areas within the individual 
countries, and in this respect Argentina is no exception. The table. 
below shows the total fertility rate in .1970 in each of the areas 
distinguished in the analysis; relative infant mortality rates are 
also shown'to give some idea of the variation in death rates.2I 
Table 15 
ESTIMATES OF TOTAL FERTILITY-RATES AND RELATIVE 
INFANT MORTALITY' RATES IN TH• 2965-1979 








(Brazil = 100) 
Venezuela rural 7.54 90 
Brazil less developed rural 7.53 144 
El Salvador rural 





Argentina North rural' 5-93 85 
Brazil developed rural 5.64 68 
El Salvador urban 5-52 123 
Venezuela urban 5.44 6o 
Brazil less-.. developed-urban 5:43 lo3 
Argentina.South rural 3-93 55 
Argentina North urban 3.31 85 
Brazil' intermediate urban 3.78 57 
Brazil developed urban 3.45 57 
Argentina South urban 2.27 55 
rr 
2.1 Up to about the age of 50 the variation of the age specific 
death rates among the different areas is fairly similar to that 
shown for infant mortality rates. From about the age of 50 on 
the range narrows greatly; at more advanced-ages-death rates 
tend to be more similar throughout the areas analyzed. 
/With the 
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With the- excepticn'tit ths rifiai'South in Argentina, fertility 
rates are higher in'all rural area
,
a than- in any urban zone, but there 
are'major'variatibnt- Within each grouping. At the top of the listing 
are three rural areas where the total'fertility rate remains at the 
very high level of more than 7 (the - figure can be approximately 
interpreted as the number'of children'the average woman would have 
during her lifetime with prevailing age specific fertility rates). 
The decline is then moderately rapid to-a clustering of one rural 
and three urban areas with total fertiiityZrates ranging around 5 1/2. 
Then a sharp drop and another rural'areaplus three urban areas with 
rates of 3 1/2 to 4. And finally, well below all of the others, the 
relatively low total, fertility rate. in the urban South of- Argentina. 
Except for this last area,,jertility rates are everywhere at 
least moderately high, but the' iangeis very great. The cluster of 
areas with figures of from 3 1/2 to 4, for example, have total 
fertility rates only about halfthose prevailing in the three areas 
at the top of the list; and there are major population groups in 
both clusters. It is always useful to bear in mind that when 
observing that the total fertility'.7rate in Latin America in 1970 was . 
about 5.38,.this is an average figure covering areas with widely 
varying figures like those shown. 
To some extent death rates follow an order oi ranking similar 
to that icit. fertility rates - in particular those areas with low 
infant mortality rates tend to be the same as those with relatively 
low fertility rates - but there are striking exceptions. In general 
infant mortality rates appear to vary at least as much by region as' 
on an urban-rural basis; thus the areas with the highest infant 
mortality rates are the urban as well as the rural areas in 
El Salvador and the less developed region of Brazil. Here too there 
is a very great range: infant mortality rates in the rural_less 
developed area of Brazil and in El Salvadorappear to be'well over 
double those in the areas with the lowestfigures. ,Too much cannot 
be made of these comparisons however as in general the data on which 
these estimates are based are less complete than that available for 
making the fertility rate estimates. 
/These differing 
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These differing population parameters, with the major further 
factor,  pf internal- migration flows,,have::lead to differing age 
structures indifferent areas, and to differing geographic, and in 
particular. rural-urban,,pcpulation structures.. These aspects have 
already been analyzed in comparative terms, and_in- the context of 
the recent past, in the introductory chapter and there is no need 
to repeat. that discussion. With.•respect to age struCtures-it:need 
only be recalled that,- except•in Argentina, populations'are • 
everywhereStill very young, especially in the rural areas.- With 
respect to rural-urban structures it is:useful to summarize here the 
degree to urbanization in the regicas which have been dintinguished. 
in the analysis. The situation in 1970 is shown in table 16. 
Table 16 
THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IN 1970 2/ 
Region Percentage 	of 
Population Urban 
Argentina, South region 87.9 
Brazil, developed region 80.4 
Venezuela 77.0 
Argentina, North region 55.7 
Brazil, intermediate region 44.2 
BraZil, less developed region /0.7 
El Salvador 39.4 
The definitions of urban here are those of therespective 
Censuses, generally cities with a population of 1,000 or more; 
in the case of Brazil howevert the definition appears to be 
based more on the type of administrative, unit. The percentage 
shown for the developed region of Brazil is in fact the figure 
for the state of. Sao Paulo, which ismore appropriate here 
given the way the developed region is defined in the study. 
/Again there 
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Again there is a wide range, and several of the major regions 
have reached very high degrees of urbanization. From these figures 
follow important implications about migration flows. In each of 
the first four regions the rural-urban flow in recent years has 
been of sufficient size to result in an important decline in the 
absolute size of the rural population. In the following two regions 
of Brazil rural-urban migration has also been substantial, even 
though the rural populations have continued to increase moderately 
rapidly. El Salvador is the only country, or region, analyzed 
where rural-urban migration in recent years has been relatively 
unimportant, at least in relation to natural rates of population 
increase in the rural area. 
Given the importance of internal migration, the structure of 
the migration flows becomes another variable of considerable 
importance, and here there is much less variation among the 
countries analyzed. The common characteristics are that it is 
primarily the very young who migrate, and women migrate more than 
men, It is a commonplace that migrants tend to be young, but they 
are perhaps surprisingly so in Latin America, particularly women. 
It is in the rural-urban migration flows that women dominate, but 
even over the greater distances involved in regional migration in 
Argentina and Brazil they appear to migrate in numbers approximately 
equal to those for men. As the structure of migration tends to be 
fairly similar in the different countries the more complete discussion 
in the Venezuelan analysis can be referred to for details. 
This then is the general demographic background from which the 
simulation experiments begin: very considerable diversity, within 
as well as among the countries analyzed, with Argentina a case apart 
in many respects; fertility rates and hence population growth for 
the most part ranging from moderately high to very high; major 
migration flows nearly everywhere, but with widely varying degrees 
of urbanization already achieved in the different regions. 
/B° Projected 
'Increase per 
annum at the 
end of the 
century 
,(percentage) 
Exp. II Exp. I 	Exp. IT Exr, 	Lxp, II Exp. 
Averag6 increase 
. per annum 





Argenti7as 130 142 0.9 1.2 0.5 
Brazil 203 237 2.4 2.9 2.0 
El Salvador 217 280 2.6 3.5.  2.0 
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B. Projectbdipulation Trends' 
Trends atthe national level 
The first question is: how fast is the population likely to 
increase from 1970 to the end of the century, and how much do the 
projections change with,changing assumptions about the underlying 
population parameters? Populations increase most rapidly with the 
assumptions of little change from the 1970 situation in the first 
experiment, and least rapidly with the assumptions of great change 
in the second experiment, so a comparison of thozc two experiments 
will show the probable limits involved. , The results of the two 
experiments are shown ill tabie 17. 
Table 1,7 
PROJECTED PCPULATION INCREASES .T0 THE FEND OF 
THE CENTURY - P20BAE), 
The extent to which Argentina is a case apart is at once 
clear. The population will increase only moderately to the.end of 
the century and the range of uncertainty is quite small; the 
difference between the maximum and minimum end of the century 
projection is only 12 per cent of the 1970 population. 
/In each 
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In each of the other,three'Couktries the population more than 
doubles over the 30 year period even in the minimum.projection, and 
to the extent the substantial changes assumed in that second 
experiment do not occur the increase will be even larger. This means 
an average rate of population increase of at least 2.4 per cent per 
annum from 1970 to the end of the century, and probably significantly 
higher in most countries. 
It is important to stress that this large increase occurs 
despite assumptions which lead to large declines in fertility rates. 
First, large scale migration to the cities, and in Brazil to the more 
developed regions, is assumed; aid as fertility rates are 
substantially lower in these areas the effect is an important decline 
in the total national fertility rate. Second, it is directly assumed 
that fertility rates in the urban areas drop sharply, at least in the 
more developed regions to the level of zero population growth in an 
eventually stable economy. The net result is that in 30 years the 
total fertility rate declinee from about.5.4 to about 3.1 in Brazil, 
from 6.6 to 3.1 in El Salvador, and-from 6.0 to only 2.5 in Venezuela. 
That populations nevertheless increase'rapidly over the period 
is a reflection of the very young.age structure in most of Latin 
America.' Thevery high fertility rates which have prevailedin many 
areas would have produced even higher rates of population increase 
with a stable age structure but, mostly due to the way in which the.  
shift to higher rates of increase occurred, the age structure in•, 
most countries is still in a process of fairly rapid evolution. It 
was primarily the number of children which first increased very 
rapidly, due to falling infant mortality rates in the 1940s and 
1950s, and this bulge is only now beginning to work its way through 
the adult age structure. As a consequence, the numbers in the most 
fertile age groups will be increasing rapidly in the coming decades, 
in most countries - usually a good deal faster than the population 
as a whole - and this will be a major factor in increasing the 




Thus even rapidly falling fertility rates, as in the second 
experiment, may require a prolonged period before the impact is 
fully felt. The rates of population increase at the end of the 
century in the second experiment are important to note in this 
respect. They have by that time declined to 2 per cent per annum 
or less, and as the numbers in the fertile: age- groups are no longer 
increasing so rapidly (reflecting the decline in fertility rates 
which began several decades earlier), the decline could be expected 
to proceed a good deal further in theearly decades of the next 
century. This is an indication.of the.very long term nature of 
population changes; even sharp changes in the parameters May well 
require several decades to produoes the expected results. 
If there is no important decline in fertility rates the 
youthful age structure may actually result-in rising rates of 
population increase in some countriesAn_the years ahead. Thus, 
even though the first experiment does assume some decline in 
fertility rates, the figures above show that rates of population 
increase at the end of the century are not necessarily lower than 
the average for the period as , a whole. In Brazil there' is a very 
small rise during the 1975-1985 period;  but the tate of increase is 
essentially constant to the end of the century; in'VeneZuela there 
is a more significant rise during the 1975-1985 period; after which 
the .rate declines' slowly to the end of the century; and in'El'SalvadOr 
the rate continues to rise, from 3.2 per cent per annUb'in1970 to 
3.6 per cent atthe end.of the century.. 
Argentina apart then it is clear that the population will 
increase very substantially in Latin America, and even if fertility 
rates should begin an immediate and rapid decline - and this has not 
yet occurred in most of the region - the rate of increase will 
remain high at least to the end of the century. Two very general 
economic:issues of.interest here are the implications of such an 
increase for per capita resource availabilities and the potential 









31 to 34 
194 to 225 
7.6 to 	9.7 
22 to 26 
Inhabitants per 
square kilometer 
11 to 12 
23 to 26 
354 to 455 
24 to 29 
- 202 - 
require a thorough study of its own„. but the figures shown in 
table 18 are of interest as a general, although imprecise, sort of 
indicator. 
Table 18 
PROJECTIONS FOR THE YEAR 2000 
In terms of the resource base 	insofar as this is indicated 
by the simplistic measure of population'densitY - Latin America will 
continue to be among the more favoured. regiont of the world.. For 
the region as a whole the population density at the end of the 
century will probably be around 30, somewhat higher than the 
figures shown for Brazil and Venezuela; for the South American 
continent the overall density will be lower; and this will be offset 
by higher densities in Central America and the Caribbean. By 
comparison with outside areas, the density for the world as a whole 
was already about 30 in the. mid-1970s, although densities in the 
areas regarded as resource rich were of course much lower.1/ 
1 	As examples, population densities in the mid-1970s were 
around 11 in the U.S.S.R., 22 in the United States, 2 in 
Canada and Oceania, 13 in Africa, and 16 in Latin America 
itself. As examples of densely populated areas, the figure 
in Western Europe was around 155, it was over 180 in India, 
over 290 in Japan, and around 475 in Bangladesh. 
/Thus even 
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Thus even with the rapid population increase which will occur 
the region as a whole will not be partiCularly densely populated at 
the end of the century. But thereSource base will have become much 
less generous than it has been customary to assume. From the early 
post-World War II period to the end of the century the population 
of the region will have multiplied about four-fold, and this of 
course means that the per capita resource base will have been cut 
by three-quarters in half a century. In the mid-1970s the world as 
a whole is no longer considered to be especially resource rich in 
relation to its population, and at the end of the century that is 
about the density level which will Characterize Latin America. 
With respect to markets, it is Clear th'at for the region as 
a whole the number of potential consumers will be more than 
sufficiently large to support even those modern industries with 
very large economies of scale. The more relevant question here is 
the extent to which the population can be integrated into the 
production process so as to provide effective money demand for 
such products. But also, at least with present institutional 
arrangements, markets need to be considered more on a national than 
regional basis and this situation, in conjunction with population 
. 
densities in the different countries has been described in the 
individual country analyses. All that need be stressed here is 
that thiS is another situation in which the diversity is striking. 
• In Argentina the total population is moderately large and 
already more generally integrated and wish higher incomes than in 
most countries, so that this should provide an effective market 
large enough to support a reasonably diversified modern economy. 
At the same time the population density will remain low, implying 
an unusually favourable per capita resource base; in particular there 
are rich agricultural resources, a key asset in a world expected to 
be characterized by problems of food availability. Argentina may 
well find'itself in a uniquely favourable situation in the region 
in these most general economic terms. 
/Brazil stands 
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Brazil stands out in a different iaye The resource base, as 
expressed by population density, will beHsomewhat better than the 
average for the region as a whole ,(,although worse than the South 
American average); but the potential market will be very large. The 
Brazilian population at the end of theoentury will be of the same 
order of magnitude as those of the eGOTIOMi.p superpowers of the post-
World War II period, the E.E.C., the 'United Ztatec, or the U.S.S.R. 
The major issue in Efazil in this respect will be the extent to which 
that population can be integrated into the modern economy so as to 
provide an effective market with real purchasing power. Although 
populations will not be nearly so-large as in Brazil, this sort of 
situation is likely to characterize other major countries in the 
region. Mexico will have a very large population and the limiting 
factor in market terms will be the extent to which that population 
can be integrated; densities will be well over double those in 
Br:-.2i1. And both Colombia and Peru will have populations large 
enough to support diversified economies, if, again, they can be 
integrated into the economy so as to provide effective monetary 
markets. 
Venezuela is more similar to the Argentine situation, but 
rather less favourable'in both respects. Population density- will 
be more than double that of Argentina at the end of the century, 
yet the total market will be significantly smaller. Income levels 
are likely to be high however so that the population can be expected 
to be relatively fully integrated and the effective market large in 
relation to the population. 
Finally, El Salvador is in a much less favourable situation. 
Population density will be very high - to the point that simple 
pressure on resources, especially land, may be a major problem - and 
at the same time the total population is not large enough to provide 
the basic market for a diversified, internally oriented economy. 
Although to less extreme degrees, a number of the smaller countries 
of the region are apt to find themselves in this sort of situation 
in the decades ahead. 
/Trends  in 
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Trends in the different areas 
In addition to the total population increase, it is of major 
importance to determine where that increase is likely to occur and 
the implications this will have for the different areas. In much of 
Latin America a substantial proportion of the population is still 
rural and, combined with the fact that-fertility-rates are generally 
much higher in the rural areas, this will,:often mean that most of 
the population increase originates 	,the'se_rUral.areas. But 
migration to the cities is occurring everywhere, often on a large 
scale, so that in general it is the urban areas which will absorb 
the bulk of the population increase in the decades ahead. To a 
lesser extent the same sort of considerations will apply as between 
more and less developed regions within the larger countries. 
Trends, and the possible range of variation, can be seen by 
comparing the results of the third and fourth simulation experiments. 
The third assumes continuing modern type'development, oriented towards 
the cities and, in Argentina and'Brazil, the more'developed regions; 
there is large scale migration and major declineS in urban 
fertility rates, although less than with the extreme assumptions 
of the second experiment'. The fourth simulation ly contrast assumes 
'a shift to a less modern type development; oriented toward the rural 
areas and the less developed regions; there is very little migration 
and it is primarily the population parameters in the rural areas 
which are assumed to change. These two experiments thus show the 
extremes to which the population increase: might remain in the 
rural areas (and the less developed regions) or might shift to the 
cities instead. A series of comparative figures are shown in 
table 19• 
/Table 19 
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Table 19 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENT. AREAS IN THE PROJECTED 
POPULATION INCREASE, 1970-2000 
Country and area 
1:1 stribution of 
population in the oountry 
Percentage of 
population 
increase in area 
Average annual 














North rural 12.9 7.9 14.8 -6.6 20.3 -0.7 1.6 
North urban 14.9 18.2 21.3 25.7 37.0 1.5 2.2 
South rural 9.7 5.7 9.1 -4.7 9.4 -0.7 1.1 
South urban 62.5 69.2 54.8 85.7 33.4 1.3 0.6 
Brazil 
Less developed rural 30.1 13.9 27.9 -0.6 25.9 -0.1 2.3 
Less developed urban 23.4 30.8 23.2 37.5 23.1 3.5 2.6 
Intermodate rural 9.9 7.9 10.8 6.1 11.7 1.8 2.9 
Intermediate urban 7.8 12.7 8.1 17.0 8.4 4.2 2.7 
Developed rural. 4.1. 2.3. 4.o 0.7 3.9 0.6 2.5 
Developed urban 27.4 32.4 25.9 39.4  27.0 .3.5 2.7 
El Salvador 
Paral 60.6 33.1 57.1 15.4 54.7 1.1 2.9 
Urban 39.4 66.9' 42.9 84.6 45.3 5.0 3.4 
Venezuela 
Rural 25.3 14.6 24.6 6.5 24.0 0.9 2.7 
Urban 74.7 85.4 75.4 93.5 76.0 3.3 2.8 
/With the 
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With the assumptions of the fourth experiment, except in 
Argentina there is not much change in the distribution of the 
population, and rates of increase are fairly similar from one area 
to another within each country.1/ But even in the fourth experiment 
El Salvador is the only country where SoMewhat more than half of the 
population increase takes place in the rural areas; in the other 
countries even if migration is held to a minimum it is primarily the 
cities which will have to accommodate the increase. In regional 
terms however the situation is different: practically half of the 
total increase would occur in the lesS deVelOped region in Brazil, 
and well over half in the North of Argentina.' 
With the assumptions of the third experiment on the other hand 
the situation is very different. There- are Substantial shifts in 
the distribution of the population in all countries, toward the 
cities and, in Brazil, toward the more devel6ped regions. Practically 
all of the population increase is accounted ler by the expansion of 
the urban areas, and most of it occurs in the more developed regions 
of B::azil and Argentina. And of course rates of-population increase 
are very much higher in the cities than in the rural areas; except 
in'Argentina the urban rates of increase are everYwhere high, ranging 
from 3.3 per cerit'to 5 per cent per annum for the 30 yeai. period as 
a whole. 'Because of the gradually declining impact of migration as 
the shift to the cities proceeds, as well as the substantial' fall in 
urban fertility rates, these rates of increase are even higher at 
the beginning of the period and then decline to lower levels at the 
end of the Century. 
These potential shifts in population structures and the varying 
'possible rates of increase in the different areas are'of major 
importance and haVe been analyzed in some detail in the individual 
1/ The low fertility rates in the urban South of Argentina mean 
that population growth in the area depends to an unusual extent 
on migration. Thus with the limited migration assumed in the 
foUrth experiment the population of the area does not increase 
.much and its proportion of the total declines from 62.5 per 
Cent in 1970'to 54.P per cent, at the end of the century. 
/country studies. 
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country studies. Several different type situations are apparent 
- depending upon the 1970 population distribution and upon 
variations in fertility rates - and these are worth summarizing for 
their general implications. 
Venezuela is the best illustration of likely trends in a 
country which was already quite highly urbanized in 1970. In that 
country the bulk of the population increase occurs in the cities 
under all assumptions; even with the limited migration assumed in 
the fourth experiment over three-quarters of the increase is in 
the cities, and if substantial migration continues essentially the 
entire increase will be urban (during the 1960s the rural population 
actually declined). 
There are several important implications, of this situation. The 
direct one is simply that facilities:required for the growing 
population will have to be provided largely, or even entirely, in 
the urban areas; because of greater densities and the usual 
provision of more services in the cities, this will mean that 
infrastructure costs are likely to be relatively high. 
A second implication is that, since the rural population has 
already been reduced to a minor part of the total, the-, impact on the 
cities of continuing migration will be relatively small,,and the 
increase in the urban population will depend primarily on fertility 
rates in the cities themselves. ,Thus in Venezuela, with the 
assumption of continuing rapid migration in the third simulation,: 
newly arriving migrants account for only about 18 per cent of the 
total increase in the urban population at the beginning of the 
period and the figure declines to about 14 per cent at the end of 
the century (despite the fact that urban fertility rates fall sharply 
over the 30 year period). Related to the total, the number of • 
migrants arriving in a year would be only about 2/3 of one per cent 
of the urban population in the early 1970s and the proportion would 
decline to less than 1/3 of one'per cent at the end of the century. 
Migration in these conditions will continue to be a major factor in 
determining the size,-and composition, of the rural population, but 
its significance for the cities will become increasing marginal. 
/A further 
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A further implication which follows is that the nature of the 
urban popUlation will gradually change: - migrants will become a 
steadily smaller proportion of the total.:  Even with the'asSumPtions 
of continuing substantial migration in the third simulation, less 
than 10 per cent of the urban popUlation in Venezuela at the end of 
the .century will have lived in the cities for less than 30 years; 
over 80 per cent of that population will have been born in the 
cities. Recent arrivals from the rural areas were a much larger 
part of the urban population during the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
shift can be expected to have 'an dmportant'impact on expectations, 
and in general on social economic and political orientations in the 
urban areas. 
Finally, and perhaps of greateat importance, the fact that the 
massive shift to the cities has already occurred, and that the 
impact of migration is declining, will mean that rates of urban 
population growth can also be expected to decline. In Venezuela 
the urban population increased at rates of well over 6 per cent 
per annum dur'ihg the 1940s and 1950s, with newly arriving migrants 
representing more than half of that increase. Around 1960 the 
impact of Migration- betan to decline markedly (two-thirds. of the 
population was alreadY urban by that date), and the rate of urban 
population increase began to slow corresiondingly. In the second 
half of the 1960s the'urban population increased at the already 
substantially'slower rate of 4.7 per cent per annum, and the rate 
will continue to decline steadily .2/ The period of most rapid 
urban population increase is therefore already over, and in 
Venezuela'future rates of increase will be much lower than the peak 
2 How fast it declines will also, of course, depend on the trend 
in urban'fertility rates.' If these do not decline much the 
rate of increase will fall to around 3 per cent per annum at 
the end of the century. If there is a substantial decline in 
urban fertility rates the rate of increase will fall to around 
2 1/2 per cent at the end of the century, even assuming 
continuing substantial migration. 
/rates of 
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rates of the recent past. Pressures::-for urban employment, housing, 
social services, etc., should as a.result be substantially less, at 
least in relative terms, and so be easier to accomodate. 
At the same time, the problem of rural poverty will be easier 
to deal with. The rural population is now much smaller than the 
urban population and so funds required to improve conditions for 
the former are more likely to be a manageable proportion of the 
total available. Those who cannot obtain remunerative employment 
in the rural areas can migrate to the cities where, as noted, they 
now have a relatively small impact, and this in itself should 
substantially ease poverty conditions in the countryside. Indeed, 
the fact that the population is already relatively highly urbanized 
is likely to mean that conditions have not deteriorated in the 
rural areas;.in Venezuela the rural population has remained 
approximately constant in size since about 1940, zo there has been 
no build-up of pressure on the land., And so long as the natural 
increase is drained away by migration all efforts can go to increasing 
levels of per capita welfare in the rural area nothing is required 
to accomodate greater numbers. All of these considerations mean 
that the problem of rural poverty is not likely to be as severe 
as in some regions, and. should be easier to deal with. 
This is all true o_f course only if the bulk of the population 
which is nor urban has been more or: less effectively integrated into 
the urban money economy; a simple,shift from conditions of rural 
poverty to unintegrated urban poverty would not really mean. changes 
of the sort implied here. But the mere fact that urbanization has 
gone this far is evidence that this has probably been the case. 
Otherwise it is unlikely that migration would have continued for 
so long on such a large scale. 
This then is something of a case of those who have shall also 
receive. Once the mass,: transition from a basically rural to a 
basically urban society is successfully made, the problems - which 
are apt to be very severe in the transition period - become easier 
and at the same time resources available to deal with them. are apt 
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to-become more generous, at least in relative terms. Much of the 
post-Morld War II period was one of transition of this sort for 
Venezuela, and it seems likelY that presSures associated with 
rapidly increasing numbers will moderate considerably in the years 
ahead. 
In addition to Venezuela, of the countries (or regions) analysed 
the South of Argentina and the developed region of Brazil are also 
characterized by high degrees of urbanization, although there are 
special characteristics in each'case and both are complicated by 
the existance of migration flows from other regions within - the 
country. Migration may therefore continue to - be somewhat more 
important, even though the rural. populations within each region are 
smaller in relative terms than in Venezuela.''NeVertheiess, much of 
the above discussion can also'be applied to these two major regions.1/ 
A somewhat different sort of problem which'may persist in these 
highly urbanized regions is that related to the absolute size, as 
distinct from the rate of expansion, of some metropolitan areas. 
Given the type of economic growth which has characterited the 
region in the post-Wat'period, there has often been a oOnsiderable' 
concentration in one or a few major cities, and some'ol'these have 
reached a size where diseconomies of scale are now thought to 
present serious problems. In these circumstances it is pOssibie' 
that if a city continues to expand fairly rapidly the difficulties 
of coping with the'expansion may increase - despite the fact that 
the rate of 'population growth may be declining. The metropolitan 
areas OT'Euenos'Aires and of Sao Paulo, for example, may well have 
reached a size where considerations of thiS sort apply. 
The relative difficulty of dealing with problems of regional 
disparity can alSo be viewed in the terms used above to discuss 
rural'spoverty, and the contrast betweenHthe situation in Argentina 
and in •BraZil can be noted here. In Argentina over 72 per cent of 
1/ For more detailed discussions see the country analyses of 
Argentina and-Brazil. 
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the 1970 population was in the high income South (62.5 per cent in 
the urban South alone). The comparison between the South and the . 	- 
North is thus fairly similar to that between the urban and rural 
areas of Venezuela and many of the same comments are applicable. A 
regional development programme in Argentina appears manageable in 
these conditions and could probably be undertaken while at the same 
time continuing a modern oriented type cf expansion in the South 
itself. That is, the diversion of resources required would probably 
not be so great that it would require all, or the bulk, of what was 
available. 
In Brazil however, the situation is much less favourable. In 
1970 leas than 28 per cent of the population was in the developed 
region (less than one-quarter in the urban developed, area), and well 
over half still lived in the less developed region. In these 
conditions the resources required for a full scale regional 
development programme could well preempt everything available, 
leavi.ng'little for continuing modern type of expansion in the 
developed region itself. That is, a different style of development 
would probably be required to bring about near- or even intermediate-
term regional change on a major scale. 
A second useful "type" to analyse is a situation where around 
half the population was urban at the beginning of the projection 
period. Brazil as a wholeand the North of Argentina are fairly 
close to this situation - in each case about 56 per cent of the 
population was urban in 1970 - but it can be better illustrated 
with the Brazilian data, the situation in the North of Argentina 
again being complicated by regional migration flows. 
The bulk, if not all, of the population increase will still 
occur in the urban areas, but if there is continuing large scale 
migration the impact on the cities will be considerably greater 
than in the Venezuela type situation. In the third. experiment, 
which assumes that rural-urban migration continues on about the same 
scale as in the recent past, the urban areas absorb practically all 
(94 per cent) of the population increase; and newly arriving 
/migrants account 
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migrants account for well over 40 per cent of the total urban 
population growth in the early 1970s and for nearly 30 per cent even 
at the end of the century.1/ In the early 1970s migrants arriving 
during the course of a year would represent about 2 per cent of the 
entire urban population, a figure which would decline to about 
0.8 per cent at the end of the century. 
These figures are much higher than those cited for Venezuela 
and indicate that rural-urban migration may for some time continue 
to be a major factor in the growth of the cities in Brazil. The 
impact will be fairly large and for some time to come recent migrants 
will continue to be an important component of the urban population. 
Nevertheless, this impact has already, begun to decline, and in 
Brazil too the peak period of urban population growth is almost 
certainly over Rural-urban migration has been substantial in 
Brazil in,recent decades and has been an even larger factor in the 
urban population growth than the simulation projections indicate 
will be the cape in the future. The rate of urban population growth 
reached a peak during the 1950s, when the urban population increased 
at the rate of 5.5 per cent per annum; during the 1960s the rate of 
increase had already declined to 4.8 per cent per annum;,and the 
third simulation projects a rate of 4.4 per cent during the early 
1970s and then a continuing decline to 3.2 per cent per annum at the 
end of the century. 
The pressures on the urban areas can therefore also be expected 
to decline in, be Brazil type case in th.. years ahead, although less 
rapidly, and from less extreme peaks, than in Venezuela. This reflects 
the fact that the mass shift from a basically rural to a basically 
urban population was compressed into a shorter time period in 
Venezuela, ptoduting rates of urban population' increase of well 
1/ The fact that the relative importance of newly arriving Migrants 
does not decline faster is due to the assumption that urban 
fertility'rates decline substantially over the period. But this 
assumption is used.in. the third experiment in all. countries so 




over 6 per cent per annum from 1940 to 1960, and then a sharper 
drop once the transition was well on: its way to completion. In Brasil 
the shift has been more gradual and so such high rates of urban 
population increase never occurred and the decline has also been 
less sharp.1/ 
This more gradual transition in Brazil is at least in part the 
result of the great regional differences,in the country, and these 
require a major qualification to the above discussion. As a general 
example, it is useful to indicate likely trends, and their 
implications, for a country with somewhat more;than half its 
population now urban. But in the specific case of Brazil this is 
of more limited relevance. As the degree of urbanization is very 
different in the major regions of the country, so trends in the 
individual regions will be different, and it is these which are of 
primary importance. As is often the case for Latin America as a 
whole, the "average" here is only a sum of disparate parts.2/ 
Finally, a third "type" is a country whose population is still 
largely rural, and this can be illustrated with the data for 
El Salvador. As shown earlier, over 60 per cent of the population 
was still rural in 1970 so that the transition to an urban society, 
with its implications for rapid expansion of the cities is a 
possibility which remains in the future. Further, this relatively 
low degree of urbanization has not changed much in recent decades; 
as early as 1930 about the same percentage of the population was 
urbaa (38.3 per cent) and in the interveng decades there has been 
no major rural-urban migration flow and rates of population increase 
1/ During-the period of most rapid urban expansion in BraZil 
(1950 to 1970) the urban population rose from 36 per cent to 
nearly 56 per cent of the total population. During the 
equivalent 20 year period in Venezuela (1941 to 1961)• the urban 
populationincreased much:more,:from 39 per cent to 67per 'cent 
of the total. 
2/ The analysiS in the chapter on Brazil is largely in terms of 
the individual regiOnth for this reason and reference can be 
made to that chapter for details. 
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in the rural and urban areas have been much more similar than in most 
of the region. Rapid urbanization, should it begin, would therefore 
also represent a sharp break with past trends. 
The first important point to note is that a relatively low 
degree of urbanization means greater uncertaintyabout the distribution 
of the future population increase as betWeen the rural and the urban 
areas. If past trends continue the bulk of the population increase 
will be in the rural area - which is not true of any other country 
analysed — but to the extent migration increases it will shift to the 
urban'area. With a continuation of past trends'rates of population 
increase'will be fairly similar, and high, in both areas; but if 
there is substantial migration the rate of increase will droP sharply 
in the rural area and rise sharply in the'cities. Thus migration 
flows become a more central variable- in this sort of situation and 
must be watched even more closely for policy purposes. 
The implications of different levels of migration are discussed 
in more detail in the analySis of El SalVador; here the principal 
object is to compare the impact of large scale migration, should it 
occur, with the other l'type situations diScusaed aboVe. With 
large scale .Migration, here as in the other type situations the 
great bulk of the population increase would te in the UrVan area, 
and it is there that facilities would have to be provided. But 
the impact of such migration on the urban area would be greater 
here. 
Using the projections of the third experiment again, newly --  
arriving migrants account for over half of'thetotal urban 
population increase in the early 1970sand still acount for about 
30 per cent of that increase at the end o#' the century. Migrants 
arriving during the course of a year total more than 3-per cent of 
the existing urban population in the early 1970s and although it 
declines steadily the proportion is still 1.2 per cent at the end 
of the - century. 'These figures are far higher than those for the 
corresponding simulation for Venezuela and substantially higher 
than those for Brazil, particularly during the first half of the 
/projection period, 
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projection period, and .indicate the major potential impact of large 
scale migration in this sort of situation. The composition of the 
urban population would here shift, but ,in a way opposite to that 
to be expected in Venezuela. Here recent migrants would be a 
rising proportion of the total for some, time to come, and would 
remain a major element in the cities until well past the end of 
the century. 
As large scale migration would represent a break with past 
trends in El Salvador the pressure on the.cities would sharply 
increase. The rate of urban population increase has been fairly 
rapid in the recent,past (around 3 1/2 per cent per annum) but 
with large scale migration the rate would rise to an average of 
5 per cent per annum for the period 1970-2000 as a whole. At the 
beginning of the large scale migration it would be around 6 per 
cent per annum and then decline, as the shift to the cities progressed, 
to about 4 per cent per annum at the end of the century./ 
A shift of this magnitude, with the urban population rising 
from less than 40 per cent to about, two-thirds of the total over a 
thirty year period, would not be particularly,unusual in the region. 
It would be similar to the speed of urbanization in Brazil in 
recent years, for example, and would be.less rapid than the 
transition which occurred in Venezuela during the post-War 
These projected rates of increase are with the assumptions 
of the third simulation, and the rates could be even higher. 
Although large, the migration assumed in that experiment is 
less than has often occurred elsewhere, and the rural population 
continues to increase at an average rate of 1.1 per cent per 
annum to the, end of the century. The third experiment also 
assumes a sharp drop in urban fertility rates, which of course 
reduces the rate'of increase. In an experiment designed to 
show the extremes (the rural population is held approximately 
constant and there is only 4 small decline in fertility rates) 
the average rate of urban population increase to the end of the 
century is 5.6.per cent per:annum. 
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period.1./ But the resulting pressureS for employment, infrastructure 
requirements, and social services in the urban areas would be 
severe and at best difficult to cope with. 
The general characteristics of this transition period, in terms 
of population trends, are among the most important results obtained 
from the simulation experiments. With the high fertility rates 
which prevail in most of the region thb'transition will of necessity 
involve a period of very rapid urban 'population growth with the 
preSsures that this will involve. This may well be a period which 
assumes crisis charaCteristicS, and is likely to be crucial to 
success or failure in establishing a reasonably integrated modern 
economy. The highly urbanized countries, or regions, have passed 
through this transition, and pressures can 1e expected to ease, 
perhaps greatly, others are still at one phaSe or another within 
the period of transition; while for still others it remains in the 
future. 
A final aspect of a still largely rural population to note is 
that the problem of rural poverty is an extremely difficult one to 
resolve. As most of the population may well be involved, the 
resources required are likely to bulk very large in the total 
available to the economy=, and in these circumstances it is likely 
to be impossible to seek a basic solution to the problem of rural 
poverty while at the same time pursuing a growth programme centerred 
on a modern type urban economy. The choice may in effect be limited 
to less satisfactory alternatives. If a near-term solution is to 
be sought to the problem of rural poverty this may well necessitate 
a different style of development, oriented toward less modern type 
In Brazil.the urban population rose from 36 per cent of the 
total in 1950 to 56 per cent in 1970,_ and. rates of increase 
in the urban and rural populations were similar to those 
projected' in the third experiment, for El Salvador. In Venezuela 
the shift projected over 30 year's for El Salvador occurred in 
only 20 (the urban population increased from less than 40 per 
.cent of the population in 1941 to over two-thirds. in 1961); 
rates of population growth were higher in the cities and there 
was essentially no expansion of the rural population. 
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production and toward the rural areasThis could be regarded either 
as a long-term alternative, or as' an intermediate-term solution, 
in the latter case with the expectation—that it would result in a 
fairly rapid decline in rural fertility rates so that, with less 
rapid population growth, the shift to a more modern urban economy 
could then be undertaken more gradually and so with less severe 
pressures. Or, alternatively, the transition to an urban, modern 
type, economy could be undertaken-at-once,.with essentially all 
resources concentrated on making the transition successfuland the 
problem of rural poverty left either to be resolved by the transfer 
of population itself, or to be dealt with later. As noted, neither 
alternative is likely to be completely. satisfactory.1/ 
The simulation projections provide data.onanother issue related 
to urbanization which is worth noting: the extent to which the 
process reduces fertility rates and hence the rate of population 
increase at the national level. Since fertility rates are in 
generai lower In the cities, if migrantSadopt.urban practices 
this will reduCethe number of births, and So urbanization is 
sometimes regarded as the most effective and practical way of 
reducing the rate of population growth. Past trends,in the 
countries Included in this study do not offer much support to this 
hypothesis. 'In Venezuela there has been a mass shift, to the 
cities in recent decades, but this has not been accompanied by any 
substantial decline in fertility rates at-the national level. In 
1/ This discussion implicitly involves one of the factors 
which are likely to be important in determining how difficult 
the transition to an urban society is likely to be: the 
'population density at the time the transition begins. If the 
rural areas are only.sparcely populated, as was the case in 
Venezuela, for example — then the problem of rural poverty is 
likely to be less severe and can more safely be ignored to 
concentrate on the pressures in the burgeoning cities; and can 
be more easily dealt with later. If densities are already 
rather high in the rural areas - as in El Salvador - then the 
problem is likely to be more serious and the whole-,process of 
transition more difficult to handle. 
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Brazil there has been a somewhat smaller, but still very substantial, 
shift toward the areas with lower fertility rates (the cities and 
the more developed regions) but again .this has not been accompanied 
by any important decline in the total national fertility rate. 
Other factors have no doubt been present, but these trends do not 
encourage,the belief that urbanization alone is likely to slow the 
rapid rates of population increase. 
The potential numerical impact can be shown in two differing 
cases - Venezuela and El Salvador - with:data from the simulation 
experiments./ Venezuela represents a country already quite highly 
urbanized and so it is not surprising:thathe'impact of further 
migration is limited, even though,fertiIity:rates are estimated to 
be nearly 40 per cent higher in the.rural.than-in the urban area. 
Both the rate of increase and the total population at the end of 
the century are closely similar in the two,experiments.2/ 
El Salvador is still primarily rural at the start of the 
projection's however, and the difference between the degree of 
For these two countries an additional simulation experiment, 
was run to determine the impact of mass migration in conditions 
where otherwise, particularly with respect to fertility rates, 
there was little change from the 1970 situation. In this 
experiment, with the exception of migration rates, all 
variables,e,re the same as in the first experiment.. Any 
difference in results is therefore exclusively due to 
migration, this being very limited in the first experiment 
and.veryjarge, in relation to the rural population,. in this 
additional experiment. 
2/ With 1970 = 100 the population is 248 at the end of the century 
with limited migration and 245 with large scale migration. The 
rates of population increase are 2.79 per cent per annum and 
2.74 per cent per annum, respectively. This simply confirms 
numerically the intuitively obvious conclusion that in a 
population which is already large urban further urbanization 
alone will not have a significant impact on total fertility 
rates. 
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urbanization in the two experiments is very greatd/ so it might be 
expected that the differential impact on population growth would be 
large. There is in fact an important difference: in the first 
experiment the total population at the end of the century, with 
1970 = 100, is 280 and the population is then increasing at the 
very rapid rate of 3.6 per cent per annum, whereas in the special 
experiment the figures are only 263 and 3.3 per cent per annum 
respectively. The impact of urbanization is as noted important, but 
even with a massive population shift Of the sort projected here, and 
with the assumption that migrants immediately adopt urban practices, 
the impact is clearly limited. Urbanization alone cannot be expected 
to reduce the rate of population increase to moderate levels in most 
of the region; that will only occur when fertility rates within the 
different areas decline from their generally high present levels. 
C. Pro ected Trends in Age Structures 
Currently prevailing age structures have already been discussed 
in comparative terms, and the principal implications noted, in 
chapter I of this study so that here it is necessary to deal only 
with likely trends to the end of the century. Apart from the 
existing age structure, it is the trend in fertility rates which 
largely determines that structure and so a comparison of simulation 
experiments With differing assumptions about fertility rates will 
show the limits within which changes can be expected to occur. This 
means comparing the results of the first experiment (little change 
from the 1970 situation) with those of the second (large scale 
migration toward areas with lower fertility rates and sharp declines 
in fertility rates in the urban areas). The results are shown in 
table 20. 
1/ In the first experiment the proporticin of the population which 
is urban rises only from 39.4 per cent in 1970 to 43.6 per cent 
at the end of the century. In. the special experiment it rises 
to 76.9 per cent at the end of the century. That is, there is 
a differential shift of fully one-third of the total population. 
/Table 20 
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In the first experiment there are only moderate changes to the 
end of the century. In Argentina there is an important increase in 
the relative importance' of 'the over 65-group; in Venezuela, and to 
a lesser extent in Brazil, there is a decline in the relative 
importance of children and .an offsetting increase in the relative 
importance of the adult age grbups; and in ElSalvador there is a 
small increase in the importance of teenager* and young adults .1/ 
With the continuing exception of Argentina, populations will remain 
very young if there is not much of a decline in fertility rates. 
In the second experiment. there is a much! greater shift in all 
countries, with the relative importance of children declining 
substantially and that of the adult age group0 increasing. But, 
Argentina apart, populations will remain quite'young even if there 
should be a sharp and sustained decline in fertility rates. At the 
end of the century less than one-quarter of the population in the 
other countries will be 40 or more years of age; whereas in Argentina 
one-third of the population was already in that category in 1970, and 
in an eventually stable, zero growth, populatioh the proportion would 
be about 45 per cent. 
Since the bulk of the age range at the endof the century 
represents those already born in 1970, and whOs'e numbers are therefore 
essentially unaffected by the assumptions of the projections, the 
differences between age structures in the first- and in the second 
experiments are due very largely to differences in the numbers of 
children and adolescents attheend of ,the century. These 
differences are very large and worth noting. With the.rapidly 
falling birth rates assumed in the second experiment the number of 
infants (the 0-4 age group) at the end of the century in Venezuela 
and El Salvador is not much more than half the number projected in 
1/ The changes are different in the several countries mostly 
because of differing past trends in the population parameters, 
the results of which are now working their way through the age 
structure. There are also some differences due to the extent 
of the decline in fertility rates assumed in the first 
experiment in the different countries. 
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the first experiment, and in Brazil it is less than two-thirds. The 
number of children (those 5-14) at the end of the century in the 
second experiment is only about two-thirds the number projected in 
the first experiment in Venezuela- and El- Salvador, and about three-. 
quarters in Brazil./ With the adult population more or less 
predertermined, it is these sharp possible variations in the number 
of children which account for the different age structures in the 
two experiments. 
There are already great differences in the age structures in 
different areas within each country, and large scale migration can 
further alter these differences. As it is mostly the young who 
migrate this will tend, over the period of the projection to reduce 
the relative importance of young adults in the areas from which 
migrants come {primarily the rural areas) and to increase the 
relative importance of the same group in the receiving areas. 
Different trends in fertility rates can of course cause the age 
structures to diverge further. The possible extent of such 
differences can be, shown by the. age structures at. the end of the 
century projected with the assumptions of great change in the_second 
experiment. Figures for selected areas in each countryae shown 
in table 21.  Too much emphasis cannot be placed_on these figures 
because of the way_in which migrationis calculated in the model,,  
but they do illustrate the striking extent of the divergencies 
which might arise. 
11 The differences are less in Brazil largely because of regional 
differences -in that country and the consequently somewhat 
different pattern of assumptions used in the experiments-. 
/Table 21 
- 224 ^ 
Table t 
AGE STRUCTURES IN 2000 AS PROJECTED iN'THE SECOND EXPERIMENT 
Venezuela 	El Salvador 	 Argentina 	 Brazil 
Age 	 Less 
North 	South 	South 	 Developed 
group Rural 	Urban 	Rural 	Urban 	 developed 
rural rural urban urban 
rural 
o-4 14.1 9.1 17.5 9.6 10.7 7.3 6.8 17.6 8.9 
5-14 26.7 20.8 28.6 21.6 21.5 16.2 14.0 32.8 17.0 
15-19 10.0 10.7 9.8 11.1 8.2 6.8 7.7 13.2 8.6 
20-39 27.4 34.4 24.7 35.7 21.6 22.8 31.7 21.2 35.8  
40-64 16.7 20.0 15.2 18.0 24.7 27.3 28.7 10.8 24.3 
65 and over 5.1 5.0 4.2 4.0 13.0 19.6 11.1 4.4 5.4 
In general the proportion of children- will be much higher in 
the rural areas and the proportion of active adults,: especially 
young adults, much lower, A special situation to note is the high 
proportion of older people in the rural South,of Argentina. A 
fairly mature .population structure has evolved in that region, and: 
continuing large scale migration will drain away much of the-ycrunger 
population, and older people, who tend to remain, will become an 
increasingly large proportion of the total. All of the figures shown 
illustrate the changes that could occur with the assumptions of 
extreme change of the second experiment; in the other simulations 
the divergencies between areas are less striking, but they are 
always substantial. 
There are several important implications of these potential 
changes in age structure. The first is that the relative size of 
the dependent population (those less than 15 and over 65) will 
generally decline somewhat, how much depending on trends in 
/fertility rates. 
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fertility rates. In Argentina thedependent population in 1970 was 
of the same relative importance as it would be in an eventually 
stable, zero growth, population (somewhat more than 36 per cent of 
the total), and this proportion will not change greatly. But in 
all of the other countries the proportion was much larger (nearly 
46 per cent in Brazil and around half in Venezuela and El Salvador), 
and can be expected to-decline, perhaps quite substantially. There 
are again marked differences from one .area to .anotherl with 
dependency ratios substantially higher in the rural areas and in 
the poorer regions. The likely range atfltheendof the century can 
be illustrated with the results of the first experiment (little 
change from the 1970:situation) and the third (substantial change, 
but less extreme than 	assumed in the second experiment), 
selected figures from which are shown in table 22. 
Table 22 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE DEPENDENT POPULATION 
(Percentage of total population) 
Country and area 1970 
2000 
Exp. I Exp. III 
Argentina: total 36.4 37.9 35.4 
North rural 49.o 47.6 45.7 
South urban 31.7 34.4 33.1 
Brazil: 	total 45.8 44.5 40.3 
Less developed rural 50.2 51.8 52.9 
Developed urban 39.4 35.8 32.8 
El Salvador: total 50.2 49.2 46.o 
Rural 51.8 51.8 50.8 
Urban 47.5 45.7 43.5 
Venezuela: total 49.2 44.4 41.2 
Rural 54.1 48.5 47.5 
Urban 47.1 43.4 40.2 
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In addition to the total it is .impOrtnt .to note the composition 
of this dependent population. Tn Argentina, in 1970 the over-65 group 
was already somewhat more than 7 per; cent of the entire population, 
and about one-fifth of the dependent population itself; and if 
fertility rates decline further these figures could rise to close 
to 11 per cent and to 30 per cent respectively at the end of the 
Century. The elderly population is thus,heginning to assume 
considerable importance in Argentina.1/ In the other countries 
however, the over-65 group was.only about3.,per centof,the 
population in 1970 (6 per cent to 7 per cent of the dependent 
population)1 and although its relative importance will rise it does 
not exceed 5 per cent of the population at the end of the century 
(less than 14 per cent of the dependent population) in any simulation. 
It will only be in the next century that the elderly group will 
become a major part of the dependent population in these countries, 
and in most of the rest of Latin America as well. 
The principal consequence of the generally large dependent 
population is simply that there aremore dependents in relation to 
the active population. EaCh member of the laboUr force will have a 
greater average number of dependents to support,.and.eo with any. 
given labour productivity level per capita incomes for the 
popilation as a-whOleare lower. This is a major factor in the 
relatively.  high. per capita income levels in Argentina, and as 
dependency ratios in the other countries decline this will tend 
to raise per capita incomes in those countries. This is the 
immediate way in which a decline in fertility rates can have an 
impact:.there are fewer children to support per member of the-'active 
population and so per capita incomes rise. 
There are also policy implications relating to the measures 
which will have to be taken to provide for the dependent population. 
1/ As a point of reference, in an eventually stable, zero growth, 
population the over-65 group would be about 15 per cent of the 
total, and well over 4o per cent of the dependent population. 
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In Argentina a major consideration Will be the provision of social 
services and health facilities for the elderly, but in the other 
countries it will very largely be provisien for children which is 
required. The major aspect here which falls in the social area 
relates to educational facilities, and the'most important issue is 
therefore how fast the primary school'age population is likely to 
increase. 
The 5 to 14 year age group can be used as an estimate of the 
primary school age ppopulation, and the figures presented earlier 
show that the relative importance of this group will decline in all 
countries - moderately even in the first experiment and much more 
if there is an important decline in fertility rates, This means 
that this age group will increase less rapidly than the population 
as a whole in the years ahead. At the national level the period of 
most rapid increase in the primary school age population has already 
passed in all of the countries analyzed so that, in the aggregate, 
the often severe pressures for school facilities experienced in the 
recent past can be expected to ease in the years ahead. But the 
extent of the easing varies greatly, and it is often the pressure 
in particular areas rather than the aggregate which is most important, 
so care must be used in interpreting such a sweeping, although still 
very important, generalization. In addition to the clear differences 
from one area to another there is often considerable uncertainty 
here, so that for purposes of educational planning trends will have 
to be closely followed if effective provisions are to be made. 
At one extreme, the rate of increase in the primary school age 
_ 
population in Argentina had already slowed to about 1 per cent per 
annum during` the1960s, and will slow somewhat further during the 
1970s. If fertility rates continue to decline this age group will 
then remain approximately constant from 1980 to the end.of.the. 
century, so that no further expansion of primary school facilities 
would be, required on. this score.. This would be a situation similar 
to that experienced in a number of the advanced industrial countries 
in recent years. But as the primary school age population is 
/quickly affected 
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quickly affected by trends in fertility'rates this introduces 
uncertainty, although less in Argentifia"•than elsewhere, and if there 
is no further important decline in fertility rates the schoolage' 
population will increase somewhat faster'again after 1980.1/ 
The primary school age population 'Will 'continue to increase 
much more rapidly in the other - countries:, 'and e. further important 
characteristic. to note is that the rate may fluctuate substantially. 
This can be illustrated by Tast and-,prrijec:ted-trends in Venezuela, 
figures'for which are shown in table 23. 
Table 23 
VENEZUELA: AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE IN THE PRIMARY 
SCHOOL AGE POPULATION 
(Percentage) 









1970-1980 1.9 1.8 
:1980-1990 • 3.4 2.8 
1990-2000 2.5 1.7 
In the first experiment (little change from the 1970 situation) 
the 5-14 year age group increases at the rate of 1.3 per cent 
per annum during the 1980s. and then, somewhat more slowly 




As shown, the peak was reached'during the second half of the 
1950s, when this age group increased at-the extremely rapid rate of 
5.7 per cent per annum. The rateAlas declined since, and will =drop 
sharply to less than 2 per cent per annum.: uring the 1970s., From 
that relatively low level it will rise eubstantially-during the 1980s, 
and again decline during the last decade of the century, the 
magnitude of the fluctuation depending on the trend of fertility 
rates.1/ 
The fluctuations in the rate. of increase in Venezuela have been, 
and will continue to be, very substantial, and pose important 
problems for the planning of required educational facilities:. and 
although less striking than in Venezuela the same factorsare 
evident in the other countries. As the probable increase in the 
primary school population.is of considerable: importancef it is.  
treated in some detail in the individual country analyses and reference 
can be made to those sections for further, discussion. 
In addition to the,variable,nature of the increase at the 
national level, there are great differences in the extent to which 
the increase, and, the need forprimary school facilities, is likely 
to be concentrated in-particular areas: and so the rate of increase 
is . also likely to vary greatly from one area to anotherAt one 
extreme, the rural primary school population in Argentina declined= 
substantially, during the 1960s, and if migration continues on a 
similar scale the decline will continue. There was also a:1 
significant decline in the rural 4eveloped area in 3razil and only 
a small increase in the rural areas: in Venezuela, so that continuing' 
migration will here too involve little or no increase.. In such 
circumstances no expansion of school places: is required, except 
perhaps.to improve:attendance ratios, and available funds can be" 
used entirely to raise standards. 
12 These fluctuations result from the nature of the underlying•
population parameters and from the way in which the transition 
to higher rates of population increase oddurred. Reference 
can be made to the Venezuelan analysis .for a more explicit 
discussion of the causes of the'fluctuations.' 
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At the other extreme, the cities must often clearly absorb the 
great bulk of the increase, and ratetApfincrease in some circumstances 
can be very high. To cite the most striking instances, the:urban 
primary school age population in Venezuela was increasing at a peak 
rate of close to 10 per cent per annuw during the late 1950s, when 
the rapid increase in this age group in the country as a whole 
coincided with the mass movement .to the cities. The rate then 
declined fairly rapidly from that peak, and, as the bulk of the 
population shift to the titiet]has already occurred, the increase in 
the urban primary school population in Venezuela-mill-An the future 
remain below 4 per cent.per'annum. Within that limit there will be 
important fluctuations from one period to another, and much will 
depend on the trend in fertility rates.. 
Rates of increase in:the urban areas of Brazil were also very 
high during the 1960s (for the decade as.a whole they ranged from 
5.5 per cent to 6.8 per cent per annum in the different regions of 
the country) and will remain quite high to the end of the century. 
But the peak rates of urban increase in Brazil, as in ,Venezuela, 
have passed, and the pressures for primary school facilities in the 
cities, ,which have often been very great.* can)e expected to-ease 
substantially in, the years ahead. 	the countries here considered 
the only urban area which could.well'experienge an important increase 
in the pressures:for primary schooling is that of El Salvador. In 
El Salvador the population is. still basically rural, and large scale 
migration to thecities could lead to.increasingly rapid rates of 
increase in the.urban primary school agepopulation. 
It is clear that.there is a good deal•of variation among the' 
different. areas,,and again, as this is of considerable importance, 
the possibilities have- been more,fully discussed in the individual 
country analyses. Here it is precisely that great variation- Which 
most needs to be emphasized. Both the existing situation and-the 
trend are'likely to be quite'different from one area to another, 
and there,is considerable room for uncertainty because of potsible 
changes in fertility rates and/Or migration flows. Adequate 
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educational planning will require a careful analysis of the conditions 
in the different areas of the country, and trends will need to be 
followed closely - they are unlikelY to be steady and can change 
relatively quickly for this age group. 
The other age group which is likely to change substantially in 
relativeithportance in most countries, and with implications that 
require noting, is the young adult group (those 20-39 years of age). 
Argentina is Again an exception, but in the other countries the 
young adult age group will increase in relative importance even if 
there is no substantial decline in fertility rates, and if there are 
larger declines the increase can be very substantial .2/ The number 
of young adults will therefore be increasing more rapidly than the 
population as a whole in most countries, and perhaps much more 
rapidly. This reflects the fact that the initial bulge, which began 
with the transition to higher rates of population growth, and which 
as noted above often resulted in very high rates of increase in the 
child population during the late 1950s and 1960s, is now beginning 
to enter the young adult age group; as a result this age group will 
expand rapidly in most countries until at least the last years of 
this century.2/ 
2.y In Argentina the decline in the relative importance of children 
tends to be offset primarily by an increase in, the relative 
importance of the elderly. If there is an important decline in 
fertility rates the relative importance of young adults will of 
Course increase,. but no more than that of the -older adult group. 
The situation is also somewhat different in Brazil. As in 
Venezuela and El Salvador, the relative importance of young 
adults will :rise, perhaps substantially; but in Brazil the 
40-64 year age group will increase approximately as much as 
young adults. 
The yrojected rates of increase in this age group tb the en 
the century in the different countries are as follows:. 
1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 
Exp,I Exp.III 
Argentina 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.6 
Brazil. 	' 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.4 
El Salvador 3.6 3.8 3.5 3.1 
Venezuela 4.2 3.8 2.8 2.3 
The rates are of course the same in all experiments until 1990. 
Only after that date do differing assumptions about fertility 
rates begin to affect this age group. 
/There is 
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There is again likely to be contiderable variation from one 
area to another within a country, particularly if there are important 
migration flows. As this group is• heairily affected, large scale 
migration can well result in an absolute fall in the number of youhg 
adults in some rural areas, with Offsetting large increasein the 
urban areas to which the migrants move.• Those experiments which 
assume large scale migration project rates- of increase of 5- per cent 
to 6 per cent per annum' during the fir8t half of the 30 year period 
in several of the urban areas. 
There are two major implications•of this rapid increase in the 
young adult population during the years to come. The first is that 
this is the age-group with the highest age specific fertility rates, 
so that a rapid increase in numbers will tend to mean a rapid increase 
in the number-of births, and hence a relatively high rate of growth 
for the population as a whole. So this aspect of the age structure 
is a •a-Ac factor in ensuring a rapid rate of, population'increase in 
most countries at least -to the end of the century''- —regardless of 
assumptions about fertility'rates. 
The impact is clear- from the simulation experiments; In the 
first experiment only a slow decline in fertility rates'is assumed, 
and this is largely, or entirely, negated by the rapid increase in 
.7e 	 e 
the numbers of those in. the, fertile age. 	in. 	the rate 
of population increase rises Marginally during the 1975-1985 period 
and then declines slowly to the end of the century; in Brazil the rate 
remains practically constant'-throughout the period of the projections; 
, 
and in El Salvador the rate of population increase rises steadily to 
the end of the century in this experiment. At the Other extreme, 
even with the rather unrealistically large declines in fertility 
rates assumed in the second experiment, the projegted rates of 
population increase generally remain very high until the last decade 
of the century. 
The second major implication is that young adults tend to account 
for about half of the total labour force, so that the rapid expansion 
of this age group is a basic factor in the expected eXpansion of the 
/labour force 
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labour force itself. As labour force trends are a central concern 
of the study, this aspect is included in the more complete analysis 
in the following section. 
D. The Labour Force  
Projected IE2Pds 
The labour force in most of Latin America will increase rapidly 
at least to the end of the century, and the simulation experiments 
show clearly the certainty of this central conclusion; despite 
widely differing underlying assumptions the projections do not differ 
greatly from one experiment to another. A general impression of 
likely trends, and possible variations in those trends, can be 
given by comparing the projeotions of the first and of the second 
experiments, and the figures for these are shown in table 24.1/ 
Here, as in most other aspects relating to population, Argentina 
is clearly a case apart. The labour force in Argentina is likely to 
increase at rates ranging around 1 1/4 per cent per annum during the 
next several decades, and at the end of the century the total, labour 
force will be perhaps 50 per cent larger than it was in 1970. This 
rate of increase is higher than that characteristic of mostof-the.  
high income industrial countries, but it is closer to that type of 
situation than to the situation which will prevail in most:of.the 
rest of Latin America. 
1/ The first experiment assumes little change from the 1970 
situation, while the second experiment assumes great change. 
In addition to the different assumptions about population 
parameters which have been noted before, the first experiment 
assumes little change in labour participation rates, while the 
second assumes that in the urban areas these shift to the rates 
which prevailed in France in 1968. 
/Table 24 
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Table 24 
LABOUR FORCE TRENDS TO THE END OF THE CENTURY 
Argentina Brazil El Salvador Venezuela 
1.4 ' 	3.1 3.2 3.4 
1.2 3.0 3.6 3.6 
1.1 3.0 ,3.6 3.3 
1.2. 3.1 3.8 3.3 
1.6 3.4 3.6 3.9 
1.4 3.3 3.5 3.4 
1.2 3.0 3.2 3.1 
141 244 291 274 
153 262 277 278 
/In the 
Actual increase 
1965-1970 (per cent 
per annum) 
Projected increases 
in experiment I (per 





in experiment II 




Size of the labour 
force in 2000 




In the other countries analyzed :the rates of increase in the 
labour force will be 3 per cent per annum or higher in the decades 
ahead, and at the end of the century the total labour force is 
likely to be 2 1/2 to 2 3/4 times it. 	size. These rates of 
increase, and the total increase to which they give rise during the 
30 year period of the projection, are very high, and will pose a 
central challenge to the modern type industrial development process 
which •characterizes the economies of the region. Historically, 
during the period of industrialization in the now highly industrialized 
countries the labour force-was increasing much more slowly, and even 
so the employment problem was for long periods often critical. In 
much of Western Europe, for example, reasonably full integration 
has only been achieved during the post-World War II period, with the 
unusually favourable record of growth and structural Chahge which 
has characterized those years; and during that period the labour 
force was expanding at a rate of around 1 per cent per annum in most 
countries. It is clear that with the much higher rates of Increase 
which will'prevail inmost of Latin America the problem of adequate 
employment opportunities will remain a central issue at least until 
well into the next century4/ • 
It is - worth emphasizing the importance of these much higher 
rates of increase, and this can be done with a simple numerical 
exercise. The problem, insofar as it relates to employment, 
is to absorb the labour force into the modern, high productivity 
and high income areas of the economy. This has generally been 
associated with a shift in the structure of the labour force 
away from the low income agricultural sector and toward industrial 
and high income service activities. 	Very large shifts of this 
sort have occurred in many of the high income industrial 
countries during the post-World War II period, reflecting the 
strong and continuous industrial expansion. The chahge which 
has occurred in three countries considered to have achieved a 
great deal during this period are noted below. With respect 
to Western Europe, common reference has been made to the '- 
Italian and to the West German "economic miracles"; and Japan 
is commonly cited as the outstanding success story of this type. 
From 1955 to 1970, which was a period of very concentrated change 
in these countries (in Italy the gross product increased at 
close to 6 per cent per annum, in West Germany at slightly (cont.) 
, 	• 
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It has already been pointed out j411 the first chapter of this 
study that these very high rates of increase in most countries are 
a relatively recent phenomenon. The, labour force has probably been 
expanding with increasing rapidity throughout the post-World War II 
period, .a process may reach a climax during the .1970s, after which 
1/ (cont.) more than 6 per cent per annum, and in Japan at close 
to 11 per cent per annum), labour force structures shifted as 
follows: 
•••■••• ••••■••••••••=1IMMINi 	 ,..4.11■■•• •■■• •••• 	
Percentage distribution of the labour force 
Agriculture Industry Services 
Italy: 1955 42.2 32.1 25.7.  
1970 17.2 44.4 38.4 
Germany: 1955 22.8 43.9 33.3 
1970 8.7 47.0 44.3 
Japan: 1955 43.8 27:3 28.9 
1970.  19.8 34.1 46.1 
The shift out of agriculture and into the higher income 
industrial and services sectors is striking ineach country, 
But this must be viewed in relation to the rates o±- increase 
in the labour force which occurred during the 1955-19704briOd: 
in Italy there was a slight decline in the size of the labour 
force over the period, in West Germany it increased at•the-rate 
of 0.7 percent:per, 	annum, and in Japan at'i.5-per 'cent per 
annum?  
• 	 . 	 , 
These rates ape much lower than those which will prevail in Latin 
America.; If it is hypothetically arsumed.that the same process 
of expansion, and the same absorption of labour into the . 
industrial and services sectors should occur, but that the:total 
labour force would be expanding at a rate of 3 per cent per 
annum, with any residual increase remaining in the agricultural 
sector, the results would be very different. In the hypothesized 
cases of both Italy and West Germany. the proportion of the. labour 
force in agriculture would actually increase (to 46.9 per cent 
in Italy and to 35 per cent in.West Germany), while the 
proportion in industry and services would, decline - although 
of course:there would be the;sameabsolute increase as actually 
occurred in these sectors, -In the Japan type expansion the much 
higher growth rate would still produce a moderate decline in the 
proportionof.the. labour -force in agriculture to 35.8 per cent), 
while the proportion, in. the industrial sector would remain 
constant, and there would be an offsetting increase in the 
proportion:engaged in services. (Concl.) 
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rates of increase may decline somewhat in many countries. As the 
above figures show, this is not a'oertainty; somewhat different trends 
occur in the different countries, and with the use of different 
assumptions. But these fluctUationd'in'the rate of increase over 
the 30 year period of the projections are of secondary importance. 
The central conclusion must be that, at least to the end of the 
century, the labour force will continue to increase very rapidlY_in 
most countries. 
Before examining in more detail the different aspects and 
implications of these trends it is importantr to clarify the two major 
factors underlying the aggregate increasel And_the relative.. importance  
of each. The first factor is simply the increase. in the,population 
in the active age groups,in the_different countries.: As hasbeen 
discussed in some detail earlier, the-total population in most 
countries will increase,rapidlyove:r the period of. the projections, 
and the relative importance of the active, age. groups, as a whole is 
likely to rise substantially; that is, the populationln these groups 
is likely to increase a good deal faster than the population .as a 
whole in most countries. The young adult age group will increase 
particularly, rapidly, especially during the 1970s and 1980s, and as 
noted this age group alone tends to account for around.half of.the 
total labour force. The second:.. most important group in the labour 
1/. (Conc10 That is, with the rates _ 	 of increase in the labour' 
force to be expected in most of 1.,atin.America in the decades 
ahead, an -"economic miracle" of the Italian or West German 
variety would not improve the structure of the labour force; 
the proportion underemployed (for which the agricultural sector 
is here used as a proxy)- Would actually rise. ,Even a "miracle" 
of the Japanese variety would lead only to'a moderaterimprovement: 
if the labour force is increasing at 3 per:centAperiannum (and 
it will increase eVen'faster in some countries), the proportion 
underemployed would decline from 43.8 per dent't6:35A'per cent 
over a 15 year period, and there would be no increasej.n, the 
proportion in the industrial sector. 
As noted earlier, modern type industrial expansion does not 
readily absorb large quantities of labour. If the labour force 
is increasing rapidly, the absorption of the bulk,of ;the. labour 
force into the high productivity sectors is apt to require 
extremely high growth rates. In the past such shifts have been 
achieved in circumstances where the labour force was increasing 
at much more moderate rates. 
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force is that of more mature adults (those 40-64 years of age), and 
this group too can be expected to increase more rapidly than the 
population as a whole. This rapid inarease in the population in the 
active age groups will alone insure a very large expansion of the 
labour force, regardless of any reasonable assumptions which might 
be made about labour participation rates. 
Labour participation rates 
This is the second major underlying factor - possible changes 
in labour participation rates - and although it is clearly the less 
important of the two, can also have ,a substantial impact in some 
circumstances. The situation here.is,a good deal more complicated, 
and "reasonable" assumptions.to,be used in the projections are more 
difficult to define;:and it is of.considerableinterest to analyze 
the situation here in more detail.,  
Perhaps the first point to note is that labour participation 
rates at the national level. must be. used with caution as they combine 
the rural and urban population, and participation rates in the two 
areas are likely to, be quite, different. Male participation rates 
are generally significantly higher at all ages (but particularly 
for adolescents. and for older men) in the rural areas while -female 
participation. rateal by contrast, tend to be much lower in the rural 
areas. These differences probably reflect at least in, part,.  
conventions of registration in the rurel'areaa 7. nearly al•Allen regard 
themselves as members of the labour force while women do not 7 and 
so rural participation rates, and projected changes in those rates, 
are probably less sigilifidfiat from the present point of view. For 
this-reason, as well as the fact that greater importance is usually 
attached to—the:problem of urban employment, due to the general social 
and political context in which it occurs, the following discussion 
concentrates on labour participation rates in the urban areas. 
It is - female labour participation rates which present the 
greatest scope for possible` changeand so can most affect the increase 
in the labour-force. *Female labour participation,rates in:Latin America 
/are quite 
are quite 'low, even in the cities, and so if more women should enter 
the labour force, for whatever reason, the impact could possibly be 
. quite large. Even within Latin America however there is a good deal 
of variation from one country 'and region to another, and it is best 
to present the estimated age Specific participation rates in the 
different urban areas before proceeding; the rates prevailing in 
France in 1968 are shown for comparison`. 
Table 25 
ESTIMATED FEMALE LABOUR PARTICIPATION RATES" 
Age 
group 

















15-19 .350 .369 .222 .388  .311 .222 .313 
20-24 .419 .459 .281 	. .437 :40 .327 	' .623 
25-29 .338 ' .332-  .232 .327 .381 .305 .507 
30-44 .278 .254 • .212 .281 .329 .279 .424 
, ,, 45-49.  .223 .212 .205 .238 .285 :236 .455 
50-514 .184 .163 .195 .189 .267 .203 • .453 
55-59 .148 .121 .181 .143 .229 . .170 .423 
60-64 .114 -  .087 .159 .095 .204 - 	' :140 .324 
6549 .087 .065 .124. .063 .169 .116 . .150 
70 + .052 .037 4666 .029 .114 .o64 .020 
1/ The French rates are for the country as a whole rather than for 
the urban area. These rates were used in the simulation 
experiments as a possible "target" tovard which rates might move. 
The French rates were chosen as they occur in ,a diversified, 
industrialized urban economy, where the social structure is 
perhaps closer to that of Latin America than in;:the:  case of some 
of the other high income economies of Western Europe. These 
rates therefore provide an indication of the direction in which 
labour participation rates might move as the industrialization 
process advanced in the region. As will be noted in the text 
however, there is a great deal of uncertainty in this area. 
/Participation rates 
- 24o - 
Participation rates for adolescents and for elderly women are 
often somewhat higher in the Latin American urban areas than in 
France; but for all of the rest of the age range they are much lower, 
so there is great scope for an increase in the number of working 
women in all of the countries analyzed.' How much of an increase 
might actually occur depends of course on the reasons for the 
present low participation rates and the extent to which anticipated 
changes might alter that situation: and this is very difficult to 
specify. One important reason for the relatively low proportion of 
working women in Latin America may simply be a lack of employment 
opportunities; to the extent that more and/or better opportunities 
become available, that alone might suffice to.increase the numbers 
„_. 
in the labour force. A comparison“ot labour participation rates in 
the different areas" does not.give-Mda
, 
 support to this hypothesis 
however. In Argentina, Per. exathge,TethaliPaitiOTPation rates are 
somewhat higher in the urban'South lib to the'age of 25; but for 
• 
women over 25 they are higher in the'urban Mirth - 	it is unlikely 
that there are greater oppOrtunities in the North than in the South. 
Further, for the female population as a whole the highest rates occur 
in El Salvador, where income levels are lower and opportunities 
probably legs attractive than in most of the 'other urban areas 
analyzed. The oppoSite ec- Ofibmic motive might even be argued to 
explain such comparisons; that is, women tend to wcia' primarily from 
necessity. But this hypothebis in its turn is contradicted by the 
fact that; up to the age of 50, the lowest rates occur in the urban 
less developed area of Brazil;  where income levels are lower than 
in most other urban areas and so the pressure to work presumably 
greater. 
Both of these factors, plus many others, probably _have a part 
in the determination of female participation rateS. The fairly 
•., 
clear conclusion that follows from an examination ,of participation 
rates in different countries is that these are to a major extent a 
reflection of the entire, and quite specific, socio-cultural 
/environment. As 
Age 	 t 
group 1966 
' 
15-19 	 .073 







55-59 f 	 ' 
6o-65 I ' 
..017  
65 	p 
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environment. As such they may vary widely from one urban area, to 
another, and it is unlikely that any simplified set of economic'or 
other factors can satisfactorily explain these differences or 
predict future trends.1/ 
2,/ This can be even more graphically illustrated by.noting female 
participation' rates in countries outside Latin America, where 
extreme variations can be found. A'number of these, admittedly 
picked to show divergencies,, follow (the figure are taken from 
the ILO Labour Statistics /earbook). 
FEMALE LABOUR PARTICIPATION RATES 














.323 .392 .493 .478 .298 .336 
.327 .614 .556 .675  :1.434 .626 
.314' .65o .252 .587 .348 .677 
.309  .739 .23o .561 .279 .676 
.348 .779 .231 .554 .349  .642 
.355 .790 .214 .505 .351 .589 
.351 .755 .183  .410 .320 .494 
.339 
.. 	. 
.711 .126 .261 .245 .292 
.244 .475 .028 .053 .056 .036 
ThetirSt three- countries are.all low income countries in 
Africia yet £etaleTparticipation rates run th:e entire range 
from extremely low in Egyptthrough moderate,in Mozambique to 
very high in:Ghana. 'The-Netherlands and benmarkare both high 
income industrialized countries PI- NOrthern Europe, yet rates 
are much higher in the latter (except for adolesCents). And 
although the last two are both Scandinavian countriest female 
participation rates are much higher in Finland.-Differences 
in statistical. methods are no doubt part of_the problemt but 
much more 	involved. As states in the text, it seems clear 
that female: labour participation rates are the'- result Of a 
large number, of factors, many of which are specific to. the 
particular PoUntry or area concerned. Even within a' given 
area the situation can change substantially in fairly short 
periods of time;  this is clear from the substantial increases 
in female participation rates which have occurred in a number 
of the high income industrial countries in recent years. 
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Viewed in these terms the general structure of female participation 
rates in Latin America is worth noting. In all' of the countries 
analyzed participation rates are highest for very young women (the 
peak is for the 20-24 year age group), and then decline quite 
rapidly after the age of 30; although there are again important 
differences in both levels and structure from one area to another. 
This general structure suggests, that the great bulk of women view 
work outside the home not as a career, but'rather as a transitory 
phase, prior to marriage, or the formation of a family, or perhaps 
until the male head of the family is more firmly established. It 
may also be linked to the type of activities open to women; these 
may be mostly casual, unskilled positions offering little incentive 
to the formation of a longer term, career oriented outlook. 
These .are clearly broad socio-cultural aspects of a society, 
and changes are difficult to project and will not necessarily be 
closely linked to economic, or any other limited set of variables. 
About all that can definitely be said is that if the role of women 
in societyl and their attitude to work outside the home should change, 
there could be a very large increase in the number of women in the 
labour force. The solution. to this difficulty, insofar as the 
simulation experiments araconcerned„ has been, as already noted, 
to select the 1968 French participation rates as a possible "target". 
To the extent the general environment changes, participation rates' 
might move part or all of the way to those levels, and :this is the 
sort of assumption used in the experiments. It must be kept in 
mind however that such assumptions are to a considerable extent 
arbitrary. 
The situation with respect td'male labour participation rates 
is more straightforward, but here too the situation is worth noting; 
again for the reasons cited earlier only the urban rates are 




ESTLMATED MALE LABOUR .PARTICIPRtION RATES 
Age.  
group 
















10-14 .052 .061 .4131!.:r '475 ,.1o8 .080 .025 
15-19 .630 ., ...659 	,_ .485 .. - .487-. .602 .530 .528 
20-24 .876: :.684 	. .841 • .842 .878 .899 .826 
25-29 .857 .964. .926 .0207 041,.! .963 .951 
30-44 .970 ,.974 •937 .:941: .962' .972• .972 
45-49 .9146 .938 	. .894 ..':.896 .963 .964 .949 
50-54 .879 .841 .834,. ; .807. .054- 040 .914 
55-59 .738 	: .643 	.., .799 ...694. .935, .906 .825 
6o-64 .587 .,469 - .583 H•525.. -.90-- .790 .657 
65-69 .490 .357 .5148 .372 .868 .700 .300 
70 + .332 	• ..224 .266 .155 .682 , , 	.490 .100 
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By comparison with the French standard, male participation rates 
in Latin America tend to be relatit,ely high for the very young 
(teenagers and those in their early.20s).,and.for the elderly (those 
•65 and over), probably reflecting somewhat lower attendance ratios 
in secondary schooling and higher educational institutions, and less 
complete social security coverage.for the elderly. From the age of 
25 to the age of 50 participation rates tend, to be .quite similar to 
those in France; nearly all males are active members of the labour 
force during these most active adult years.. 
The divergence among countries' occurs, primarily, in the 50-65 year 
age groups: In El Salvador and Venezuela male participation rates 
remain relatively•high through this•age range - well above the 
French rates. In Argentina and Brazil by . contrast participation - 
rates decline rapidly through this•age range, particularly in the 
more developed regions in the two.ceuntriesv and are well below the 
French rates. This aspect is of some interest, particularly in the.' 
case of Argentina, and is discussed•further•in the individual country 
analyses; 
Overall, while there. is some.variation.in male labour participation 
rates among the .different .countries? this is much 100e_than in the 
case of female participation rates; and the general level is also 
more similar to that in France. If male participation rates should 
move toward the French "target" rates, as assumed in several of the 
simulation experiments, this would result in a significant decline 
in the male labour force in El Salvador and in Venezuela, but would 
involve little overall change in Argentina and Brazil. 
When considering possible changes in labour participation rates, 
and the impact this might have on the size of the labour force, it 
is best to consider all of these elements in combination; the total 
result may well be quite different from that obtained from the 
consideration of any single aspect in isolation. The major factor 
here is that the changes may produce opposing trends in the male and 
in the female labour force: participation rates for women could rise 
/substantially, and 
- 
substantially, and lead to a large increase in the number of women 
in the labour force, but male participation rates are more likely to 
decline and so partially offset such an increase. 
The potential overall importance of changes in participation 
rates can be seen from the projectiOns of the second experiment, 
where,it is assumed that by the 'end of the century urban participation 
rates move to the "target" 196.8 French'1evel, TheAotal impact of 
such a shift in the different urban areas- is shown ,by the figures in 
table 27. 
Table 27 
THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF CHANGES IN'LABOUR PARTICIPATION 
RATES ASSUMED IN THE SECOND SIMULATION EXPERIMENT 
Percentage change 
in the size of 
the labour force 
in 2000 dub to 
Percentage of the' 
increase in the 
labour force 
1970-2000 due to 
Argentina 
changes in labour 
participation rates 
changes in labour 
participation rates 
lOtal Male Febale. Male Female 
urban North 10.8 -4.o 57.1 23.7 -11.9 67.5 
urban South 14.4 -1.2 64.1 29.1 -3.5 65.6 
Brazil 
urban leSS 'ddVeloped 21.9 0.5 87.8 25.4 0.8 58.2 
urban ,developed 15.4 3.5 48.9 17.8 4.7 41.7 
El Salvador: 	Urban 2.7 -8.1 50.7 3.3 -11.2 27.9 
Venezuela: 	urban 8.7 -8.5 66.7 11.6 -14,5 50.0 
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As the figures show, such changes would be of some importance 
everywhere, but there is substantial variation from one urban area 
to another. The least impact would be in El Salvador. Urban female 
participation rates are.already relatively high in that country so 
that a shift to the French levelrwouldresult in only a 30 per cent 
increase in the size of the female labour force - substantial, but 
much less than in the other countries. rAr0 as the underlying active 
population will be increasing veryr,rapidlyi the assumed change in 
participation rates accounts for a more moderate 28 per cent of the 
total projected increase in the female labour force. Male participation 
rates are also quite high in El Salvador so that a shift to the 
French level would result in an important decline in the male labour 
force, although this would still•notbevery Urge in relation to 
the total projected increase to the end of the century. Finally, 
since the assumed change inlabour'partioillation rates produces 
opposing effects on the thaTe.and.t4e-temale labour forces, these 
largely offset each otherandthe'sie of labour force as a whole 
is little affected. The impact on the..female labour force would be 
much greater in Venezuela,: but oth6iise the situation is similar to 
that in El Salvador and, the overall effect would be quite moderate. 
In Argentina and-Brazil the relative impact would be 
considerably greater. A shift in participation rates to the French 
level would result'in 6,flarge increase in the female labour fordei 
and as male participation rates are lower there would be less of an 
offsetting decline in the male labour force (this would actually 
increase in Brazil). As a result the total labour force would 
increase substantially, and the shift in labour participation rates 
would account for an important part of the projected increase in 
both countries. 
All-of the above is with . th . assumption that labour participation 
rates shift fully to the French levels by the end of the century. To 
the extent they move in that direction, but to a lesser degree, as 
assumed in other simulation experiments, the impact is of course 
less but of the same sort discussed here. 
/The substantial 
-247._ 
The substantial variations from_one country to another mean 
that this is another aspect which will need to be closely followed 
to determine trends in any particular. area, It is clear :that concern 
will be primarily with female participation_rates, where there is 
great scope for changes in all countries,.with. consequent, large 
potential increases in the female labour, force, and where the factors 
which might bring about such change are likely to be quite specific 
to the area concerned. Possible changes in male. labour participation 
rates would have a much smaller impact on,the.male labour force, and 
are more uniform and probably easier to. predict. 
While possible changes in :labour participation rates are of 
considerable importance, it should again, be stressed that they are 
not the major factor in the rapid Trojected increase in the labour 
force. Even in the second experiment, where the impact of changing 
participation rates is greatest, this accounts for only from 3 per 
cent to 29 per cent of the total projected increases; in the other-
experiments the relative importance is less,. The predominant factor 
is the increase in the underlying population in the active age groups, 
and this alone will insure,a rapid increase, in the labour force to,  
the end of the century in most of the region., 
Trends in individual areas 
Turning away from the aggregate increase and its underlying 
causes, the next aspect to be considered is where that increase is 
likely to be concentrated, and the probable rates of increase which 
this implies in the different areas of the countries analyzed. Since 
the increase in the population in the active age groups is the 
major determinant of the increase in the labour force, the'earlier 
discussion'Of.general population shifts and rates of total 
population growth in the different areas provides the basic 
background (see above, pp. 205-208), and the discussion here should 
be read:in that context. 
In ruralrUrban terms, it-is clear that it is pritarily the 
cities which ill haveto- Cope with theproblem of adequate emPloyment 
/opportunities in 
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opportunities in the decades ahead. Even if there should be very 
little rural-urban migration the bulk of the increase will occur 
in the urban areas. In. the first experiment, where little migration 
is assumed, around 85 per cent of the-total increase in the labour 
force to, the end of the century nevertheless occurs in the urban areas 
in Argentina and.Venezuela, over two-thirds in the urban areas in 
Brazil, and only in El Salvador is the proportion slightly less than 
one-half.. If substantial migration isassumed nearly all of the 
increase will take place in the urban areas. ThUs, in the third 
experiment (substantial migration but less massive than in - the 
second experiment) less than one-sixth of theincrease in the labour 
force is in the rural area even in ELBalvador, and in the other 
countries the proportion is negligible. 
In general then, pressures,for additional employment opportunities 
are, to say the least, not likely to rise rapidly in the rural areas 
- but prevailing conditions vary greatly. , If large scale migration 
continues it is possible that labour shortages" could develope in 
some rural areas. The. principal such possibiiity.is the rural South 
in Argentina, but it might also occur in VenetUela orthe rural 
developed area in Brazil;_and'in any case employMentobportunities 
are not likely to be a serious problem in these areas,ik In rural 
areas such as in El Salvador or the rural less developed area in 
Brazil, however, the problem of employment is likely to remain of 
much greater importance. At least until 1970 the rural labourforce 
was still increasing very rapidly in El Salvador, and moderately,  
rapidly in the less developed region of Brazil, and if these rates 
of increase continue then of course pressures for employment will 
rise. Further even if large scale migration should sharply slow 
the increase 'in the decades ahead the pressures in such areas have 
1/ This does not mean that the problem of low rural incomes, or 
even rural poverty, will necessarily disappear in such areas. 
More or less adequate. employment opportunities should certainly 
improve these conditions, but their resolution is likely to 
depend on other factors outside'the scope of this study. 
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already been built up to the point where;they.are likelyto.remain 
severe for prolonged periods of time., But it is still true that, 
from the national point of view, the employment problem will not 
necessarily be concentrated in such areas. In El Salvador slightly 
over half of the increase in the labour force will occur in the 
rural areas if there is no significant migration, but to the extent 
that migration to the cities increases' the problem will shift to 
the urban area even here. And in Brazil less than one-fifth of the 
increase in the labour force will occur in the rural less developed 
area, even if there is little migration; to the extent migration 
occurs the proportion-willbe still smaller!'. 
Putting aside the strict rural-urban division and thinking 
instead in terms of low income areas,. there are two such areas in 
the countries analyzed which are likely to be of major concern in 
this respect. The first, as already noted, is the rural area in 
El Salvador. If migration trends continue in the pattern of the A s.  
recent past half of the increase in the labour force will be in the 
rural area, and even if migration :increases-A significant part ot.. 
the increase is likely to occur there for some years to come. The 
second is the less developed region in Brazil. If there is.:Jittle 
migration (as in the first experiment), well over 40 per cent of the 
total increase in the labour force in Brazil will occur in 
region; and even with large scale migration has in the third, 
experiment) well over 30 per cent of the increase will occur there. 
Most of the increase will be in the cities of the region, but the 
employment problem will nevertheless have to be dealt with to a 
major extent within the less developed region.of the country. 
But it is in the urban areas that the bulk of the increase will 
occur, and as unemployment here tends to be more open, and to exert 
greater social and political pressures, it is of particular interest 
to determine how rapidly the labour force is likely to expand in tile
urban areas.:  Much will depend on the extent of migration, and on 
how much labour participation rates change, and the:range Of 
possibilities Can be determined by examining the results of the first 
/experiment (little 
Urban Urban Urban  











experiment (little change from the ,1920 situation) and the third 
experiment (substantial change, but less extreme than the changes 
assumed in the second experiment). The relevant figures from these 
two experiments are shown in table 28. 
Tabla.28 	 • 
PROJECTED INCREASES IN-THal,ABOURFORCE IN 
SELECTED URBAN AREAS, 1970 TO 2000 
Size of the 
labour force 
in 2000 
(1970 = 100) 
Exp. I 187 134 265 285. 325 299 




(per cent  





1970-1980 2.2 1.1 3.3 3.8 4.o 4,.o 
1980-1990 2.1 0.9 3.3 3.4 4.o 3.6 





1970-1980 2.3 1.8 5-5 4.6 6.3 4.5 
1980-1990 2.2 1.9 4.o 4.2 5.2 3.9 
1990-2000 1.6 1.8 3-3 4.o 4.6 3.6 
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As the figures show, with the partial exception of Argentina, 
the labour force in the urban areas will expand greatly during the 
30 year period of the projections. With the assumptions of the 
first experiment the labour force in the urban South in Argentina 
will increase by only about one-third, an average rate of increase 
of 1 per cent per annum. With the assumptions of the third 
experiment the increase will be about twice as large; and in the 
urban North it will be significantly larger with either set of 
assumptions. Possible changes in labour participation rates are of 
considerable importance in the urban areas of Argentina, particularly 
in the South. In the urban South fertility rates have already 
declined to 'quite low levels and the rate of natural 'increase in 
the active age groups will be fairly low; and as close to two-thirds 
of the labour force was already concentrated in the area in 1970, 
migration can no longer have such a major: iMpact. Thus if there is 
no change in labour participation rates the increase in the labour 
force in the urban South,' with or withdut migration, will be fairly 
moderated./ and the PoSsibility of an important increase in the 
labour force as a result of rising partiCipation rates imparts an 
element of flexibility to'the labour forca'in that area this is 
of considerablaimpOrtance in Argentina and is analyzed further in 
the chapter covering that country. The major pOint to note here is 
that the increase 'in the urban labour force in Argentina will be 
fairly moderate whatever the assumptions made; again the situation 
is clearly differentiated from that in, most of the rest ofthe 
regipn. 
In all of the other urban areas considered the_increase in the  
labour force will be much Larger. Even if there is nd-large scale 
migration the labour force at the end of the century will,be.about 
2.1 In the third experiment, with its assumption of large scale 
Migration, the labour force would increase only,about 45 per 
cent to the end `of the century if labour participaticin rates 
rerhained constant The difference between thisJigurean4the 
63 per cent increase shown in the table reflects_  the impact of 
the assumed changes in participation rates. ' 
/2 2/3 times 
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2 2/3 times its 1970 size in the urban less developed area in Brazil, 
and the range is then upward to 3 1/4* times the 1970 size in the 
urban area in El Salvador. If there is substantial rural-urban 
migration, which has been the case in most 'regions in the past and 
is likely to be the case in the future, the increases will be still 
larger. In the projections of the third experiment the urban labour 
forces increase to around 3 1/2 times their 1970 size by the end of 
the century, except in El Salvador where the corresponding figure is 
4.8 times. As can be seen from the table, although there is some 
variation, such figures imply that to the end of the century urban 
labour forces can be expected to increase at rates ranging around 
4 per cent per annum. 
Such rates are extremely high, and virtually assure that the 
problem of urban employment will remain a central concern in most of 
the region at least until the end of the century./ Nevertheless, it 
is very important to 'note that, in one sense, the period of maximum 
pressure has already passed in many of the urban areas of Latin 
America. As the above table shows, in most of the urban areas the 
rate of increase in the latter 1960s was higher than. that projected 
for the decades ahead. Thus, insofar as the rate of increase in 
the labour force is an adequate measure of the pressure for employment 
that pressure can be expected to ease in many urban areas. 
1/ The difficulty of absorbing an increase of this magnitude in a 
modern, urban oriented pattern of industrial development can be 
illustrated by refering again to favourable post-World War II 
experiences (see the note on page 235). During the 1955 to 1970 
period, during which the gross product increased at an average 
rate of close to 11 per cent per annum, employment in the 
industrial sector in Japan increased at the rate of 3 per cent 
per annum, while employment in the industrial and services sectors 
combined increased at the rate of 3.9 per cent per annum. In 
Italy and West Germany, where the gross product increased at 
around 6 per cent per annum during the period,- employment in the 
industrial and services sectors combined increased at rates of 
2.4 per cent and 1.8 per cent per annum respectively. Such past 
experience indicates that modern type industrial expansion, even 
when very rapid, tends to be achieved with only moderate increases 
in employment in the high productivity sectors. 
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The reason for this slower rate of increase is again linked to 
the extent to which the -shift to the cities has already occurred 
and has been analyzed earlier in relation to the population as a 
whole. A more precise appreciation of the labour force situation. 
would require estimates which take into account past changes in urban 
labour participation rates, and these have not been made. With that 
margin of uncertainty, it is nevertheless clear that the period of 
most rapid expansion of the urban labour force in Venezuela occurred 
during the 1950s; although still very high the rate of increase has 
already fallen from that peak level and can be expected to decline 
Iurther in'the decades ahead. The same general pattern is 
characteristio of Argentina and Brazil, although the fluctuations, 
have been more moderate-, and,' in BraZil the period of most rapid_ 
increase was alao more recent.1/ 
The only urban area considered where the period of most rapid 
increase in the labour forCe'Clearly lies ahead is that in El Salvador. 
Rural-urban migration in that country has been limited, and has not 
been a majOr factOinthe increase in the urban labour force in 
recent years. EVen apart from migration the urban labour force will 
tend to increase somewhat faster in the years ahead due to the 
undeislying increase in the active age groups; and if substantial 
migration to the cities should begin the increase, as shown by the 
figures in the table, could be very rapid indeed. 
But although the rate of increase in the labour force is very 
important, it is not the only determinant of the pressure for 
employment opportunities. A further basic factor is the prevailing 
situation: that is, how Much pressure has already been built up. If, 
the past very rapid increase in the urban labour force has led to a 
siltation where a large'pOel of un- or under-employed has already, 
1/ There are also iniportant regional differences in these countries 
which are discussed in the respective country chapters. The 
period of most rapid increase has passed in most urban areas;- 
the possible exception is the urban less developed area of Brazil 
here the alreadyrapid increase could' speed up temporarily if' 
migration should increase. 
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been created, a slowing of the rate of -increase may mean only that 
the pool of under-employed will inCreaSY less rapidly; it will not 
necessarily shrink,. and so the pressure6'toremPlOyment will not 
necessarily lessen. *The nuMber -ofuneMpIoyed will decline only if 
new employment opportunities' are'CreatedYfaSter -thanthe labour 
force is increasing; and as'notel:Fthe Iabotir Three:Will continue to 
increase very rapidly -in most urban areat, nd thiS,Will be difficult 
to achieve. 
The magnitude of, existing presturet 'could well be the central 
consideration in such-circumstances, andthis is one of the critical 
aspects of the transition- from a basically- A-Ural tCa basically urban 
population structure. The'tranSition has tended.to be a rapid one 
in many countries, involving mast . Migration whibh fora 20 to 30 year 
period has produced a very rapid increase in'theUrban-labour force. 
If the urban economic structure-tat been sufficiently dynamic and 
flexible to cope with this infliikjalthough:severe,problems are 
unlikely to have been avoided even in the'best of tirCUMttances), 
the passing of the trantition, period will bringfloWerrates.Of 
increase and the urbanempIeytentproblem may bebode-more manageable. 
If, on the other hand,-•the•tranaitiOnal'influx tendYcl:tto Overwhelm -- 
the urban economy, the passing of the transition peridld-and: 6:-Siower' 
rate of increase in.the labour force may not, in itself, produce 
any fundamental change. It is likely that such conditions vary 
widely from one extreme to the other in the different urban areas of 
the region. 
Another aspect of the passing of the transitionalphase•is the 
effect this'will- have-on:the composition of the urban labour force. 
The very,highArates'of increase' in the recent past in manyurban. 
areas area reflection of the 'large influx of rural worker8. 
migrants have probably often accounted for one-third to one-half .af 
the increase in the urban labour force, and workers with a still 
limited experience of urban life have been an important proportion 
of the urban total.. As the period of transition passes migrants 
will be of declining-importance and the situation-will change. New 
/entrants in 
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entrants in the urban labour force will increasingly be dominated 
by those born, or at least having grown up, in the cities, and those 
with limited experience of urban lite will cease to be a substantial 
part of the total labour force. Expectations, and responses, may 
well change in these altered circumstances, and the pressures for 
adequate employment opportunities may take somewhat different forms. 
A final aspect of the growth of_the labour force worth noting 
is that this often differs significantly from the growth in the 
population as a whole. This results_to a large extent from changing 
age structures. As was pointed out earlier the transition to higher 
rates of population growth, which occurred in many countries in,the 
1940s, initially tended to cause a sharp increase in the number"of 
children, and: this bulge then began working its way gradually through 
the different age groups, with corresponding changes in the age,, 
structure. TO the extent that birth rates have begUn to decline 
this too produces changes. in the agestructure. In the individual 
areas within a country migration can cause further shifts as migration 
affects particularly the very young; and, finally, changes in labour 
participation rates can cause labour force trends to diverge from 
those of the population as a whole, particularly in the urban areas. 
The possible extent of such divergence can be quite substantial, as 
shown by the following illustrative results.from theprojections of 
the first and the third.simulation experiments. (See table.29.) 
In Argentina, for the country as: a whole the labour force 
increases marginally lessthan the total population in the first 
experiment.O.ittlP change from the 1970.situation4 but in all of 
the other countries: the labour force increases more even in this,  
experiment; in the.third experiment, with substantial assumed changes, 
the labour force increases more rapidly in all countries, and the 
divergence is much greater. In area terms there are also substantial 
divergencies, and considerable variation from one area to another; in 
particular, the labour force in some rural areas may increase less 
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less developed rural 196 191 98 96 
developed urban 263 285 279 350 
El Salvador: total 280 291 255 286 
urban 311 325 433 479 
Venezuela: total 248 274 229 282 
urban 273. 299. 262 323 
One implication of these divergencies is simply that population 
trends are often a. poor indicator for estimating changes, in the 
labour force. In most countries of the region the labour force 
probably increased significantly less rapidly than the population 
as a whole from around 1940 to the mid-1950si whereas since around 
1960 the relationship has been reversed. This sort of situation is 
important as it is one factor in the emerging employment problem. 
Comparative trends in the individual areas are more complex and 
there is even more need to keep such possible divergences in mind. 
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A further implication is that such divergencies reflect shifts 
in activity rates (total labour participation rates) 11/ and thus 
affect trends in per capita income levels - quite apart from the 
movement of productivity levels. There was a good deal of variation 
in activity rates in 1970, and as is clear from the above discussion 
they may change substantially in the decades ahead. Illustrative 
figures for 1970 and at the end of the century with the projections 
of the third simulation experiment are shown in table 30. 
Table 30 




of the third 
experiment) 
Argentina: total 37.9 42.6 
urban North 35.4 41.1 
urban South 39.1 43.8 
Brazil: 	total 31.7 38.4 
urban less developed 28.1 35.1 
urban developed 35'.o' 43.8 
El Salvador: total 31.6 35.5 
Venezuela: total 30,6 37.6. 
Argentina again stands apart, with the activity rate at a 
substantially higher level in 1970. The total figures for the 
other countries are quite similar, but within Brazil (as to a lesser 
extent within Argentina) there is a substantiii. difference along 
2.1  Activity rates, defined as the ratio of the total labour force 
to the total population," are of 'cOurse nothing more than a 
measure of the concept being discussed. 
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regional lines, with theactivity'rAte:in_the more developed region 
considerably higher.. These-highenactiVity'rates in Argentina (and 
in the more developed regions) mean that lidr capita incomes in those 
areas will be higher even apart frompossibIe Aifferences in 
productivity.:permamber of the labour force; :an :effect a given 
volume of production per worker ds shared udth'a smaller number of 
inactive persons., 
With the assumptions of the third experiment activity rates 
everywhere will rise substantially, and in general the disparities 
will be reduced. Part of the rise is the result of the very rapid 
increase in the labour force which will occur .in most of the region, 
and this poses the central problem of adequate employment opportunities. 
But a further major factor is the less rapid growth of the non-active 
population, and thia'aan'ben-16Portant factor in raising per 
capita incomes1 it is, in effect, the relatively immediate economic 
benefit that results from a decline in birth rates. 
Changes of this sort-can-.be of considerable importance. From 
around 1940 to the mid-1950s total activity rates probably fell 
significantly in many countries of the region, and this tended to'' 
hold down the increase in per capita incomes; that is, given the 
increase in productivity per member of the labour forcefwhith . ; 
occurred, there was a smaller'increase in per capita:incometh because 
the number of inactive persons per member of the labour force was 
rising. This trend probably began to be reversed around the mid-
1950s in much of the region, and is sharply opposite,with the 
projections of the third simulation. With the rise in activity rates 
shown, even if there was no increase in productivity per member of 
the labour force there would be an increase in .percapita incomes 
of well over ,20 per cent by the end of the century in Brazil and 
Venezuela, for example. 
Changes in the structure of the labour force 
In addition to the changes in size, there ar.e.likely to be 
major changes in the structure of the labour force in most of the 
/region. The 
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region. The most important of these is the continuing shift toward 
a predominantly urban labour force. The nature and significance of 
this shift has already been analyzed, above and it is only necessary 
here to emphasize the extent to which the labour force in the region 
is likely to be urban by the end of the century. In 1970 the great, 
bulk of the labour force was already, urban in the more highly 
developed regions of Argentina and Brazil and in Venezuela; but 
the majority of the total was still rural in the other regions of 
Brazil and in El Salvador. Even with the assumption of little change 
in the first experiment there. is a continuing rise in the relative 
importance of the urban labour. force everywhere, and if substantial 
migration continues the shift will of course be much greater. With 
the assumptions of the third experiment over two-thirds of the labour 
force will be urban at the end of the century even in El Salvador, 
and the proportion rises, to well over 90 per cent in the more 
developed regions of Argentina and Brazil. The figures for the 
different countries and regions are shown in table,31. 
Table 31 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF. THE LABOUR FORCE 




of exp. 	I) 
2000 
(projections 
of exp. 	III) 
Rural Urban 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Argentina: total 20.0 80.0 19.1 80.9 11.4 88.6 
North region 43.1 56.9 38.3 61.7 27.o 73.0 
South region 12.3 87.7 10.6 89.4 6.6 93.4 
Brazil: total 44.3 55.7 36.6 63.4 20.5 79.5 
less developed region 58.4 41.6 50.4 49.6 27.8 72.2 
developed region 14.9 85.1 11.5 88.5 5.9 94.1 
El Salvador: total 58.9 41.1 54.1 45.9 31.2 68.8 
Venezuela.: 	total:, 24.5 75.5 17.8 82.2 13.4 86.5 
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A second major change which is likely to occur is with respect 
to the structure of the labour force by sex. In 1970 males heavily 
dominated the labour force everywhere, but women can be expected to 
be of increasing relative importance in the decades ahead. To some 
extent this aspect of the changing structure of the labour force is 
linked to the rural-urban shift: since males are a larger proportion 
of the labour force in the rural areas (generally around 90 per cent 
of the total) than in the cities, the movement to the cities will 
itself tend to increase the relative importance of women in the 
labour force as a whole. But most of the prospective change here 
will occur to the extent that labour participation rates shift 
toward Western European levels. As was discussed earlier, such a 
shift could result in a very large increase in the number of working 
women, whereas the number of active males would be more likely to 
decline, and the structure of the labour force would change 
accordingly. The extent of the change which might occur is indicated 
in the projections of the third experiment, and these figures are 
shown in table 32. Males will continue to comprise around 70 per 
cent of the total labour force in the different countries - and 
around two-thirds in the urban areas - but the projected shift is 
nevertheless quite substantial. 
/Table 32 
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Table. 32 




of exp. 	III) 
Male. ,Female. 
Male Female 
Argentina: total 78.0 22.0 69.6 30.4 
North urban 73.2 26.8 67.6 32.4 
South urban 75.6 24.4, 67.5 32.5 
Brazil: total 79.5 20.5 70.6 29.4 
less developed urban 94.9 25.1 64.5 35.5 
developed urban , 71.6 28.4 67.8 32.2 
El Salvador: 	total. 83.0 17.0 72.9 27.1 
urban 70.6 29.4 65.4 34.6 
Venezuela: total 80.6 19.4 70.0 30.0 
urban 77.o 23.o 66.9 33.1 
Finaliyithere are also:likely to be important change6 in the 
age 'strUeture of the labour fbrce. In 1970 the labOur 'forbe 
Latin AMerica was a very youhg one: young adults accounted for abOUt 
half of the total, and teenagers a further 15-20 per cent. The 
proportion of older to younger workers tL:,refore tended to be rather 
low, and this can have important implications. On the one hand, 
aloung labour force has obvious advantages in that young workers 
are more flexible and more easily trained, and in a rapidly 
changing economic structure this can be of considerable importance. 
On the other hand the older but still fully active members of the 
labour force are likely to be more stable and more experienced, and 
as the economy becomes more complex - in particular as the industrial 
sector expands - these aspects are likely to be of increasing 
importance.'',In the high income industrial countries the balance 
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between the two large adultTage:groups is much more even (in France 
in 1968, for example, young adults were about:46 per cent of the 
labour force and the older active adult group 42 per cent) and this 
is likely to be a factor of some importance.' 
Within the region labour force age structures already varied 
considerably in 1970, and as noted are likely to change further in 
the years ahead. Within each country labour force age structures 
also vary a great deal, both by area and by sex, and the national 
aggregates, and changes in- those aggregates, may not be very 
meaningful without taking this into account. The figures for 1970 
for these different groupings are shown in table 33, along with 
the end of the century results from the projections Of the third 
experiment to give an idea of the sort of changes likely to occur. 
At the national level young adults are of similar relative 
importance in all countries; the differences tend to-be concentrated 
more in the relative importance of teenagers and the older active 
adult group. Again Argentina stands apart, here because the labour 
force is less young than in the other countries, with the proportion 
of more experienced older adult workers substantially-larger. In 
area terms the proportion of teenagers is higher in the rural labour 
force, and in general in the less highly developed regionst'but 
particular patterns of 'migration flows can have an important and 
varying impact on age structures. Finally, the female labour force 
is much younger than the male labour force, and a somewhat different 
age classification would make this contrast still greater; within 
the young adult labour force women tend to be much more heavily 
concentrated in the first half of the age range (those 20-29) than 
men. 
/Table 33 
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Table 33 
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF THE LABOUR FORCE, BY AGE GROUP, 
1970 
2000 (projeotions of 
experiment III) 
10-19. :20739 49-64:. 65 + -10-19 .20-39 4o-64 65 + 
Total labour force 
Argentina 13.7 , 474 34.7 3.9 .9.3 , 	48o : 	38:9. 3.8 
Brazil 19.8 50.5 27.1 2.6 .13.7 53t3 30.6 2.4 
El Salvador 23.1 47.8 24.9* 4.3 -17.5 53.9 25.8 2.8 
Venezuela 17.5 50.4 28.6 3.4 12.5 . 	55.7 . 29.3 2.5 
Rural labour foree 
Argentina, North 18.3 38.3 36.4 7.0 16.o 39.7 33.6 10.6 
Argentina, South 12.9 35.2 44.0 7.9 11.6 38.1 36.2 14.1 
Brazil, less developed 23.2 45.8 27.2 3.8 27.1 42.2 23.8 6.9 
Brazil, developed 24.0 46.9 26.2 2.9 21.1 45.9 28.2 4.8 
El Salvador 27.2 44.7 23.8 4.3 25.9 44.4 24.4 5.3 
Venezuela 22.9 41.3 30.1 5.7• 20.0 45.9 27.5 6.6 
Urban labour force 
Argentina, North 16.7 51.9 28.5 2.9 10.5 50.7 36.4 2.4 
Argentina, South 12.4 X50.0 34.5 3.1 8.0 48.8 40.2 2.8 
Brazil, less developed 17.5 51.8 28.3 2.4 13.3 55.3 29.7. 1.7 
Brazil, developed 15.3 55.6 27.7 1.4 9.2 55.9 33.5 1.5 
El Salvador 17.1 52.2 26.5 4.2 13.8 58.2 26.4 1.6 
Venezuela 15.8 53.4 28.2 2.6 11.3 57.3 29.6 1.8 
Male urban labour force. 
--n 	, 
Argentina, SOuth'' - - 10.6 49.0 37.0 3.4 
:,..: 
7.6 .48.4 14.1. .2.9 
Brazil, developed 1144 56.7 30.3 1.6 8.5 56.6 33.4 1.5 
El Salvador 15.8 51.5 28.0 4.7 13.2 574.  '270, ' 	1.8 
Venezuela 14.5 52.9 29.8 2.9 10.3 56.9 30.7 2.1 
Female urban labour force 
Argentina, South 18.0 53.1 • 26.7 2.2 9.3 49.7 38.3 2.7 
Brazil, developed 25.2 53.1 20.8 0.9 10.4 54.4 33.7 1.5 
El Salvador 20.4 54.0 22.7 2.9 14.8 59.1 24.8 1.3 
Venezuela 20.1 55.3 22.7 1.8 13.2 58.1 27.4 1.3 
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As the age structure of the.population as a whole gradually 
changes and, of greater importance in the decades immediately ahead, 
to the extent that labour participation rates shift toward Western 
European levels, labour force age structures:will themselves change. 
While in general the labour force cam be.expected to be somewhat 
more mature, and experienced, at the end of the'century, there are 
substantial differences in the extent and manner in which this is 
likely to occur, and although the.figures are shown in the table, 
several of the more important aspects can be specifically noted., 
With the projections of the third- experiment the changes in 
the rural areas are quite small, but too much importance should:not 
be attached to these figuresPerhais the most significant 'rural 
change is the consistent rise in the relative importance of the 
over-65 group in the laboUr force, caused by the draining away of 
the more active age groups through migration. 
The changes in all of the other groupings are much more 
substantial. The greatest shift occurs' in the structure of the urban 
female labour force, where the movement•of labour participation rates 
to closer to the Western European levels is the primary factor in 
producing a sharp decline in the•.relative importance of teenagers 
and an offsetting increase in the importance of active adults, 
usually concentrated in the more - matureadult group. At the end 
of the century the age structure•of the female labour force is 
much bore similar to that of the male labour force. The male labour 
force itself changes in a similar way, but the change is much 
smaller. And of course the shift in the total urban labour force, 
beinethe sum of the maleand female age structures, is also of 
the same sort. 
1/ As has been noted before labour participation rates in the rural 
areas are probably less meaningful than those in the urban areas, 
and little or no change in these rates has been assumed in the 
third, experiment. The changes shown in the table therefore 
reflect changes in the structure of the population as a whole, 
which in its turn can be greatly influenced by migration; and 
here too caution must be used because of the way in which 
migration is treated in the model. 
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But as the aggregation process continues a divergence between 
the different countries becomes increasingly clear, and at the 
total national level is quite marked. In all of the countries 
analyzed the labour force becomes somewhat more mature, but the 
sense in which this is true varies from one country to another. In 
Argentina the age structure of the labour force shifts clearly closer 
to that which characterized the high income industrial countries: 
the relative importance of teenagers declines, and this is offset 
by an increase in the relative importance of the more mature but 
still fully active adult age group - which was already of considerably 
greater relative importance than in the other countries considered. 
In the other countries there is also a decline in the relative 
importance of teenagers, but the offsetting gain is in the young 
adult age group to a much greater extent. In Brazil the relative 
increase is somewhat greater in the more experienced adult group, 
and so the shift is more similar to that in Argentina, but in 
El Salvador and in Venezuela the relative increase is heavily 
concentrated in the young adult group. 
As a consequence, at the end of the century Argentina is further 
removed from the other countries in this respect than was the case 
in 1970; the proportion of the labour force accounted for by 
teenagers and young adults is much lower in Argentina while the 
proportion of older, more experienced, workers is much higher than 
in the other countries. The basic explanation is again the earlier 
beginning of the population transition. It will be only in the 
next century that a similar evolution can lead to a corresponding 
maturing of the labour force in the other countries. 
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